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
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DANIEL MANIN,

AND

VENICE IN 1848-49.

BY

HENRI MARTIN,
AUTHOR OF "L'HISTOIRE DE FRANCE."

(TRANSLATED BY CHARLES MARTEL.)

WITH AN INTRODUCTION


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INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

ENGLISH DIPLOMACY RELATING TO VENICE.

So much of the work of Henri Martin is devoted to a discussion of the policy of England and France with respect to the Venetian struggle—so much has been said of the part taken by Lord Palmerston in relation to the proposals made by the Austrian Cabinet for English mediation, that I have thought a brief review of the leading incidents connected with it might not be unacceptable to the English reader. Such a review is indeed necessary to enable us perusing the statements of the French writers do full justice either to the intentions or the conduct of the British Cabinet.

The observations of Henri Martin relate to the transactions immediately affecting Venice, but it is impossible fully to understand these transac-

tions without some reference to the general question of the intervention of England in the affairs of the Italian peninsula during the eventful years which formed the early period of the pontificate of Pius the Ninth.

I have no desire to enter on any consideration of the general merits of that policy. In offering these introductory observations to the translation of a work which describes a most interesting episode in modern Italian history, I have no intention of involving myself in the discussion of any of those vexed questions which concern the internal affairs of Italy—still less have I any wish to be supposed to adopt all the opinions expressed either by Manin or his biographer. Those opinions must be their own interpreters. But everything that throws light on the true history of the period of 1848 must aid men in forming accurate judgment of the real value of these and all other opinions upon the present and future of Italian affairs.

It is a singular fact, and one which has been very singularly overlooked—that the first suggestion of an active interference, on the part of England, in the affairs of Italy, came from

the Pope. On the 16th of June, 1846, the Cardinal Mastei Ferretti was elected sovereign pontiff—a date destined to become memorable in the history of Europe. His first act of liberality—that of granting a general amnesty to political offenders—was accepted as the inauguration of a liberal policy which was to distinguish his reign. This step was taken by the Pope on the 16th of July. It was not accomplished without the strongest manifestations of displeasure on the part of the Austrian government, whose policy from 1815 had been to make the Pope the mere viceroy of imperial rule. A serious misunderstanding arose between the new Pope and Prince Metternich,* and efforts were made to induce the French government to desire their ambassador at Rome to support the representations which the Austrian minister made to his Holiness on the dangers of his contemplated policy, and the evil results of the amnesty he had already proclaimed.

Prince Metternich had long since avowed his determination not to tolerate in any Italian

* Despatch of Lord Cowley, July 17th, 1846.

state any system of government more liberal than that which Austria adopted in her Italian provinces.* The adoption of a liberal policy by the Pope excited at once his indignation and alarm. Every attempt was made to intimidate Pius. Moderate as were the reforms by which the benevolent pontiff designed to secure the blessings of good government to his people, they were sufficient to throw the despotic cabinet of Vienna into a rage. The grant of commercial reforms—of a modified liberty of the press—of municipal freedom and improved judicial institutions, were said to be intended by the Pope. These were projects which provoked an hostility to the Pontiff which was soon manifested in acts not very consistent with the reverence which it is sometimes said by those ignorant of history that the Austrian cabinet manifests to the Holy See.

The Pope resisted with mildness, but at the same time with spirit and with firmness, the attempts which were made to coerce him. His position was a peculiar one. The most influential persons around him were hostile to his

* Despatch of Prince Metternich. "The Italian Cause, its History, and its Hopes." London, 1859.

liberal views. The power of Austria was more than hostile—it was menacing. The Italian sovereigns, with the one exception of the King of Sardinia, were the mere serfs of Austrian despotism. Charles Albert had shewn but little inclination to favour the liberal opinions of his early youth. The crafty and insincere government of Louis Philippe secretly sympathised with the views of Austria, and, after a little affected hesitation, was perfectly known to have come to an understanding with the cabinet of Vienna. Wherever the Pope looked to governments or authority, he met with hostility more or less open, or, at best, with a hollow and not very reliable approval. His only real support was in the enthusiasm and affection with which everywhere throughout Europe the people greeted his name.

In spite of all these difficulties—difficulties the effect of which upon a sovereign placed in the position of the Pope it is impossible to over-rate—Pius the Ninth did not waver in the course of moderate but real reform on which he had entered. Without transgressing the limits I have laid down for myself, I may ven-

ture to say that it is impossible for any fair-minded man to rise from a perusal of the documents which form the materials for the history of the period, without feeling that full justice has never been done to the character and conduct of Pius the Ninth. The sincerity of his devotion to the cause of Italian freedom and independence, he proved by the steadfastness with which he adhered to his liberal determinations in spite of difficulties which would have deterred many a man of more apparent resolution. Not the least striking incident in his eventful history is the perfect candour with which, even in the wildest excitement of popular enthusiasm, he warned the thousands who hailed him with acclamations such as no Pope since Hildebrand or Alexander had received, that he would consent to nothing inconsistent with the essential principles of that sovereignty which he regarded himself as bound by a sacred obligation to maintain.

Those who view the question from the aspect of Italian patriotism, ought never to forget that the first impulse of Italian freedom was given by the hand of Pius the Ninth. It was from

Rome that Charles Albert learned to give free institutions to his subjects. In the course of little more than a year, the example and the authority of the Pope had detached all the Italian princes from the influence of Austrian control. Tuscany and Naples had obtained free institutions from their sovereigns, who granted them in defiance of the direct menaces of Austria. His adoption of a liberal policy was his own free act. His first reforms were not forced on him by popular commotion, or ungraciously conceded to avoid the peril of revolution. He was himself the originator of reform. He adhered to his popular determination in spite of all the difficulties by which he was surrounded—difficulties from the enumeration of which we must not omit the greatest of them all—that of finding his authority used even for projects to which he was entirely opposed.

The time, perhaps, is not yet come when an impartial hand can trace the history of the strange events which intervened between the accession of Cardinal Ferretti, on the 16th of June, 1846, to the pontificate, amid the rejoicings of the people, and the flight of Pope

Pius the Ninth from the Vatican on the 25th of November, 1848. When that history is written, Pius the Ninth will take a higher place among the enlightened friends of human liberty and the advocates of Italian freedom and independence, than many even of his present admirers would be disposed to award him.

The strongest proof, perhaps, of his sincerity in the course on which he had entered, is to be found in the fact already stated, that he appealed to the English cabinet for the moral support of England to sustain him against the adverse influences by which he was surrounded.

This appeal was indirectly made by the Papal Nuncio at Paris, in an interview with the Marquis of Normanby, then the British ambassador to the French court. Early in April 1847 Monsignore Fornani took occasion to speak to Lord Normanby of the great difficulties which his Holiness had to contend with in carrying out even those administrative reforms which he had already commenced; and he added, "that a more active moral support from England would be of the greatest service to the progress of

social improvement in Italy.”* In this communication both Lord Normanby and the Nuncio professed to speak without direct authority from their respective governments. Lord Normanby communicated the conversation to the English Cabinet. Lord Palmerston replied by desiring him to ascertain in what manner it was thought that the British government could give more active moral support to the Pope, and at the same time to assure the Nuncio that her majesty’s government had every desire to do whatever may possibly be in their power to comply with any wishes which the Pope may express.† In the interview which followed, the Nuncio suggested the establishment of direct diplomatic relations ;—he stated that he would at once write to Rome, but “ threw out, as his own suggestion, that if a minister could not be established at Rome, it would be, at least, a great support to his Holiness if some one in the confidence of her majesty’s government

* Lord Normanby’s Despatches, April 19th, 1847.

—Italian Correspondence, Part I., p. 35.

† Correspondence on Affairs of Italy, Session 1848, Part I., p. 36.

could have a temporary opportunity of personally communicating with the Pope and his ministers."*

On the 18th of September, 1847, Lord Minto, then a member of the Cabinet, was despatched to Italy on that mission which has given rise to so many and so hostile criticisms. His instructions directed him to proceed to Turin, to Florence, and to Rome. To the first two courts he bore regular credentials; at Rome, however, he was to appear "not as a minister plenipotentiary, but as a member of her majesty's government, fully informed of the views and sentiments and opinions of that government, and entirely possessing the confidence of his sovereign and his colleagues." He was authorised to assure the Pope "that England would not view with indifference any aggressions committed on the Roman territories with a view to prevent the Papal government from carrying into effect those internal improvements which it may think proper to adopt."†

Subsequently, Lord Minto was accredited to

* Italian Correspondence, Part I., p. 37.

† Ibid. pp. 124, 130.

the court of Naples. His stay in Italy extended to the month of April, 1848. Unquestionably his presence at the Italian courts contributed not a little to the adoption of a liberal policy by the sovereigns. It did much also to control and moderate the popular movements which took place. The influence of England was felt not only in encouraging the princes to disregard the threats which were addressed to them by Austria, but in inducing the people to refrain from impatient efforts at revolution, and to place confidence in the intentions of sovereigns, whom they believed to be, at least, in some degree, guided by the councils of the representative of England.

The position of Lord Minto was, undoubtedly, a strange one. His mission to Sardinia was described by Lord Palmerston as an extraordinary one, in which he was sent by her majesty "to treat with that court on matters of high interest with relation to the present state of Italy."* Apparently he was sent to offer advice to Italian sovereigns on the internal affairs of their own states. But the peculiar

* Italian Correspondence, p. 119; Lord Palmerston to Mr. Abercrombie.

state of Italy must be remembered before such a course is condemned. Every question that affected the tranquillity of Italy involved the general peace of Europe. England could not be indifferent to the events which seemed to present a hope of the establishment of free and liberal institutions in the peninsula. The Pope had set the example of a liberal policy, and at the period of Lord Minto's mission, two, at least, of the Italian sovereigns had shown an inclination to support him. But Austria had directly menaced both the Pope, the Duke of Tuscany, and the King of Sardinia, and an actual aggression on the Papal territory had provoked the strongest remonstrance from the Pope. The English minister cannot be blamed who believed it, under such circumstances, to be both the duty and the interest of his country to offer to those sovereigns the assurance of England's sympathy, and of England's support against any attempt to interfere with their independence, in regulating their own internal affairs. There were abundant indications that it was absolutely necessary that England should give some intimation that she was not prepared

to submit quietly to a repetition of the conferences of Laybach and Troppau.

To give moral support to Pius the Ninth, as the chief and guide of the Italian movement, was the great object of Lord Minto's mission. It was manifestly suggested by the communications made by Lord Normanby of his interviews with the Papal Nuncio.

During his residence at Rome the Cabinet of Lord John Russell made an effort to establish direct diplomatic relations with the Pope,

Immediately on the assembling of Parliament in February, 1848, a bill was introduced into the House of Lords to permit her majesty to establish with "the Sovereign of the Roman States" those diplomatic relations which the anti-Papal policy of the statutes of the revolution precluded any British sovereign from holding with the Pope. It was passed through the Upper House with unusual rapidity, and early in March was sent down to the Commons. ;

It was sent down with an alteration, which, in reality, entirely defeated the object of the bill.

Lord Eglinton proposed an amendment, by which her majesty was precluded from receiving



as the Roman ambassador any ecclesiastic of the church of Rome. This amendment was carried by the narrow majority of sixty-seven votes against sixty-four. It would have been hard to expect that any independent sovereign would enter on diplomatic relations with a court which dictated to him restrictions in the selection of the ambassadors he might choose ; but it was perfectly certain that the Pope would never consent to a rule which would compel him to choose a layman as his representative ; whatever, therefore, may be said in support of the amendment beyond all doubt, its adoption defeated the practical object of the measure. That measure has now been law for more than thirteen years, and no ambassador from England has yet been accredited to the Pope.

Ministers, it would seem, regarded the amendment as, at all events, detracting from the importance of the measure. They made no effort to press it through the Lower House. It was not until the month of August, at the very close of the session, that it was proceeded with. It was passed after an opposition in which the most zealous of the Roman Catholic members

combined with the partizans of extreme Protestant opinions. It was carried, however, in its mutilated shape by large majorities, and before the end of the session it received the royal assent, to remain a dead letter on the statute book until the time may, perhaps, arise when an English ministry may find it expedient to send a special ambassador on some extraordinary mission to the Pope. Such an ambassador probably the Papal government would not decline to receive.

The presence of an English minister at Rome during the events of 1848, would, in all probability, have materially influenced the progress of those events. Such a minister might, by the authority of his country, have moderated and restrained the popular excesses which finally alienated the Pope from his new policy :— he might have, at the same time, sustained against Austrian influence the independent judgment of the Pope. At a later period he might have obviated that misunderstanding which resulted from the act familiarly known as the Papal aggression, a misunderstanding which has done a mischief to the cause of liberal

policy in England, the effects of which will long and seriously be felt.

In reference to the subject of Lord Minto's mission in connexion with subsequent events, it must be remembered that early in 1848 a new Italian question arose, with which that mission was altogether unconnected. This was raised by the revolt of the Italian provinces of the Austrian Empire. It formed no object of the English diplomacy to interfere with the territorial possessions of Austria, as settled in 1815. It was, indeed, the object of that diplomacy, and of Lord Minto's mission, to encourage the Italian sovereigns to assert their independence by making such internal changes in their policy as they might think necessary, in spite of the remonstrances and the menaces which Austria assumed the right of addressing to them. But such a resistance to Austrian aggression on the rights of the Italian sovereigns was altogether different from a design of depriving Austria of those portions of Italy which had been ceded to her in 1815. Lord Minto was instructed to encourage the Pope, the Grand Duke, and the King of Sardinia in their refusal to submit to

Austrian dictation. But it never entered into the contemplation of the British cabinet to excite revolt in Venice or Milan.

Nevertheless, the antagonism between free institutions and the Austrian system of government was so strong, that to encourage the establishment of these institutions in any part of the peninsula was in reality an act adverse to Austrian rule. Metternich had discerned this when, in 1820, he declared that Austria would not tolerate representative institutions in any Italian state. It was the deep conviction of the same truth which, in 1847, dictated the angry remonstrances against the liberal policy of the Pope, the open threats of occupying Tuscany with Austrian troops, and the less distinct menaces which were conveyed to the Sardinian King.

The mission of Lord Minto had no reference to any disturbance of the territorial arrangements which gave certain provinces of Italy to Austria. He went to exert the moral influence of England with some of the Italian sovereigns, to encourage them in supporting the liberal policy of the Pope. That mission could only be

opposed to Austria so far as Austria attempted to exercise an influence beyond her own territories to coerce the movements of independent states.

The treaty of Vienna had distinctly guaranteed the sovereignty and independence of all the Italian states. But from 1815 the policy of Austria had been one of interference with the internal affairs of every Italian community. That interference had been avowedly exercised for the purpose of repressing every movement towards free institutions in any of them. The accession of Pius the Ninth had provoked demonstrations from the cabinet of Vienna, which plainly proved that Metternich was still prepared to adhere to his declared policy of preventing by force the establishment of representative institutions in any part of the peninsula.*

* In October, 1847, the Grand Duke of Tuscany expressed to Lord Minto his alarm at observing that while the British ministry had obtained from Prince Metternich a disclaimer of the intention of invading the Sardinian or Papal States, no such disclaimer had been made as to Tuscany, and he expressed the strongest anxiety of Her Majesty's government on the subject.—*Italian Correspondence*, part i. p. 123.—Lord Minto's Letter, October 29th, 1847.

At the very time when he described Italy as "a mere geographical designation," he declared that the imperial government could not tolerate free government in any of the states included in that designation, because it was inconsistent with the system adopted by Austria in her own Italian provinces.

This was not all—it was perfectly plain that Metternich, in 1848, was attempting to repeat the combinations which had crushed Italian freedom in 1821. The great military monarchies were to be united in a league for the suppression of free institutions. In January, 1848, the King of Naples announced to his people his intention to grant them a representative constitution. A collective note had been addressed to him by the representatives of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, protesting against the intended concession as inconsistent with the obligations by which the Neapolitan government was bound not to establish institutions at variance with the principles of government adopted in the Imperial provinces.*

* Despatch of Lord Napier, January 31st, 1848.—
Italian Correspondence, part ii. page 64.

Thus was it that up to the very hour of the outbreak of the revolt, Austria persisted in binding up with the question of her own territorial possessions—her right of interference with the other Italian states, by coercing them to adopt in their internal government the despotic principles of imperial rule.

Against these inordinate assumptions—assumptions at variance with the spirit, if not the very letter, of the treaty of Vienna—Lord Minto's mission of necessity exerted the influence of England—to encourage the Italian princes to resist them.

It needs no very deep acquaintance with the modern politics of Italy to see that since 1815, four questions, which may, in one sense, be termed distinct, have entered into all the agitations that have disturbed that country.

1st. The introduction of free and popular principles of government into the several Italian states.

2nd. The emancipation of those states from the control which Austria assumed to exercise over them.

3rd. The continuance of Austrian dominion

over those Italian provinces which had been annexed to the empire.

4thly, and lastly. The great question of the consolidation of all the fragments into which Italy had been broken, into one single national incorporation, which should represent one united Italy among the nations of the world.

The determined hostility of the Austrian cabinet to free institutions, their claims of virtual sovereignty and control over all Italian states, and their arrogant and insulting denial of any nationality in the Italinas, had made these questions, distinct as they were in their own nature, practically inseparable; and any sagacious politician who attempted to give free institutions to any Italian state, ought to have foreseen that unless Austria abandoned the unwise and tyrannical maxims which guided her Italian policy, the success of such an attempt would be the commencement of a struggle which would end in the driving of the Austrians from Italy, and the establishment, in some form or other, of one national Italian power.

This truth very soon became manifest in 1848. The menaces which Austria addressed to the

Pope and the Italian sovereigns who were disposed to follow his example, were met by revolts in Lombardy and Venice. These revolts were followed immediately by a movement which Lord Palmerston, in one of his dispatches, described as "a universal crusade" of the Italian sovereigns and people against Austrian power, while the general adoption of the tricolour flag of Italy, the symbol of Italian unity as well as of Italian independence, emphatically manifested the determination that Italy should be one nation.

To the movement which was directed against the territorial possessions of Austria, British diplomacy gave neither countenance nor support. The influence of England, so far as it was exerted, was exerted to discourage it. The strongest remonstrances were addressed by Lord Palmerston to the Neapolitan government against their sending troops to aid the cause of the insurgents in the North.* At a later period it was actually believed by the Neapolitan government that the British admiral was instructed to prevent by force the embarkation

* Despatch to Lord Napier, April 11th, 1848.—
Italian Correspondence, part ii. p. 307.

of the Neapolitan volunteers.* Every effort had in the same way been made with the Sardinian government to prevent their aggression on the Lombard territory of Austria.† The interference of Piedmont and Naples in support of the Lombard insurrection took place in opposition to the advice and the influence of England.

Once, however, that step was taken—England assumed no right of controlling the movements of independent states. Her ministers recognized no obligations which bound them to become the partizans of Austria in the strife. Henri Martin has fairly described the policy of the British minister as actuated at first by misgivings as to the possible movements of the republican government of France. To this he might have added the natural aversion of a British minister to any steps which might provoke a European war, and an apprehension of the ambition of revolutionary France; but most assuredly the French writer only does

* Lord Minto's Letter, April 6th, 1848.—Italian Correspondence, part ii. page 356.

† Despatch to Mr. Abercromby, March 27th, 1848.—Italian Correspondence, part ii. page 182.

justice to Lord Palmerston, when he represents him as not hostile to the cause of Italian nationality—endeavouring, indeed, as his duty was, as minister of England, to prevent a war against the Austrian possessions, but once that war was commenced in spite of him, not very unwilling to see the arms of Italy triumph.

Still it must be repeated that throughout the entire of the struggle, there is not one single act of the British minister, of which the most sensitive partizan of Austrian despotism can find just reason to complain. There are those to which the advocates of Italian independence might possibly take exception. The dissuasion against an invasion of the Austrian provinces, addressed to the kings of Sardinia and Naples, were justified in the general interests of peace. The same motive influenced, no doubt, the English cabinet at a later period, when the intervention of Lord Normanby at Paris prevented the despatch of a French expedition to Venice, at the very time when the Venetian patriot was so anxiously expecting its arrival.*

* See Vol. I, p. 231. Correspondence as to Affairs of Italy. Lord Normanby's Dispatch, July 25th, 1848.

In the early part of 1848, the apparent union of all the Italian princes, and the military successes of Charles Albert, alarmed the Austrian government. In their despair of being able to retain any part of their Italian dominions by force, the ministers of the Emperor implored the mediation of England. In the month of May, Baron Hummelauer was dispatched on a special mission to London, to request the British government to assume the office of endeavouring to make terms between the Emperor of Austria and the revolted provinces. On the 23rd of May, he addressed to Lord Palmerston a letter, in which he stated the willingness of his government to give a separate administration to the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom. The English minister was requested, in the character of mediator, to propose these terms to the Lombards.

After a personal interview with Lord Palmerston, Baron Hummelauer very materially modified this proposal. On the 24th of May he placed in the hands of the Foreign Secretary a memorandum, in which he expressed the readiness of his government to give up Lombardy and leave

the Lombards free either to form a separate state or to attach themselves to any existing Italian state—and to concede to the Venetian provinces the grant of a separate administration and a national army under one of the Imperial Archdukes as Viceroy.

This transaction, to some extent, both in France and in this country, has been made the subject of observation, which assumes that these offers were in fact rejected by the British Cabinet, and that an opportunity was thus lost of settling the Italian question upon a basis which would have secured tranquillity and peace.*

Such observations are founded on a total misapprehension of the character of the proposal and of the real state of affairs. The British government were not asked either to accept or reject any offers of Austria. They had no power to do either the one or the other. The decision upon the Austrian proposal rested with the provisional governments of Milan and Venice. What was asked of Lord Palmerston was, that

* This charge against Lord Palmerston, made more than once in the House of Commons, is repeated in the preface to the last edition of Mr. Whiteside's Italy.

he should be the medium, as the representative of the English government, of conveying these proposals of peace from the Imperial Cabinet to the revolted provinces. All that was asked—all that could be asked of the English government—was to intervene in a strictly mediatorial capacity, and endeavour, as a mutual friend, to effect an arrangement on the basis of the terms which Austria declared herself ready to concede.

Upon the 3rd of June the English Cabinet declined to intervene with the authority proposed by Baron Hummelauer. They did so only on the ground that it would be useless for the British government to accept the offer of mediators unless they could propose terms which had a reasonable chance of being accepted. In the opinion of the English Cabinet there was no hope of inducing the revolted provinces to agree to the proposals which Baron Hummelauer had requested them to make. If, however, the Austrian government were ready to yield the city of Venice and a certain portion of the Venetian territory, the English Cabinet were ready then to intervene and endeavour to effect an arrangement of territorial boundaries and financial pro-

visions, in which Austrian interests would be adequately protected.

It needs but a glance at the state of affairs as it then existed to convince any one that it was impossible for the English Cabinet to give any other reply. Proposals like those of Baron Hummelauer, if made either to the Lombards or the Venetians, would have been scornfully rejected. They would infallibly have met with the same fate at Turin, although it is a mistake to suppose that it was to Charles Albert they were to be addressed. A provisional government was then in possession of Lombardy, and it was with this government that Baron Hummelauer asked England to treat. The Cabinet of Vienna had distinctly and positively refused to recognize Charles Albert as authorized to represent Northern Italy in negotiation. But of the decision of Charles Albert no doubt could be entertained. A short time before Baron Hummelauer's proposal, the English minister at Turin had informed his government that Charles Albert had declared that his honour was pledged not to enter on any negotiation until the Austrian troops had evacuated Italy. Even if

he wished, he dared not have surrendered Venice against the will of the provisional government at Milan. But it was not with him, but with that government and with the Venetian dictatorship that the determination would have rested. The pages of Henri Martin abundantly assure us of the manner in which the proposal to return under the Austrian yoke would have been received in "the city of the sea." But even the Lombards would never have consented to abandon their Venetian brethren to their fate ; they would have felt probably, that their own freedom was insecure while Austria retained possession of a province from which her armies could at any time command the Lombard plains.

In May, 1848, the entertaining of a proposal to give up Venice to Austria would have been treated everywhere in Italy as an act of treason to the Italian cause. The power which would have conveyed such a proposal would have been branded as the deceitful partizan of Austrian despotism, and England would have lost whatever influence or character she possessed in Italian affairs.

So far, then, from premitting an oppor-

tunity of settling the Italian question, the English minister who refused to accept the office of a mediator, in which his power would have been limited to urging Baron Hummelauer's proposal—escaped by that refusal a position in which he would have been the medium of conveying an offer which was sure to meet with an ignominious rejection—a position in which English influence would have been destroyed, and the English character disgraced. It was not possible for Lord Palmerston to obtain an acceptance of the Austrian proposal—it would have been possible for him to have compromised his country and his sovereign by being a party to it.

The despatches in which Lord Palmerston conveyed to the Austrian government the reply of the British Cabinet to Baron Hummelauer's request, may be studied as models of cautious, and at the same time truthful, diplomatic language. The refusal of the British government to intervene was rested on the ground that, "however reasonable the proposal might be in itself, things had now gone too far to allow of there being any reasonable chance of its being

accepted by the Venetians, or that it could be brought about by any means except absolute military conquest."

"Her Majesty's government, therefore, would be unwilling to enter upon a negotiation which, in their opinion, offered no prospect of success, and to make a proposal which they feel confident beforehand that one of the parties would positively refuse to accept."*

At the same time, as he pointed out on a subsequent occasion,† he took care to state that the British government decided only what they

* Despatch of Lord Palmerston to Baron Hummélauer, June 3rd, 1848.—Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy, part ii. p. 531.

† Despatch of Lord Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby, July 12th, 1848.—Italian Correspondence, part iii. page 30.

"There was nothing in all this which bore in any degree the character of a decision as to what Austria should do—it was, indeed, a decision as to what Her Majesty's government would do, that is to say, it was a decision by Her Majesty's government not to mix themselves up with matters with which Great Britain has no direct concern, unless they were empowered by Austria to do so upon conditions which might afford a reasonable prospect that negotiations might end in peace."

themselves ought to do, and not what that of Austria should do. "It was for the Austrian government to consider what the chances might be, that a prolongation of the war would lead to the reconquest and to the secure and useful retention of the Venetian province. Upon this point it would be presumptuous in Her Majesty's government to offer an opinion."

No words could more clearly and distinctly state the ground taken by the British Cabinet. They refused to act as mediators unless they could convey proposals which they thought might possibly be accepted. To convey proposals which they knew beforehand would be rejected, would be in effect to make themselves partizans of Austria. The wisdom of this decision is proved by the fact, that almost simultaneously with the receipt of Lord Palmerston's reply, the Austrian government received from the provisional government of Milan a prompt and unceremonious rejection of a similar proposal, addressed directly to themselves. This rejection took place without the slightest knowledge of the communications that had passed between the Cabinets of Vienna and London.

The course adopted by the English ministry was the only one open to them even on the assumption that Baron Hummelauer's proposal would have effected a desirable arrangement. The answer was conclusive that it was impracticable. It may, however, be permitted to those who, not bound by any official conventionalities, can look at these questions solely in the light of humanity and justice, to deny that such an arrangement, even if practicable, was one which any British minister ought to have proposed. Venice was then in arms to assert her independence. Every Italian state, without exception, had joined in the national crusade. The Austrian authorities at Trieste were imploring the protection of the British navy against the Neapolitan squadron which swept the Adriatic with the flag of Italian independence. The Sardinian and Venetian fleets were cruising together off the lagoons. The Austrians had been actually expelled from the Venetian territory. What would have been said of the British minister, who, under such circumstances, had proposed to the men, whose heroism is recorded in these pages, that they should return under

the dominion of the oppressors whom they had driven away—who would have urged on the Italians to permit the German, in keeping Venice and the quadrilateral, still to retain his iron grasp upon Italy ?

The English minister, as we have seen, refused to be the medium of conveying such a proposal, solely on the unanswerable ground that there was not the slightest chance of its being accepted. When the Cabinet of Vienna declined to make the further concessions which the English government suggested, that government had nothing more to do. Lord Palmerston pointed out that the fortune of war must determine the question, and that “ the part which naturally belonged to the British Government was to remain spectator of events until invited by the contending parties to interpose by good offices with a view to an amicable arrangement.”*

A short time afterwards, Austria, by one of those miraculous recoveries which have often marked her history, began to retrieve her position in Italy. The capitulation of Durando

* Despatch to Lord Ponsonby, July 17th.—Correspondence, part iii. p. 44.

at Vicenza in the middle of June, first turned the tide of victory in her favour, and success attended her arms until on the 9th of August Charles Albert was compelled to abandon Milan, and conclude an armistice with the Austrian general.

French intervention seemed then the only hope for the patriots; and of French intervention the British government entertained the strongest dislike. It must be confessed that it was principally by the exertions of Lord Normanby at Paris that General Cavaignac, then at the head of the French republic, was restrained from sending aid to the Italians. Lord Normanby's effort would not have been successful if the jealousy of the English cabinet had not been shared by that of Turin. Nevertheless, there were times when France was on the very point of active interference, if it had not been for the interposition of the English ambassador.

On the last day of July, 1848, Lord Normanby had an interview with General Cavaignac, in which the latter informed him of serious reverses of the Sardinian arms, and of an

expected application by Charles Albert for the assistance of France; and stated, at the same time, that no government established in France would be able long to resist the demand for armed intervention in Italy. Lord Normanby proposed, as a means of avoiding this, the project of a joint mediation of France and England between the Emperor of Austria and the Sardinian King.*

At the very same time the English minister at Turin was urging on Charles Albert the necessity of coming to terms with the Austrians.†

M. Ricci, the special envoy sent from Turin to Paris with authority in the last extremity formally to solicit the intervention of France, strongly urged on Lord Normanby that France and England should undertake a joint mediation, and actually delayed his negotiations with the French Government for assistance to give time for England to adopt such a course.‡

* Despatch of Lord Normanby, August 1.—Correspondence, part iii. p. 29.

† Despatch of Mr. Abercromby, July 29th.—Correspondence, part iii. p. 85.

‡ “M. Ricci urged very much that England should use her moral influence, in connection with France, to

And, finally, in an interview with the Sardinian ambassador, Lord Palmerston urged on Count Revel the propriety of accepting the joint mediation of England and France. In this interview Lord Palmerston distinctly avowed that which had never, indeed, been concealed—"that England certainly wished to see Northern Italy united in one state: but that," he added, "it was necessary to consider how far this was practicable."*

come to some pacific settlement of the Italian question, the first step of which, of course, must be an armistice, which would leave the contending parties in their then existing condition. I told M. Ricci that I had no means of knowing how far her Majesty's government might be disposed to undertake such a task; but, if at all, it should be done before there had been any specific demand of assistance on the part of the government of Turin to the French republic. M. Ricci said he could obtain a short delay by arranging the conditions with the French government of an intervention, in case the eventuality should arise."—Despatch of Lord Normanby, August 2nd, 1848. Correspondence, part iii. p. 58.

* Memorandum of conversation between Viscount Palmerston and Count Revel.—Correspondence, part iii. p. 94.

The French government, according to Lord Normanby's representations, was as unwilling as the English that a French army should cross the Alps—but General Cavaignac dreaded an expression of popular opinion, which might force him to the step. The cabinet of Turin resorted to French intervention only as a measure of the last necessity. All parties equally desired to avoid it. On the fifth of August, Lord Normanby wrote to his own government, urging the necessity of instant action, if the dreaded intervention of France was to be averted. On the 7th, the English cabinet, in reply, desired him to communicate to the French government a proposal of the terms of a joint mediation; and on the 10th this proposal was substantially adopted by France.

The basis of the proposal to be made to Austria was to be the memorandum of Baron Hummerlauer presented to Lord Palmerston in the preceding May.

While negotiation was thus proceeding at Paris, Radetzky, in Northern Italy, had been achieving a series of rapid and brilliant victories, which placed all Lombardy at his feet.

On the 9th of August, Charles Albert abandoned Milan; and an armistice was signed, which, during its continuance, bound the King of Sardinia to attempt no interference beyond his own dominions.

Venice remained the solitary exception to the complete restoration of Austrian rule.

In the mean time the Austrian army, under General Welden, had entered the Legations. A proclamation was issued by their commander, in which all the most extravagant pretensions of Austrian dominion over Italy were revived. The entrance of the Austrian troops was followed by a protest from the Pope against this violation of his territory, against which he appealed, not only to divine justice, "but to the protection of all friendly states."

The position of affairs was materially altered by the successes achieved in Northern Italy by the Austrian troops. Of that change Austria had the full right to claim the advantage. But there still remained behind the possible intervention of France; and it was very plainly intimated to the cabinet of Vienna, that unless an assent were speedily given to the proposed

mediation, that intervention would not be long delayed.

The history of diplomacy contains nothing like the conduct of Austria in relation to the proffered mediation. Under one pretence or another, her ministers succeeded in baffling all the efforts of the French and English cabinets to obtain a decisive answer to the proposals. Pressed repeatedly for an immediate reply, they found excuse after excuse for an evasion of the demand. At first it was the absence of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs from Vienna that prevented the reply. When he did return, the answer was that Austria had been invited by the King of Sardinia to open direct negotiations, without the intervention of any mediating power. When this statement was absolutely proved to be false, and when France plainly threatened hostilities, Austria accepted the mediation, reserving, however, for future discussion the basis upon which it was to proceed. This strange acceptance took place in September; and the following March found nothing really done towards entering on the negotiation. By a series of manœuvres which might

be termed consummate in their skill, if their object had not been so plain, Austria contrived to defeat the combined determination of England and France. When the negotiation was at last positively fixed to commence at Brussels, and the Imperial plenipotentiary absolutely named, Count Colloredo—the personage selected was sent on a mission to London, instead of proceeding to his post. Some expressions of the Sardinian King, in opening his parliament, supplied the pretext for a demand of explanations designed only to constitute a new delay ; and, at last, the rash step of Charles Albert, in terminating the armistice, and renewing the war, on the 12th of March, put an end to all negotiation, and left the issue of the Italian question to be determined on the fatal field of Novara.

Early in August, 1848, the prompt interference of France had only been averted by the English proposal of a joint mediation ; and, repeatedly, as delay after delay tried the patience of the most cautious diplomatist, it required all the influence of Lord Normanby to prevent the immediate despatch of French troops to Venice.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The conduct of the English ministry was marked by a forbearance to Austria, which would appear to have been subsequently matter of regret. It has been said that the agents of the Imperial government availed themselves of the delay to excite in Italy that revolutionary crisis which so fatally compromised the Italian cause. The assassination of Count Rossi and the tumults which led to the flight of the Pope from Rome, like many other occurrences of the same nature, have been attributed, not without some show of reason, to the desperate manœuvres of Austrian intrigue.

Be these things as they may, certain it is that from August, 1848, the statesmen of Vienna contrived by a series of dexterous evasions to escape the mediation which in form they had accepted. Successive French ministers were amused with delusive hopes from day to day of the commencement of negotiations which were never to be entered upon; and the English ministers were used to forward, in reality, the designs of Austria, by restraining the impatience of France under these repeated

procrastinations, and preventing her armed interference to save Venice from her fall.

While these extraordinary negotiations were proceeding, the fortunes of the Austrian monarchy had varied. On the 10th of August, the Emperor had returned from Innsbruck to the capital from which he had been driven by the revolution of the spring. In October, he had been compelled a second time to abandon it, taking refuge in Olmutz. In January, he once more returned to Vienna, but only to abdicate the imperial sovereignty in favour of his youthful nephew. The war with the revolted Hungarians had been distinguished by various alternations of fortune. At one time the rebel troops came close to the walls of Vienna. In January the successes of the imperial arms had retrieved the reverses of the earlier campaign; and the assurance of the support of the Russian armies whenever their aid was called on, placed Austria in a position to break off altogether from the proposed mediation, and to reckon confidently on the complete subjugation of her Italian provinces.

These things could not have happened had

there been during this period a settled government in Paris. But France was still agitated by the heavings of the revolution—disturbances at home distracted the attention of her rulers; and, besides, for some time, the near approach of the presidential election supplied for indecision in foreign affairs a convenient pretext, if not a legitimate excuse. A government like that of Cavaignac, temporary and almost provisional in its nature, not unnaturally hesitated to commit the country to a very determined course of action in Italy; and, amid the perils of a socialist and red republican insurrection in the streets of Paris, even the leaders of a revolution were not very willing to embark in a war “of nationalities” abroad.

On the 10th of December, the election of Louis Napoleon as President of the republic opened a great page in the destinies of France—but the accession of the new president to the cares of government gave full occupation to his energies in domestic affairs; and we could scarcely expect to find any immediate decided change in the foreign policy pursued by his predecessors.

The result of all was the triumph of Austrian diplomacy, and the restoration of imperial dominion over the Italian provinces, without any terms or conditions as to the future.

Strange to say, during some period of these negotiations, the Austrian cabinet, there is the strongest reason to suppose, entertained the belief that the English government was not sincere in pressing the mediation, and that the opinion of England was more Austrian than Italian.*

It is impossible not to notice a statement to this effect, resting, as it does, on the authority of the British ambassador at Paris. Whatever might have given ground for such an impression, unquestionably none could be found for it either in the conduct or the language of Lord Palmerston. In his despatches to Lord Ponsonby, he urged repeatedly the necessity of an immediate answer to the English proposal. He did everything except threaten war. At a later period, he expressed himself in very strong terms of the violation of her engagements by Austria, and pressed the surrender of Lom-

* Lord Normanby's despatch, August 31st, 1848. Correspondence, part ii. p. 245.

bardly even in the interests of the Austrian empire itself. Up to the very hour of the fall of Venice, the influence of England was exerted in endeavouring to mitigate the horrors of war, and to rebuke the excesses of violence into which either party might be betrayed. These rebukes, it is right to say, were frequently called for by the acts of the Germans—once, and once only, on the part of the Venetians, by their words.*

But, throughout the whole course of English diplomacy in Italy, from the hour of the mission of Lord Minto to the fall of Venice, it was impossible for the most cautious observer to attribute to the English minister a single act inconsistent with his obligations to Austria as a power in amity with the British sovereign. True to the principle of regarding the relative positions of the parties as determined by their success, he suggested in May very different terms from those which he proposed in August.

* See Lord Palmerston's despatch of November 21st, 1848, on the subject of an address issued to the people of Lombardy, calling on them to rise and massacre the Austrian troops.

The sympathies of the English cabinet with the cause of Italian freedom were not concealed—but there cannot be charged upon that government a single act of partizanship unbecoming a neutral power. The only complaint that could possibly be made might be by the Italian patriots, of the influence which prevented the intervention of France, and of the policy which regarded that intervention as a greater calamity than the defeat of the Italian cause.

But it must, even in the view of Italian patriotism, be remembered that the question of intervention of France in 1848 was very different from that of her interference in 1859. That intervention might have been the signal for a European war—a war of which, in the then condition of Christendom, no one could have calculated the result. But even this was not all—Who was to tell what ambitions or passions might bear sway in France, and give to an Italian expedition a character of revolutionary conquest? France had not yet emerged from the excitement of the revolution, the chief of which had proclaimed its watchword to be sympathy with all oppressed nationalities. Even

against the revolutionary government the red banner of a still more revolutionary party had been raised. Socialists and red republicans might to-morrow be the governors of the state. In the troublous portents of 1848 no man could read the future destinies of France.

Even Manin besieged in Venice was not without his fears that French intervention in Italy might assume the form of a socialist war against property throughout Europe.* The risk was one which, to save his country, the Venetian patriot might be content to run. It was one, however, which an English minister very naturally viewed with feelings somewhat different in their nature. The Italians themselves, with the exception of the Venetians, all deprecated an appeal to France—to the very last the Lombards rejected it, and Charles Albert assented to it in the last moment as a desperate extremity—and even then he encum-

* See this very remarkable passage in Henri Martin, vol. i. page 197 :—"The principal danger," writes Manin to his envoys, "of French intervention will be that the war may become social, that is, a war between those who have something to lose, and those who have nothing."

bered his appeal for aid with restrictions and conditions which abundantly proved the misgivings with which he made it.

That Lord Palmerston endeavoured in 1848 to prevent the armed interference of the French republic in Italy, is no proof of indifference to the Italian freedom. There were, certainly, two occasions upon which the energetic exertion of English influence alone prevented the immediate despatch to the assistance of Venice of the armaments of France.

While the English ministry gave their moral support to the cause of Italian freedom, their policy was guided by great principles, which may, perhaps, be thus described:—1st. Not to sanction by their encouragement any interference on the part of other nations, with the internal affairs of the Austrian empire. 2nd. To preserve, if possible, the general peace of Europe. 3rd. As a portion of this duty, to prevent, as far as they could, the armed intervention of France in Italy. 4th. In suggesting terms of arrangement between the parties, to be guided by an impartial view of the advantages which the position and prospects of either party might

leave them reasonably to expect—and 5th and lastly. Not to commit England to any armed interference except in cases in which the interests or the honour of England were directly concerned.

An adherence to these principles was a policy not calculated to satisfy the demands of a ministry like that of Austria, which expected the partizanship of every regular government in a struggle which it stigmatized as an attack by its opponents upon European law, and upon the faith of treaties. It did not meet the exaggerated demands of those patriots who believed that every free nation should become their active ally in their effort to be free. But it was a policy which met the requirements of duty in a minister serving in a great and ancient monarchy, and therefore bound by the obligations of such a monarchy to sovereignties with which it is at peace—but a minister at the same time, controlled by the representatives of a free nation, and therefore equally bound not to be the partizan of despots against the struggles of oppressed nations for liberty.

It is impossible, even in this rapid sketch of

a very minute portion of the diplomatic history of 1848, not to be struck by the strangeness of the events to which that period gave rise. The agitations which suddenly, and without any apparent cause, shook almost every throne in Europe—the wild hopes which, as if by some mysterious sympathy, in distant countries simultaneously agitated men's hearts—the strange stirring of the nations of the earth, all suggest to us almost of necessity the feeling of an impulse given by a power higher than any human will. Surveying these events from the retirement of the Vatican, Pope Pius gave utterance to a great truth when he described them as not the work of man. "The events," he said, "which the last two months have seen succeeding and pressing on each other with such rapidity of change are not the work of man. Woe to him who hears not the voice of the Lord in this storm, which is shaking, and splits, and breaks to pieces the cedars and the oaks! Woe to human pride if these wonderful changes are attributed either to the faults or the merits of any human beings whatever, instead of adoring the mysterious designs of that Providence in

whose hands are all the boundaries of the earth." The wild wave appeared, indeed, to subside as mysteriously as it rose—the world seemed to return to its former state, and over the wide surface of Europe princes ruled and peoples submitted, as if the things of 1848 had never been. Nevertheless, in the results of those struggles, the cause which some will call the cause of revolution, others that of progress, achieved two mighty triumphs, the re-establishment of the Napoleon dynasty in France, and the institution of a free and constitutional monarchy in Piedmont. These were the only traces which were left by the agitations that seemed at one time to convulse and to be about to revolutionize all Europe. But who can predict the influence which these two changes may yet exert upon the future destinies of Christendom? Who can calculate the power of these two elements in moulding the coming history of nations? In the restoration of the empire of the revolution to France—in the establishment of representative government in Piedmont, the thoughtful observer of events can see that the subsiding commotions of 1848 have left

behind them results in the European commonwealth destined to produce effects as great as any which the wildest of these commotions promised, and far more permanent than any which could have followed from the threatened disorganization of kingdoms and states. In our dim and uncertain gaze into the future we can only hope and pray that these effects may be to promote the ultimate peace and liberty of nations, and to preserve the priceless blessings of religion and order, blessings without which liberty must perish, and peace cannot exist.

VENICE IN 1848—9,

UNDER DANIEL MANIN.

CHAPTER I.

The Hungarian War—Roman and Tuscan Revolutions
—Project of the Italian Constituent Assembly—Fall
of the Cavaignac Government in France.

THE hopes of Italy were raised by important news from Vienna. The Hungarian war had commenced. The Croats, excited by Austria against the national Hungarian ministry, had been beaten by the Magyars. Simultaneously with this check to Imperial power, revolution broke out for the third time, at Vienna; and for the second time the Emperor of Austria fled from his Capital (6th and 7th of October). Civil war was in the very heart of Austria. Manin lost no time in writing to Pasini, to hold

all the Hungarian soldiers and citizens then in Venice, or who wished to repair thither. This was a noble response to the unfortunate resolution by which Kossuth had so recently sustained the co-operation of Hungary with Austria against Italy. The command was intrusted to an Hungarian officer, named Winckler; who, on the 22d of March, had broken his sword rather than give the order to fire on the Venetian people.

On the 25th, the triumvirs received an address from the principal members of the left of the Piedmontese parliament, which sat at that time. The Piedmontese deputies entreated the Venetians not to separate themselves from the kingdom of Upper Italy, which, they considered, subsisted by right, notwithstanding the purely military fact of the armistice. They demanded an envoy and the co-operation of the Venetian Consul at Turin, conformably with the Act of Union, and a complete understanding between the Venetian and Piedmontese agents, in order to obtain the intervention, either diplomatic or armed, of France in Upper Italy; on their part

they would urge their government to renew the war, and to aid Venice with all its forces.

Manin replied, in his private capacity, to Gioberti, one of the signers of the Piedmontese address, that it would be very imprudent to compromise the harmony that existed at Venice between the army and the people, by renewing political discussions in a city surrounded by the enemy ; that if the military situation improved, they would then have more liberty of action in this respect. "When they have recrossed the Tessin, we can then discuss." (26th of October.)

He himself gave an example of the conduct he advised to others, and in order to encourage the Venetian provinces to renew the insurrection and to strike a blow which should be felt even at Milan and at Turin, he decided with the military leaders to make a sortie, on a much larger scale than the previous one. On the 27th, at day-break, three columns, amounting together to twenty-five hundred men, led by Pepe and Ulloa, debouched by land and water, from the fort of Malghera and the Fusina canal, and attacked the village of Fusina, the fortified railway station between Malghera and Mestre, and

then the village of Mestre itself; Fusina was speedily taken without much resistance; but at Mestre, where, forewarned by a spy, the Austrians had concentrated a large force, a bloody conflict took place. The Italians, several times repulsed, led to the assault by Ulloa, Fontana, and Cosenz, finally penetrated into Mestre, driving out the Austrians, who lost five hundred prisoners, two hundred killed, and six pieces of cannon.

The volunteers of the various Italian regions, the Venetian civic guards, and the soldiers rivalled each other in boldness. A Bolognese priest, orator, and poet, of an enthusiastic temperament and heroic nature, one Ugo Bassi, who had been several times wounded in the Venetian campaign, marched at the head of one of the battalions, waving a crucifix in one hand, and the red banner of the Roman Volunteers in the other;* he was one of the first to rush into the fortified houses from whence the Croats

* He had returned to Venice on the 21st of September, with 1200 of those who had capitulated with

• Durando on the 11th of June.]

rained a perfect storm of bullets. A detachment of the "Hope" battalion, composed of youths between fifteen and eighteen years of age, figured in the combat. Two combatants, still younger, distinguished themselves by deeds which remind us of the youthful heroes of the French Revolution. Before Mestre, a little drummer of the civic guard, Speciali by name, fourteen years of age, beat the charge in company with another drummer, at the head of the Lombard Volunteers, who opened the attack and suffered the most. His comrade fell, struck by a ball; he lifted him on to his back and continued to beat the charge, under the most vigorous fire, until the termination of the action before Fusina. A cabin boy of twelve years of age, named Zorzi, seeing the flag of his pinnace struck by a ball and thrown overboard, jumped into the sea, swam to the flag, and brought it on board, climbed to the top of the mast, and there, amid a murderous fire, fastened the national colours, shouting *Viva l' Italia!*

Venice had maintained an admirable attitude throughout the day. All anxiety disappeared

in the enervating joy at the idea that Venice would have the honour of giving the signal for renewing the Italian struggle. The civic guard *en masse* loudly demanded to be led against the enemy. Immediately the news of the victory arrived, the majestic tone of the great bell of San Marco was heard. In a moment the Square was deserted, and the church filled with a grateful people, offering up thanksgivings to the God of battles.

The 29th of October was a fête day at Venice. The trophies taken from the Austrians were disembarked at the Piazzetta; and the people, old men and children included, attached themselves to the captured cannon, and dragged them to the ancient palace of the doges. The victorious troops defiled upon the Square, under a glowing autumnal sun, the sun of Titian! Everything reminded the city of the lagoons of its olden times, when the Venetian ships brought from the East the trophies captured from the Ottoman fleets. The women laughed and wept by turns, upon seeing, at the head of the first column, a very little boy carrying a flag which completely enveloped him in its ample folds, and

which he could not lift from the ground. This was the cabin boy Zorzi.

The popular delight was redoubled by an important event.* On the 27th, while the fight was going on, the Sardinian squadron was signalled at sea. Admiral Albini returned to raise the blockade of Venice, according to orders issued anterior to the news from Vienna, occasioned by the violation of the armistice of Salasco by Radetsky.† This was a proper commentary

* Sorrow and mourning are always mingled with the joys of war. A few days subsequently, the funeral of the slain painfully moved the people and the army. One of those generous Neapolitans who took so noble a part in the defence of Venice—the brother of that Carlo Poërio who until recently expiated in the dungeons of Ferdinand the crime of having desired to establish a free and legal authority in his country, and who is now doing a new service to Italy—in vividly awakening the sympathy of a great nation by exhibiting the spectacle of her noble sufferer—Alexander Poërio, wounded in the combat of the 27th, succumbed to the consequences of an amputation. He was one of the noblest and wisest of Italy's sons. Poet, like Körner, like him he devoted his muse to the independence of his country—and he died for it.

† Radetsky had refused to deliver up, according to the conventions, the park of siege artillery left at Peschiera by the Piedmontese.

on the letter of Count Freschi and the address of the Piedmontese deputies. The Austrian ships had disappeared.

The people entirely abandoned themselves to the joyous influences of the passing hour, unmindful of the gloomy forebodings of the previous day or of the morrow. Their chief kept his cares and anguish to himself. Manin had received unwelcome dispatches from France and England. A letter from Tommaseo, dated the 12th of October, crossed a letter in which Manin put a question to the French government respecting the blockade. Cavaignac had instructed the commander of the French naval station to interdict every kind of aggression on the part of the Austrians; and the minister Bastide, as we have seen from his double dispatch of the 17th of October, had advised the French consul at Venice of the measures taken to prevent either a strong attack or a vigorous blockade.* In other respects the attitude of

* On the 3rd of November, the commander of the French steamer *Solon*, arrived from Toulon, announced to the triumvirs that two ships of the line, two frigates, and two steamers would assemble off Venice to remove

Cavaignac was less satisfactory. He did not reply to the question as to the loan or a financial guarantee, nor did he show himself disposed to profit by the recent events in Hungary and Vienna, as Manin had so ardently desired. He advised the Italians against taking the offensive immediately.

At the same time, Lord Palmerston's letter, in reply to Manin's of the 20th of August, arrived.

This document, dated the 10th of October, was as follows :—

“I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 20th of August last, . . . and calling upon her Britannic Majesty's government to use its endeavours in order to prevent Venice from again falling under Austrian rule.

“I have to inform you that it forms no part of the proposals made by the British government to the Austrian government for the pacification of Italy, that Venice should cease to be under the Imperial crown, and that, consequently, it the blockade, even by force, and to defend her, if necessary. It was not then known at Paris that, thanks to the Sardinian squadron, the blockade was already raised.

would be wise for the people of Venice to come to an understanding with the Austrian government."

All Manin's suspicions were confirmed and exceeded by this terrible blow! He immediately sent the English dispatch to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs with the following letter:—

"Venice, 29th October, 1848.

"MONSIEUR,

"To a private letter which I addressed to Lord Palmerston, I have just received the enclosed reply. The English minister avows his intentions with regard to Venice with the greatest candour. I ask of your loyalty, Monsieur, a similar candour. It is right that we should know if the Venetian people—which from the commencement of the revolution has proclaimed the republican principle, which addressed itself to France and reckoned upon her assistance—must resign itself to being abandoned by her, and henceforth reckon only upon its despair and rely upon Providence. It is not the President of the little republic of Venice who addresses the Minister of the powerful French

republic, but the citizen who asks of the citizen, one honourable man of another."

After this last appeal, he could only fold his arms and wait patiently, if not until he received a reply from France, at least until it became known how Lombardy and Piedmont would act. Waiting was not inaction. The situation of Venice was very good, both as to provisioning and as to military defence, for which it was indebted to an excellent committee, formed of the most respectable and capable citizens. Provisions were neither scarce nor dear, but there was great financial distress in the State. Supplies were secured only to the end of November. The Venetian triumvirate, receiving no pecuniary assistance either from Italy or France, demanded of the people of Venice a fresh effort to assure the resistance until the end of the winter. The sacrifice was so much the greater, as the resources to meet it were much less than before. The appeal was responded to. On the 6th of November, the municipal council, composed principally of the largest contributors, voted, 1st, the guarantee of the two former loans, amounting together to five millions of lire;

2d, the octroi of a new loan of twelve millions of lire, to be made by the city to the government, the said loan to be represented by a paper money, which an extra land-tax assured the repayment in the course of twenty years. The vote was nearly unanimous, upon the proposal of a citizen belonging to the least advanced in political opinion, M. Priuli, who declared that at Venice, "thanks to an unexampled spirit of concord, all parties were suppressed; that the war had been really, almost exclusively, a war for Italian independence; and that this fresh sacrifice for the country, *which might not be the last*, ought to be made. M. Priuli only asked to remind Italy that Venice, who fought for the good of all, ought not to be made to bear alone the crushing burden of the struggle; and that the Venetian government should request the Sardinian, Roman, and Tuscan governments to share with Venice in the guarantee of the loans contracted for the national war, and to make the paper money created for this object legal tender and currency in their respective states.

Manin addressed himself, not only to the Italian governments, but to France, and charged

Tommaseo to endeavour to obtain from her the guarantee of one-third of the Venetian paper-money.

The resolution adopted with a calm antique simplicity by the municipal corps was the more noble, seeing that the news from without was bad. Venice, by her attack on Austria, had vainly given the signal for renewing the struggle. The last Venetian place which, beyond the suburbs of Venice, had continued to resist, the fort of Osoppo, in Friuli, defended by intrepid volunteers, was obliged to capitulate on the 12th of October.*

Except at Valteline, where a rising was quickly stifled in blood, Lombardo-Venetia, crushed under the hoofs of the Austrians, continued quiet. She would have risen in fury against Radetzky, if the Piedmontese had recrossed the Tessin. At the same time the Venetians would have rushed out from their lagoons. But notwithstanding the ardent excitement of the Piedmontese tribune and press, the King of Sardinia did not denounce the armistice, and his

* The Venetian Assembly adopted the widows and orphans of the defenders of Osoppo.

minister wrote to the Venetian triumvirs to induce them to abstain from hostilities (3rd of November), and even declared that, if they persisted in acting on the offensive, Sardinia would be obliged to withdraw its fleet.

All the old accusations against Charles Albert were renewed, which assuredly was very unjust. The King of Sardinia desired to fight to the last extremity with as much eagerness as any of his accusers—but it was absolutely out of his power to act with only his own forces, the reorganization of which required much time and great resources; and the French Government had intimated to him that if he resumed arms instead of referring to the mediators, he must not expect any assistance from them.

The French Government also caused the loss of the opportunity afforded by the Viennese insurrection; and the Hungarians rendered no assistance at the time of the insurrection, which, left to itself, was hemmed in and besieged by the regular army of Windischgrätz and the Croation hordes of Jellachich. Vienna succumbed on the 31st of October.

What then was the secret thought of the go-

vernment of France? It wished to gain time. Looking more to the state of things at home than abroad, it desired to amend the decisive epoch of the Presidential election ; and, if General Cavaignac were elected, having then its hands free, to act according to such favouring circumstances as might present themselves both for Italy and for France.

Without discussing the arguments, without misunderstanding either the difficult position, or the patriotic intentions of the men who governed France from June to December, 1848, we can only repeat what we have said with regard to the design of embarking troops for Venice. It was a great misfortune that they did not *make* the future instead of *waiting* for it. Whoever was chosen on the 10th of December, ought to have found France already in action.

As to England, appearances, as we have clearly shown, deceived Manin as to the real sentiments of the statesman at the head of the English ministry. If the French Government had intimated to Austria that it withdrew the proposed bases of mediation—as Austria by not accepting them had left it at full liberty to do—

and that the alternative now was between the entire independence of Italy and war, Lord Palmerston, far from protesting against such a course, would have given it his moral support; and if Austria had recurred to an appeal to English mediation, he would at the very utmost have asked for a pecuniary indemnity—he asked for it without attempting to impose anything. His energetic nature would have readily accommodated itself to more decided action on the part of the French Government, and, in his reply to Manin, he might have plainly told him the truth—that for so far at Paris they had not very clearly explained their intentions—and that this was not very satisfactory to himself. His letters are very painful for Frenchmen to read, but so full of instruction, that we consider it our duty to quote the most striking passages. Here are two despatches which in no way contradict his very remarkable letter of the 31st of August.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY.

“ Foreign Office, 9th October, 1848.

“ MY LORD,

“ I herewith transmit to your Excellency copy of a despatch which has been re-

ceived from Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Milan, reporting on the state of affairs in Lombardy, and I have to instruct your Excellency to read this despatch to Baron Wessenberg, and to say that Her Majesty's Government would entreat him seriously and dispassionately to consider whether the state of things therein described as existing at a time when there is an Austrian army of 120,000 men in occupation in Northern Italy, and when all open resistance on the part of the people to Austrian power is impossible, can be looked upon as calculated to inspire the belief that when that army shall have been reduced, as it of course must in due time be, to the ordinary peace amount, there can be any chance that Austria can maintain useful or permanent possession of a country whose inhabitants are so deeply and universally imbued with an unconquerable aversion to Austrian sway.

"It surely would be far wiser for the Austrian Government, and much more conducive to the real and personal strength of the Austrian Empire, to release these people from a dominion which they will ever regard as a yoke, and to take the present favourable opportunity for

making a fair and just pecuniary arrangement with them on their separation from the Imperial Crown.

“There cannot be a reasonable doubt that if the rule of Austria were now again to be established in these provinces, discontent would seize the first opportunity to vent itself in renewed outbreak and insurrection ; a great exertion of force would again be required, and at a great expense, to put insurrection down. Foreign aid would again be implored to save the provinces from renewed subjugation ; and, after such an experience of the impossibility of reconciling the people to the dominion of Austria, there can be little doubt that such foreign aid would be granted. The result would be a war between Austria, and an antagonist more formidable than the people of Lombardy—and, even though that war should become an European conflict, by the participation of other Powers who might be drawn into it, there cannot be much reason to think that the result of such a conflict would be to leave Austria any territory south of the Alps. But Austria should maturely consider that, although the general feelings of

her friends and allies would lead them to come to her aid if she was threatened in her own possessions, and in her natural existence in Germany, yet there might be a general sense of the injustice of her pretensions to impose a yoke upon the Italians: and that feeling might have the effect of leaving her with very scanty support in such a contest as that which I have described.

“ I am, &c.

(Signed) “ PALMERSTON.”

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY.

“ MY LORD,

“ I herewith transmit to your Excellency for communication to Baron Wessenberg, copy of a despatch from Her Majesty’s Vice-consul at Milan; inclosing a proclamation which had been issued in that city with respect to individuals found with arms in their possession: and I have to instruct your Excellency to observe that this proclamation, which savours more of the usages of centuries long gone by, than of the spirit of the present time, must strike everybody as a proof of the intensity of the fears by

which the Austrian commander is inspired ; for he thinks it necessary to threaten summary death to every man, of whatever rank or condition, in whose house a weapon of any kind may be found concealed. He must surely imagine the danger of renewed insurrection to be great and imminent. But if such is the case now, when there are 30,000 Austrian troops at Milan, and when a great portion of the Milanese have left the city, what will the state of things be when the Austrian troops are reduced to a small number, when the inhabitants have returned, and when these violent military measures no longer prevent them from providing themselves with arms and ammunition ; and it is worth while for Baron Wessenberg to consider whether the hatred towards Austria, of which this proclamation indirectly acknowledges the bitterness and intensity, is likely to be diminished by the desecration of churches, and by the military occupation of private houses, with all its attendant consequences.

“ It must be confessed that the proceedings of the Austrian military authorities in Italy seem to indicate an expectation that they will shortly

have to abandon the country, and that they must take advantage of the interval to wreak their vengeance upon it; for if they contemplated a continued occupation, reason would point out, that measures of conciliation would be best adapted to pave the way for permanent possession.

“ I am, &c.

(Signed) “ PALMERSTON.”

On the 11th of November Lord Palmerston referred to the same subject with fresh vigour.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY.

“ Foreign Office, November 11, 1848.

“ MY LORD,

“ I herewith transmit to your Excellency a copy of a despatch which I have received from Her Majesty’s Vice-consul at Milan, reporting on the state of Lombardy : and I have to instruct your Excellency to communicate the same to Baron Wessenberg ; and at the same time to request his most serious attention to the statements contained in this and other reports, which have been received from the same quarter.

“Your Excellency will at the same time say that Her Majesty’s government are persuaded that these simple statements of facts must surely convince Baron Wessenberg that it is impossible to expect that a province in which there exists throughout the whole population, both in the towns and in the country districts, and from the noble to the peasant, such deeply-rooted hatred of Austrian domination, can ever become a secure or an useful possession for the imperial crown.

“It cannot reasonably be imagined that any national institutions which the Emperor may grant to the people of Lombardy can alter their national antipathy to foreign rule, or have any other effect than that of affording them greater facilities for throwing off the yoke from which they are so anxious to get free.

“If, indeed, such institutions as are now promised, had been granted to the Lombards ten or fifteen years ago, there is no saying to what extent practical independence might have reconciled them to nominal subjection; but matters have now gone much too far between the Italians and the Austrian government, to make it

possible that any such connection could be permanent: and if the whole of Lombardy is in a state of either passive or active resistance to Austrian rule now, when the province has been recently re-conquered, and is occupied by an overwhelming Austrian force, exercising authority by all the terrors and severities of martial law, what sort of obedience can the Austrian government expect to meet with from the Lombards when the Austrian troops shall have retired, when the local government shall be administered by the very Italian nobles who are now in voluntary exile, to avoid any contact whatever with the foreign invader, and when there shall be assembled a Parliament composed of Italians and elected by the people, who are even now, under circumstances of the most extreme difficulty, engaged in a desperate, because wholly unequal struggle, with the regular forces of Field-Marshal Radetzky?

“It is much to be desired for the general interests of Europe, that the present government of Austria should not allow itself to be misled as to the real state of things, that it should, without partiality or prejudice, calculate the chances

of the future, and that it should allow the conclusions to which it may thus arrive, to guide and determine its course in the time present.

“The present moment is a most favourable one to Austria for making an arrangement, by which Lombardy would be released from Austrian rule. The army of Austria has re-occupied Lombardy, and therefore the concession would manifestly be the result of deliberate choice, and not of local compulsion. The authority of the Emperor has now been fully re-established at Vienna, and, consequently, the decision to which Austria might come as to Lombardy, could not be considered as a sacrifice extorted from the government of a dissolving empire; and the two powers who have undertaken the present mediation are friendly to Austria, and sincerely anxious for the maintenance of the peace of Europe. But several things may alter before many months have passed away. Important changes may take place in France. The election which is coming on next month, may bring other men into power in that country: with other men another policy may come in. Traditional maxims of policy connected with a busier

action in regard to foreign countries, may be taken up as the guide of the government of France. Popular feeling in that country, which at present inclines to peace, might easily be turned in an opposite direction: and the glory, as it would be considered in France, of freeing the whole of Italy up to the Alps from the domination of Austria, might reconcile the French nation to many sacrifices and to great exertions. Occasions for calling upon France to interfere in favour of Italian independence would not long be wanting, and would be amply afforded by the Lombards so soon as it was known by them that the French government and people were disposed to answer to their call. It is hardly possible to doubt that an efficient and powerful French army, aided and supported by a general rising of the Italians, would be too strong for the force which Austria could spare for operations in Italy: and the probability is, that in such a case Austria would lose everything in Italy, even up to the Alps. It may be said, indeed, that such a conflict might bring on a more extensive war in Europe, and that other powers might take part with Austria.

But is the Austrian government sure that the sympathies even of Germany would be with Austria in her attempt to rivet her yoke upon the Italians, and would not the principle of nationality, which is now the rallying cry of Germany, tell against Austria in such a struggle? Nor would the principle of ancient prescription be much more in her favour; because, although that principle may be pleaded by her in the case of that part of Lombardy which, as the Duchy of Milan, has long been connected with the Imperial crown, yet that principle would be strongly invoked against her by the Republic of Venice, a State which has played a distinguished part in history during nearly fourteen centuries of freedom: and the Austrian title to which goes no further back than its transfer to her by Buonaparte by the Treaty of Campo Formio, and its subsequent re-assignment to her by the Treaty of Vienna.

“ Her Majesty’s government have good reason to believe that the Administrator of the German empire—himself an Austrian Archduke, and known to be passionately attached to the State which was the country of his birth, and the resi-

dence of the greater part of a long life—is strongly of opinion that Austria ought to emancipate Lombardy ; and if Her Majesty's government are not misinformed, that same opinion prevails extensively in many parts of Germany. . . .”

In fine, the policy of Lord Palmerston was *double*, but in a sense entirely opposed to what is commonly called *duplicity* ; that is, on the one hand it very clearly explained to Austria what it thought of it, and made it fear France, in order to compel it to treat on the least unfavourable conditions possible for Italy : on the other hand, believing the French government to be indisposed for war, and deceived by the reports of the English Consul Dawkins, upon the possibility of Venice resisting a serious attack, it dissimulated the good feeling it had for Venice, in order to compel her to an arrangement which would prevent her sharing the fate of Milan.

In a situation so complex, where appearances were so different from the reality, Manin could not from Venice penetrate the depth of true feeling beneath the obscurities on the surface : but the eye of a sagacious friend observed for him at

Paris and London. "I see," Manin wrote subsequently, "that our sacred natal land, which has given the highest examples of every kind of greatness, still produces not only soldiers who fight manfully on the battle-field, and martyrs who die heroically on the scaffold, but also statesmen and diplomatists of the first rank."

He here makes allusion to the Vicenza legist, Pasini, whom he had improvised ambassador extraordinary to the mediating powers. That race of ancient Venetian ambassadors, whose narratives have added so much to our country's annals, that wise and powerful political race, is not extinct—we have but to recognise it. M. Pasini has many times reminded us of his predecessors, whose negotiations have been so useful to us through many centuries. It would be interesting to publish his correspondence, so clear, so precise, so prudent, so entirely applicable to a single aim, compared with that of an illustrious author, who at the same time represented Venice at Paris, and whose letters shine by other qualities, by observation at once vivid, keen, penetrating, and severe—too severe sometimes! of characters and events which pass

around him in France by rapidity of outline—by brilliant colouring, and by the high literary faculties he brings to bear upon his task of watching and judging the drama of real life. We would then see the Venetian genius under both its aspects.

Pasini laboured to unravel the real sentiments of the cabinets of London and Paris. On the 18th of October, in reply to a very able and clear memoir he had sent to Lord Palmerston, the English minister wrote him a letter which was a commentary on his brief response of the 16th of October to Manin. The purport of this letter was, that if the Italian arms had been more successful, the mediating powers would have demanded the independence of Venice; that the course of events ought to be taken into consideration; and that now it would be better to negotiate directly with Austria.

Pasini's first thought, on receiving the letter of the 18th of October, was exactly the same as Manin's on the receipt of the letter of the 16th. This was, to demand a categorical explanation from the French government. General Cavaignac replied, that he should consider himself dishonoured, if he consented to an arrangement

which left a single Austrian soldier beyond the Alps; that France would propose the erection of Lombardo-Venetia into a State completely separated from the Austrian empire; that to render the success of the negotiation possible, he would admit an Austrian prince at the head of this State, but at the most leaving the Emperor only a nominal sovereignty. "The Lombardo-Venetians," he said, "once masters of all their resources, can organize themselves so as to profit by future events."

The General, therefore, admitted that the expedient which he had adopted was only a truce, and must lead to a new war.

"If Austria refuses," added the General, "I shall obtain from the Assembly the means of doing what I may consider necessary for the honour and interests of France."

Some days afterwards (9th of November), the minister, Bastide, declared to the National Assembly, that they were not mediating between the Emperor of Austria and the King of Sardinia, but between the people of Upper Italy and the Emperor of Austria. This placed Venice in the same rank with Piedmont.

He declared that England gave her firm and loyal support to France.

Fortified by this declaration, the most decided step the French government had yet taken, Pasini wrote, on the 9th of November, to Lord Palmerston a noble and eloquent dispatch, in which he explained with lofty sentiment and profound thought all the reasons why England and Europe should not again deliver Italy or any part of it to the Austrian yoke. It thus concluded:—"We cannot capitulate to Austria: we cannot concede to her even the shadow of that right which has never belonged to her usurpation. At the last extremity, we shall protest, and reserve our right for the future." At the same time he refuted the idea that had been suggested to Lord Palmerston, of the pretended inability of Venice to defend herself.

The instructions to the French fleet—the rank of vice-admiral conferred on M. Ricaudy, the commander of the naval station, in approbation of his energetic conduct*—the explana-

* On the 14th of November, the French steamer *Solon* gave chase to an Austrian steamer, which had captured some boats laden with provisions.

tions of Cavaignac—the declaration of the minister, Bastide, from the tribune—had already replied to the question directly put by Manin to M. Bastide on the abandonment of Venice. On the 17th of November, M. Bastide made a very decided, earnest, and dignified reply.

“I know not what kind of future God has in reserve for my country ; but so long as I shall direct its foreign policy, France will never abandon the cause of Venice ; for you are a brave people, such a generous nation cannot leave to perish. There is, I well know, a policy which would make Venice a ransom for Lombardy. That policy is not mine : never will I accept a treaty of Campo Formio.”

The policy of France exhibited signs of improvement ; but would this improvement last ? France was approaching a crisis, the issue of which it was impossible to foresee. This government, whose tone was growing firmer and more friendly, where might it be on the morrow ?

Manin's courage remained unshaken ; but his body sank under the weight of physical suffering and moral anxieties. He continued to divide his nights between the cares of the state and those of his sick child ! Many times seriously

over-excited within a few weeks, his old complaint was so irritated towards the end of November as to cause fears for his life. For several days it seemed as if the whole Venetian family was threatened with the loss of its father. The whole population thronged round Manin's house at San Paternian. Happy was the man who was the bearer of some recipe which he fancied might alleviate his sufferings or effect his cure.

He recovered, to suffer and to triumph again.

Weighty events at this time directed upon Central Italy a portion of the interest which for many months had been wholly absorbed by Upper Italy. Tuscany, after many disturbances and fruitless conflicts, took, under an impulse given by Montanelli, who had returned from captivity, an entirely new initiative in the general affairs of Italy, and proposed the formation of an Italian Constituent assembly to which all local governments should be subordinated, and which should direct the national struggle.

Manin was in no haste to give an opinion as to the opportuneness of this proposal, conformable at bottom with his own principles ; but he recommended immediately to the repre-

servatives of his government abroad not to attack a project which, he said, met with considerable support, and possibly might be accepted by a majority of the Italian nation.

Montanelli and Guerazzi, by an arrangement to which the grand duke submitted, had become part of the ministry, in Tuscany. At Rome the Revolution had assumed a more tragic character ! The minister Rossi, the proud mediator of irreconcilable passions and principles, the object of the exasperation and hatred, both of the Jesuits and Revolutionists, of the friends of Piedmont and of the accomplices of Austria, fell a martyr to an impossible task, the reconciliation of modern legal order with theocracy (15th of November). The crime by which he fell, so odious in itself, was, in its consequences, a really national calamity for Italy. It seemed to impress the stamp of crime on the Roman Revolution, which broke out on the next day, and created misapprehension in foreign nations as to the causes of this revolution, causes serious and profound—but which were to be dated from the allocution of the 29th of April, and not the assassin blow of the 15th of November, and thus prepared

the way for the unhappy events of the following year.

Pius the Ninth, after having apparently acknowledged the insurrection, fled from Rome, (24th of November,) and took refuge, not in France, where the government would have given him an asylum, but with the King of Naples, the deserter from the Italian cause and the friend of Austria. This was an hour of intense torture to many pious, simple souls, who had dreamed of the regeneration of Italy, and of Christianity, under the standard of a pontiff liberator. He had dispelled their dreams for ever, in this world. Others, abandoned by their guide, did not abandon themselves, but appealed from the pope to God, and to their consciences. When the Roman volunteers quitted Venice to return and share the new destinies of their country, (6th of December,) their almoner, the intrepid and devoted Ugo Bassi, who had so many times inflamed the hearts of the Venetian army by his preaching, and who, in battle, braved death without striking a blow, gave to Manin a most touching and affectionate farewell. This worthy priest, who had need of a model to venerate and

obey, substituted in his heart the hero of Venice for Pius the Ninth. Upon quitting the city, he kissed the stone before Manin's door, upon which, according to Venetian custom, his name was engraved.

"Next to God and Italy," he exclaimed, "before the pope—Manin."

They never met again; the dictator died in exile, the priest under the tortures of Austrian executioners.

Manin's policy was, necessarily, to accept the solidarity of every national movement, and repudiate every kind of excess. His faithful and able auxiliary, Pasini, attempted, not without success, to take advantage with the English government of the political tempests in Central Italy. He reminded Lord Palmerston of his prediction that the Italian revolution would turn to extreme parties and hopeless violence, if the mediating powers did not hasten and interfere against the foreigner in favour of regulated liberty; at the same time he explained the situation and defended the Roman cause, both at Paris and at London.

Certain demonstrations made at this time by

the British Cabinet confirmed Manin in his opinion of the ill-will of England. Lord Palmerston addressed remonstrances to him against the sortie at Mestre, against the formation of a Hungarian legion,* and against the new loan of twelve millions of lire. The motives of the English minister, as we have shown, were not what the Venetian Dictator supposed. Pasini, being nearer, began to see matters in a clearer light. His despatches displayed growing hopes. In a long interview with Lord Ellis, whom it was intended should represent England at the future conferences with Austria, Pasini discovered that the English government had not come to any determination upon the solution of Italian affairs, but discussed all the proposals which were presented to it; and that the excesses of Radetzky and his officers offended Lord Palmerston, and that England inclined to press the opening of the conferences (3rd of December).

Pasini also became better and better satisfied with France. On the 8th of December, he ob-

* On the 9th of December the Hungarian legion was succeeded by the formation of an Istro-Dalmatian legion.

tained from M. Bastide more satisfactory explanations than he had received from General Cavaignac. The French minister acknowledged that France had replied, and proposed on the 15th of August, to Austria and Sardinia, the basis of the Hummelauër proposal ; but declared that Austria, not having accepted these bases, France was not pledged to them. The arguments of the Venetian envoy appeared to have convinced the minister of the necessity for rejecting every combination which maintained an Austrian prince in Upper Italy, as it did not assure a durable peace, nor dispense with France having an army of observation on the Alps. He also appeared decided upon sustaining the admission of the representative of Venice at the Conferences.

Venetian diplomacy gained in character day by day. France and England were more disposed to understand each other effectually upon the whole of Italian affairs, as well upon Rome and Florence as upon Milan and Venice. Such was the state of things at the beginning of December.

But just at this time a legal crisis in France

removed from office the men who held the power, at the very moment when their foreign policy had assumed a settled form. Three years of stormy and confused transition date from the 10th of December, 1848, during the first of which the fate of Italy was decided for some years. We have only spoken hitherto of French diplomacy in its relations with Venice and Upper Italy. Some remarks are, however, necessary to explain the extreme complication which existed in the situation of France.

In the movement which resulted in the overthrow of the government of 1848, two currents entirely distinct, if not opposed in their elements and origin, became accidentally mingled;—a popular current proceeding from those rural masses among whom was preserved especially, a resentment of the two invasions, the national instinct of revenge for the treaties of 1815—and also a conservative and reactionary current coming from the upper classes of society, whose political position the republic had disturbed and whom the socialist clubs—a matter in other respects very formidable—had alarmed not only for their exclusive and ill-founded pretensions, but even for the

safety of their legitimate and essential interests. The conservative party had but one idea—war against the clubs, which it identified with the republic and democracy. As usually happens in coalitions, the extreme section drew after it the moderate section; the counter-revolutionists were the leaders of the liberals and the constitutionalists; and the latter would not see that the real struggle abroad was not between order and mobocracy, as it was called; nor even between the constitutional *régime* and the republic, but between the principles of national right, and the despotism of foreign conquest.

The current proceeding from the country manifested itself by electing the President of the 10th of December: the reactionary current manifested itself by the election of the Legislative Assembly in the spring of 1849, and by the majority which was the result—a majority which was only more impassioned because it was opposed by a numerous and ardent revolutionary minority.

Nothing could be more fatal for Italy than the state of mind called forth in France by the elections of 1849. But, at the date imme-

diately following the fall of the Cavaignac administration, Italy could still indulge her illusions on the progress of affairs in France. But who could tell what would be the attitude of the new executive power—what would it do?—what could it do? Manin, again in a state of uncertainty, sent a moving address to the elect of the 10th of December, in which he entreated them to perform the promises France had made for the complete enfranchisement of Italy, adding, that he had been called by Providence to reconstitute the nationality of the native country of his family (29th of December).

The first despatches of the Venetian envoys, after the 10th of December, were not unfavourable. "I have said to the President," wrote Tommaseo, on the 25th of December, "that a Buonaparte was certainly called by Providence . . . to make reparation for Campo Formio. . . . This remark did not offend him, . . . and he even made a sign of approval."*

Tommaseo's letter crossed a despatch from

* In other despatches, the Venetian agents appeared to believe the President more favourable than his minister to Italy.

Manin to Pasini, in which Manin showed how very decisive their six months' experience of the Austrian restoration in Lombardo-Venetia was, and announced a general convulsion as the consequence of the iniquity, if the great Powers continued to tolerate it.—“Rivers of blood, immense calamities will be the result of the policy they wish to follow at the present day, to the supposed advantage of Austria, and the latter, in the end, will have the miserable glory of dragging the whole of Europe into the abyss which its mad follies and cruelties had prepared for itself alone.” (3rd of January, 1849.)

In presence of the dark and impenetrable future, of the probability of the most terrible sacrifices, Manin believed it to be his duty to revive his indispensable power, and to renew once again his legal support and mandate. In place of the assembly elected in June, for another object, and under other circumstances, the Triumvirate decreed, for the 20th of January, the election of a permanent Assembly, chosen by universal suffrage, and furnished with unlimited powers for six months (24th of December, 1848). The Government—a most remarkable

thing—addressed itself to the parochial clergy, calling on them to instruct their parishioners in the sacred duty of using their civic rights. Among this people, who were at once deeply attached to their religious traditions and very independent of the Papacy, the old aristocratic government had preserved the clergy from the invasion of ultramontane maxims ; and if Venice had little to boast of in its patriarch—a feeble and vacillating man, the mere creature of circumstances—the inferior clergy for the most part continued patriotic, after Pius the Ninth had abandoned his country's cause.

The priests, therefore, at Venice were a support rather than an obstacle—from a very different quarter arose an embarrassment, which might have become a peril. In a club recently formed at Venice, called the *Circolo Popolare*, Socialist questions were discussed. The leaders of this club wished to avail themselves of the popularity of Father Gavazzi, the friend and colleague of Ugo Bassi, and to induce the eloquent monk of Romagna to preach their doctrines ; he was a little inclined to Socialism, as is sometimes the case with priests who embrace democracy, and mingle with it certain traditions of primitive

Christianity. The Vigilance Committee interdicted the preaching, and Gavazzi quitted Venice, writing to Manin to complain of the manner in which his devotion to him had been rewarded.

Manin replied by the following remarkable letter :—

“ Venice, 14th January.

“ DEAR GAVAZZI,—

“ I regret what has occurred ; but you ought to consider that we have assumed the sacred task of defending Venice at any cost, and that Venice cannot be defended unless it be kept in tranquillity and concord. Now, these necessary conditions might have been compromised by the ‘ Circolo popolare’ . . . in consequence of the Socialist theories that were begun to be preached there. You well know that these seductive theories might quickly carry away the minds of ignorant, but ardent, energetic artisans, and lead them to make terrible practical applications of them, which would imperil society, and bring ruin upon these very poorer classes whose condition they professed. France has lately furnished a very solemn and fearful example of this.

"Now, if these theories have produced such frightful consequences at Paris, which is menaced by no external foe, reflect how much more fatal they would be to Venice, besieged and blockaded, with an enemy at its very gates.

"I beg of you also to remember, that we have here, most assuredly, a good many Austrian emissaries, ready to inflame the torch of discord at the first spark that manifests itself, because they perfectly well know that it is the only means by which it can happen that this city will cease to become invincible. A great number of these emissaries wear the mask of ardent patriotism and become demagogues:—they are really dangerous. . . . The Government would fail in its duty if it did not strike this evil at its very roots, and to that end make use of the extraordinary powers conferred upon it for the safety of the city. I am afflicted, I say again, that these measures should wound your feelings; but every consideration, every feeling whatsoever, must give way before the duty of saving our country. Excuse me if I remind you that what you complain of would not have occurred, if you had given me that

confidence which I believe I merited—if you had consulted me as to the opportunity of your project. . . . We should very quickly have understood each other. You would have avoided an unpleasantness, and I should have been spared a pang. But let what has passed be forgotten ; in future have more confidence in me. I shall always regard and esteem you as one of the most fervent apostles of liberty, and of Italian independence.

“ And remain,

“ Ever yours, very affectionately,

“ DANIEL MANIN.”

This incident was followed by no other consequences, and Venice was not divided by social quarrels.

CHAPTER II.

The Elections at Venice—The Gondolier Galli—Failure of the Mediation—Charles Albert takes up Arms again—The Venetian Army prepares to enter upon a Campaign—News from Novara.

THE elections gave rise to many very interesting incidents for the study of Venetian character. The gondoliers, for instance, held a preparatory meeting on the 16th of January. Everything was conducted with a propriety and dignity not always met with at meetings of the upper classes of society. One of the gondoliers, named Galli, made an address in the popular dialect, vigorous without exaggeration, and of a very high moral tone. He made a rapid sketch of the Venetian annals, reminding the meeting, that before there was a Venetian aristocracy,

there had been a Venetian democracy, and that it was the latter which had laid the foundation of Venetian greatness. . . . “Our present Venice is the Venice of early times, devoted to fishing, poor, and democratic. It was then great in arms, in commerce, and civic virtues—it ought to be the same at the present day. . . . I have spoken of democracy and aristocracy, but do you know the meaning of those words? . . . Democracy is *equality of rights* for every citizen, without distinction; aristocracy is the preponderance of the nobility, to the detriment of the common right. . . . We wish *to enjoy the same rights, to perform the same duties*, as other citizens. But, for God’s sake, do not suppose that the word *democracy* signifies, either in word or deed, the appropriating what does not belong to us. . . . The rich? let them remain rich, so that they may be able to employ us. Our patrons?* respect them, for they supply us with the means of living honestly; and they will cheerfully consent to losing some hours of our labour, knowing that those hours

* A portion of the gondoliers hired their services permanently to wealthy families.

will be devoted by us to the public good. They will take part in our discussions ; they will listen, and suggest projects of amelioration for us, for our children, and for generations yet unborn !

“ Everything which we do to-day in the spirit of democracy we must be ready hereafter to modify, for the general good of Italy—for, above all things, we are Italians !”

Galli was nominated by the whole meeting a candidate for the national representation, with one of his comrades, named Grossi. Of these two poor boatmen, the first, the orator, occupied his leisure hours with music and poetry ; the other restricted himself to the absolute necessities of life, to make a small collection of works of art. This will give an idea of the elevation of the populace.

The country being too poor to pay its representatives, the gondoliers, before electing the candidates, raised a subscription in order to assist their comrades, who would be obliged to neglect their work to serve their country in the Assembly.

This firm and intelligent people, sensible and calm, were so passionately attached to Manin,

only because they saw in their chief their own qualities carried to the highest degree—as an impersonation in power and purity of themselves. Nothing could be further from the truth than to see in the Dictator of Venice a statesman raised by chance, amid a population which obeyed him with a blind docility, and to make of Manin a kind of solitary prodigy. He was only the chief among his own class.

The 18th of January, the anniversary of the captivity of Manin and Tommaseo, gave rise to the most fervent demonstrations of popular feeling for the dictator. In a visit Manin made the day previously to the arsenal, the *arsenalotti* (workmen in the arsenal), so fierce when ruled over by the cold and harsh *Austrian scribblers*, but become docile at the vivifying words of the national leader—surrounded him, listened to him with such evidences of affection, “hanging on his lips as children on those of a father,” that he wept, and was on the point of fainting from emotion.

On the 18th, Manin thus concluded a reply to a serenade by the people before his house at San Paternian. “The imprisonment, of which you celebrate the commemoration, has taught us

that happy are they who suffer for the popular cause. It has inaugurated that emulation in sacrifice which make you a model people, not only in Italy, but also in Europe. Repeat now the cries which, confined in every breast, from the 15th of January, escaped on the 17th and 22nd of March.

“Viva Italia! Viva Venice! Viva San Marco!”

At that time another name would have been added to these patriotic cries, but it could no longer come from an Italian heart!

The elections took place without the slightest disorder. Manin was elected by eight electoral districts out of eleven. More than two-thirds of the electors had taken part in the voting—a very large proportion in universal suffrage. On the evening of the 25th of January, when the result of the elections was made known, an immense crowd assembled under the windows of the government palace, to congratulate the elect of the entire city. “The magnificent square of St. Mark, with its long rows of palaces, its domes and towers lighted by one of those Venetian illuminations which convert night into

day, the gigantic *Campanile* rising up against the dark background of the sky, like a column of fire, presented one of the most beautiful spectacles the world can show.

To the cries, many times repeated, of *Viva Manin! Viva Saint Mark!* Manin appeared, and responded by one of his clear, brief, addresses:—

“I thank this brave and intelligent people. You have elected representatives to make laws for the interests of Venice. Other representatives will have, hereafter, to treat at Rome of the great question of Italian unity. Upon the occasion of the annexation of Venice to the kingdom of Charles Albert, I said:—‘*All this is provisional. The assembly which will sit at Rome will decide definitely.*’ My prophecy was, perhaps, received with disdain—but now, this prophecy has very nearly become a reality. . . . The destinies of Italy will be accomplished by the Italian confederation.”

Thus, politically, Manin could discuss the possibility of immediate convocation at Rome—theoretically, he admitted it in principle. It is important to notice this fact.

While Manin strengthened and concentrated his moral force at home, he renewed, with desperate energy, his appeal to the other Italian regions—appeals which were but too little listened to. He was not afraid to remind Italy either of her faults, or of her deficiencies. Notwithstanding the good disposition of the Tuscan ministry, which had in the interior been erected into a republic by the flight of the Grand Duke to the Austrians (7th of February), Tuscany sent very little aid to Venice: and the Provisional government of Rome, which had also become republican a few days before Tuscany (5th of February), but was feebly administered, did not even pay the Pope's debt—the debt due for advances made by the Venetians to the army of Durando.* Piedmont, crushed as she was under the weight of her misfortunes, and the support of her army, had voted a respectable subsidy—600,000 lire a month; that is, a fifth of the expenditure incurred by Venice (19th of December). The city of Genoa promised to

* The Roman Assembly, however, subsequently, voted a gift of 100,000 crowns; but Venice never touched a coin of it.

take one million of the loan, but events prevented these engagements from being fulfilled.

The hopes of effectual support from abroad, indulged in for a time, were fading away day by day. The English cabinet was well disposed, but could not go to war in the defence of Italy. The new French cabinet would not, and positively declared that it could not, on account of the state of its finances. The representative of that coalition which soon after obtained a majority in the assembly of 1849 the cabinet was in reality but little disposed to interfere with energy in favour of anything which had proceeded from the revolution of 1848. M. Drouin de Lhuys, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, showed much regard, and even sympathy, for Pasini; promised to maintain the *status quo* at Venice during the negotiations, and to strengthen, rather than recall the French naval force there: but at the same time he manifested so strong a desire to avoid war, as to lead Austria to play upon it in the strangest manner. After the lapse of six months, the mediation had not advanced one step. The policy of Austria, quibbling and arrogant by turns, drew the mediators into one delay after another. At last, while awaiting its Plenipotentiary at Brus-

sels, the place designated for the conference, it proposed to substitute an European Congress for the Conference (19th of Feb.). M. Drouin de Lhuys lost all patience, and threatened to withdraw from the mediation, reserving to France its liberty of action. Thereupon the Austrian Envoy Extraordinary at London announced to Lord Palmerston that the full powers of the Austrian plenipotentiary were ready, on the sole condition that the mediators should previously discard the pretensions of the King of Sardinia as inadmissible, and should engage themselves to maintain the territorial arrangements of 1815; that is, on condition that the mediators should decide the question beforehand in favour of Austria (22nd of February).

Lord Palmerston treated these strange pretensions as they deserved (23rd of February).^{*} Then Austria re-commenced its manœuvring: it hesitated to put the pacific tendencies of the French government to too rude a test; and after having many times prepared to besiege

^{*} See the *Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Italy*, 1849, part iv. passim: and particularly pp. 54, 80, 124, 125, 130, 132, 193.

Venice, it did not yet venture to attack it. The policy of Austria was to provoke an attack against itself, by driving Piedmont and Venice to extremities through the excessive tyranny it exercised upon the Lombardo-Venetians, and against which Manin protested to the French government on the 19th of February. This protest was in reference to the savage proclamation of General Haynau at Padua ; Haynau, as Welden had done before, ordered every one to be shot who had the slightest communication with the inhabitants of Venice, and also held both their communes and their families responsible for deserters. Manin at the same time asked France to prevent Austria cutting off the supplies of Venice from the side of the Romagna, as it had already done on the east of the Piave, and on the coast of Istria and Dalmatia.

The new Venetian Assembly met on the 15th of February. Manin opened it by a speech, in which he announced that the representatives of the people would be required to decide upon a plan which at the time agitated the whole Peninsula; namely, the concentration of the will and the power of the nation under the direction of a single assembly : and that they would have to

decide—both as to the principle and as to the time of its application—whether Venice would assent to the Italian Constituent assembly proposed by the Tuscan government.

“Citizen Representatives, upon your resolutions will depend the destiny of our glorious Venice ; which its misfortunes, its recent glory, our own sacrifices even, have rendered still more dear to us. Imbued with a sincere love for our great and common mother, Italy, you will courageously resist all its enemies : you will reconcile local with national interests ; your duty will be alike to reject the promptings of an unreasoning democracy, and to avoid the snares of a treacherous diplomacy. You will calmly and wisely weigh all your resolutions, and maintain Venice at that height of respect and honour to which the deeds of our forefathers, and, we may add to-day, our own actions have raised it.” *

* We remark also in this address the assertion, that during the year of the Revolution which had just elapsed, criminal offences had not increased, and even that offences against property had considerably diminished.

Manin, without being at all opposed to the principle of an Italian National Assembly, was fully aware of the peril of subjecting Venice to a distant control, in its present very exceptional position, and under the extreme uncertainty as to what might be done by this Assembly, in which it would be impossible for a great portion of Italy to take a part. Many patriots, the same who constantly demanded sorties to be made against the enemy, without taking into account the situation of the Venetian government with regard to the mediating powers, wished, with more ardour than prudence, to immediately unite Venice with Rome and Tuscany under the Constituent assembly; the acceptance of which by Piedmont was not assured, nor even probable. On the other hand, Tommaseo, on his return from Paris, was more in harmony with Manin upon the principles, than upon the practice of the government, and placed himself at the head of those who desired to restore the rules of the debates and publicity of ordinary times in that scene of constant peril in which the country, like a ship in danger of sinking, was now placed.

Discussions of a very delicate nature thus arose between men who pursued the same aim, but by different routes. The first vote, given on the 17th of February, on the proposition of the deputy Benvenuti, decided that the meeting of a sovereign Assembly had put an end to the powers of the dictatorial government which had been instituted by a former assembly. This was not Manin's opinion, who admitted, indeed, that the Assembly could deprive the government of its powers, but not that these powers had *ipso facto* ceased. The same deputy proposed, pending the regular constitution of the Assembly, to confer the *executive power* upon the citizens Manin, Graziani, and Cavedalis.

Here was an evident intention of changing the dictatorial power into a mere ordinary magistracy. Manin, in his own name, and in that of his colleagues, demanded that they should define with the greatest precision what they understood by *executive power*, in order that they might say conscientiously if this power appeared sufficient to enable them to assume, even for a few days, the heavy responsibility of saving the country, which so many perils still environed.

Upon an amendment proposed by the representative Minotto, and modified by Tommaseo,* and which gave to the triumvirs *full power* in everything relating to the defence of Venice, a very lengthy discussion ensued, during which Manin spoke on three several occasions. He asked simply and broadly, without circumlocution or subterfuge, for that amount of power which should appear to him indispensable for his work.

“In every country, under extraordinary circumstances, extraordinary powers have been granted to the government. Are we or are we not in an extraordinary position? During the last six months we have not always employed all the powers entrusted to us, but the consciousness of having them gave us strength. I beg the Assembly to accept the proposal of the representative Minotto; otherwise, if you wish to question

* “I beg,” said Tommaseo, “the president Manin and the government to accept in the name of the whole assembly, the assurance of our full confidence; I beg of him not to relax in his efforts in serving our country, and I ask it in the name of our common captivity, of our common duties, and our common hopes.”

the government at every moment, and discuss if what it does is quite within the limits of a formula not yet defined (*executive power*), our position will become intolerable. We must do much, and do it quickly too; therefore we must not be compelled to think much of forms and restrictions. You can easily perceive the public tranquillity, but you cannot see all the cares, toils, and perils, which attack it every hour, not singly, but in hundreds! Every day our lives are imperilled. I tell you frankly, openly, as friends and brothers, it is impossible for me to accept these functions without extended powers. If six months' experience of absolute power has given no one occasion to say we have abused that power, then the Assembly can decide whether it will confer on me, not the dictatorship, but an extended power, and I do not apprehend that this will be demanding an act of excessive confidence."

Then he asked, in the name of himself and his colleagues, that in the powers demanded, that of dissolving the Assembly should not be included.

After these loyal explanations, the Minotto proposal was unanimously voted.

On the 22nd and 27th of February, Manin and his colleagues presented the reports they had promised on their general condition to the Assembly. They showed that from the 22nd of March, to the 12th of August, 1848, they had expended 21 millions of lire; but that from the 12th of August to the 31st of December, the expenditure had not exceeded 14,500,000 lire, owing to the economy introduced into the administration. A corvette of 24 guns, two brigs, and a schooner had been repaired and armed, and were ready to leave the arsenal; the construction of another schooner, a brig, and a frigate, the *Italia*, was advancing rapidly. The number of sailors and marines was 4,845; the troops of the line, diminished by the departure of the Romans, were reduced to 16,430 men, which were about to be reinforced by a levy of 3,000 men. In the forts and islands there were batteries mounting 550 pieces of cannon.

Tommaseo also, on the 2nd of March, made a very remarkable report on his mission to Paris. In connection with his relations with the Hun-

garian envoy in France, the illustrious author born in Dalmatia, and quite *au courant* with Slavic affairs, described his efforts to reconcile the various people that Austria employed to tear each other to pieces. He showed how the Hungarians, in misunderstanding the rights of the non-Magyar populations of the kingdom of Hungary, had given Austria the means of drawing the Slavonians into the Imperial cause, and of throwing them at the same time against Hungary and Italy ; he reminded them that the Italian troops had served to suppress the movements in Croatia, before the Croatian soldiers became the butchers of the Italian people ; in this manner he unveiled all the secrets of the Empire.

After explaining why France, called upon too late, had not been of more assistance to Italy, he concluded by the following words :—

“ Let us respect ourselves and France ; not in hoping too much, but in not despairing of her ; and be assured that when she awakes and learns her own strength, duty, and superiority, she will decide our fate in an instant ; when she wills it,

a sign from her will be a command ; a word from her will be more than a great battle."

The Assembly, however, was organized, and voted its regulations. The government made known to it that they considered its provisional mission as ended (2nd of March). The representative Avesani, proposed "to confer an unlimited dictatorship on the present triumvirs, so long as Venice continued a besieged city—with the exception of submitting to the Assembly every proposition relating to the future political condition of the country."

Avesani demanded a vote of urgency ; the vote was rejected, and the rejection explained by an order of the day, which renewed and maintained the *full provisional power* conferred on the 17th of February (5th of March).

The vote was near being followed by very serious consequences. The people, who always took extreme views of things without modification, understood nothing of the skirmishing between the government and the Assembly, and exaggerated its importance. Previously dissatis-

fied with some votes adverse to Manin's proposals, this time, on hearing the rumour of the decision of "urgency," they believed that it was a plan to deprive them of their leader. The square of Saint Mark rose tumultuously, and the multitude wished to invade the palace of the Doges, where the Assembly held its meetings. Manin had already during the morning twice dispersed the crowds which shouted his name by telling them they held his honour in their hands, and that if they did not disperse it would be said that he was the cause of the disturbance. Heaven made them give a shout for the Assembly. But this time his word would not suffice. Manin then put himself, with his son, at the head of a detachment of the civic guard, and sword in hand opened a passage, and went and placed himself under the portico of the palace, at the foot of the Giant's Staircase, declaring that they would have to pass over the bodies of himself and his son before they should enter the hall of the Assembly. He spake with so much vigour that the people retired, and order was restored.

In the evening the following proclamation was placarded over Venice:—

“BROTHERS!

“You have given me much pain to-day. To testify your affection for me, you have risen in tumult, yet you know I detest tumults.

“The Assembly of your representatives is naturally indignant that you should wish to violate the liberty of its decisions.

“You, who attempt to disturb order, sully the renown you have acquired, and by your discord will help the Austrians to regain Venice.

“As you say you love me, I intreat you to show it by your actions. . . . Have at heart my honour, your own, and that of our beloved country!

“To-morrow let there be no shouting, no meetings. Remain at home. Rely upon the Government and the Assembly, who regard your welfare as dearer to them than life.

“I ask you with confidence, that you will at once show that you are not deaf to the sound of my voice.

“MANIN.”

After exhibiting so much firmness to the people, he spoke no less freely to the Assembly. He urged the next day on that body the impossibility of prolonging a Provisional state of things, which left the Government without moral power, and this, in a State which was only an intrenched camp, and among a people whom it was necessary to govern like an army.

The deputy Olper proposed to nominate Manin chief of the executive power, with the title of President, that the Assembly should retain the legislative and constituent power, that the President should have full powers for the internal and external defence of the country, including the right to adjourn the Assembly. In urgent cases, the President to make legislative arrangements, on condition of having them subsequently approved by the Assembly.

Tommaseo, to maintain the dignity of the Assembly, and to remove every appearance of constraint in its vote, proposed to adjourn the decision until next day. On the 7th of March the proposition was almost unanimously carried.

Manin's authority was strengthened by these

agitations ; and never had this authority been so necessary. A great crisis was approaching.

Austria, unsuccessful in her efforts to put an end to the resistance of Hungary, apprehensive that Hungary would resume the offensive, would have been now disposed to an armistice, and to a semblance of direct negotiation with Venice, in order that she might direct her Venetian army against Hungary, and to deprive Piedmont of the support of the Venetians. She would have entered on negotiations, but concluded nothing. When Hungary was conquered—and direct negotiations had got rid of the mediation of France and England—she would have resumed her attack upon Venice and overwhelmed it. Manin did not fall into the snare.

A decree of the 15th of March enjoined all the officers, naval and military, to return to their posts, and to hold themselves in readiness to execute whatever orders they might receive, and notified the mobilized civic guard to be prepared to sustain the movements of the troops.

On the 16th, Manin wrote in the following terms to Pasini, at Paris :—

“ On the 12th of this month Piedmont declared the armistice at an end.

"This event compels us to quit our state of inaction. We cannot remain idle spectators of a struggle undertaken for our independence.

"During seven months Italy has been nursed with the hope of a pacific solution ; and after this long lapse of time the negotiations have not even commenced.

"From the month of August until the present day Piedmont has supported, without fighting, all the expenses of the war ; and the Lombardo-Venetian provinces have been so horribly oppressed and pillaged that they can expect no remedy except in a new desperate struggle.

"On the one hand, Austria refuses to cede a single inch of reoccupied territory, which it devastates in order to retain ; on the other hand, the mediating powers persist in vexatious inaction, and openly refuse all aid of a nature calculated to change our present condition.

"As for Venice, if it cannot be overthrown by force of arms, it can be left to consume itself day by day, through the near and inevitable exhaustion of all its pecuniary resources.

"While we are required to believe in the maintenance of solemn engagements—while

sympathy is expressed for us, and reiterated assurances of a pacific mediation and a political reorganization of Italy—the Italian nation is abandoned to the tyranny of a sanguinary prince. Depredations, assassinations, executions ordered by a brutal and ferocious pro-consul* are held as legitimate by treaties which Austria has so many times violated.

“What right, then, have the powers to oppose the war about to be recommenced? Why make it a crime for Venice to take part in it? What future can Italy hope for from the mediation of the powers, when we see no preparations for action on the part of France!—when we remember the precise declaration of England that the powers would not interfere as judge-arbitrators to decide the question, but only as mediators to bring about a reconciliation!”

By justifying Venice in following Charles Albert, Manin justified Charles Albert in resuming arms. The accusations of a party of revolutionists against the sincerity of the King of Sardinia were unjust. The statements of the

* Radetzky.

reactionists, who represented that he was forced into the war by the *demagogue* faction, were as unjust as they were unfounded. Charles Albert did not resume the war for fear of an *émeute*: he drew his sword to vindicate his honour and that of Italy, and to raise himself, at any risk, from a most intolerable position. In spite of the retrograde party (*codini*), and the old party in favour of Piedmontese isolation, who dreaded success—in spite of certain people, who had little to hope from the state of disorder of an army still insufficiently organized—in spite of the politicians of Central Italy, who were not yet ready to make Rome and Tuscany seriously interfere in the war—he marched to battle as a martyr walks to the stake. With strong resolution yet but little hope, he appeared to have the feeling that defeat, even if he succumbed, would secure the future.

Manin returned to the struggle, if not with very gloomy presentiments, at least without any illusions as to the immensity of its dangers, and the inequality of the chances.

The army and the people around him were overjoyed with the prospect of action. The con-

fidant nature of the Venetians expanded. The troops, worn out by long months of inactivity, amid the fever of the lagoons, at the idea of entering upon a campaign, acquired a strength, vigour, and ardour, amounting nearly to intoxication.

On the 19th of March, the Commander-in-chief removed his head-quarters to Chioggia. The Venetian General wished to draw the Austrians to that side, to conceal the operations of the Romans for driving out the enemy from Ferrara, then to take part in the campaign of the Piedmontese in Lombardy. A naval division, consisting of three corvettes, two brigs, and a steamer, at the same time joined Admiral Albini to clear the Adriatic, and perhaps make a diversion in favour of the Hungarians, on the coast of Istria, or of Dalmatia. Hungary, which, after the fall of Vienna, seemed nearly crushed under the Austrian yoke, had risen again with brilliant exploits, and its formidable resistance became now an external point of support to Italy.

The first engagement took place on the 21st of March. Less than three hundred Romans

and Lombards, barricaded without artillery, in the village of Conché, near Brondolo, sustained, during five hours, an attack by a thousand Austrians, supported by three pieces of cannon. Finally, they retired in good order. On the 23rd, they returned, under the command of the Lombard Major Sirtori, with a feeble reinforcement of two hundred men, and two pieces of cannon, and retook Conché at the point of the bayonet. Among the usual shouts of *Viva l'Italia*, *Viva la Guerra*, were heard cries of *Viva la Mors*. (Death for ever !)

The army awaited the signal to march. The attention of the people was directed wholly towards Milan. From the 20th of March, the day on which the last prorogation of the armistice expired, until the 25th, Venice was in a state of feverish excitement. The anniversary of the 22nd of March was celebrated with an enthusiasm which Manin tempered by grave and austere words.* On the 25th, rumours of

* "While we are celebrating this patriotic festival, in other parts of the country they are fighting for the sacred cause that is so dear to our hearts.

"Our joy, therefore, should be calm and serious, as

a triumph were circulated. It was said, that Radetzky was retreating, that the Piedmontese were in Milan, that Lombardy had risen *en masse*, and Radetzky cut off from the Tyrol. . . During three days the population rushed about the city as if in a state of delirium; they embraced each other in the streets and the squares; and at midnight the Square of Saint Mark resounded with the *Marseillaise*, played by a military band!

On the 28th, private letters from Turin brought the crushing tidings of the check received by Charles Albert at Mortara, of his utter defeat at Novara, of his abdication in favour of

becomes a people who remember a glorious deed to prepare itself for others more glorious still.

“Be prepared for all the chances of war. Do not show puerile bravadoes in good fortune, nor be cast down in bad.

“War demands sacrifices—it requires internal tranquillity, mutual confidences, the most perfect harmony, an absolute silence upon military operations.

“The places for enrolment are open. You cannot better celebrate the festival of the 22nd of March than by enrolling yourselves in the defence of the country.

“Viva la Guerra!”

his son, and of his departure from Piedmont!

The first impression was that of stupefaction—that overcome, the first movement was to rush to the Square of Saint Mark. In a few moments it was filled with a crowd, which, as usual in all its troubles, cried loudly for its “*father*, Manin!”

“The faith of Venice in this man,” says a foreign witness, “was inconceivable, complete, and absolute.* . . . The people seemed to attribute to him omnipotence and omniscience, and believed him capable of guarding Venice from every peril, and of rescuing her from every calamity.”

After long-continued shouts for Manin, at length the windows of the palace opened, and the dictator appeared on his accustomed balcony. His words were few. He referred the people to the bulletins to be published by the Government, which had not yet received official information—but the grave and sad expression of

* “He had never deceived, never abused it,” adds the narrator.

his countenance fully indicated that he believed the greatest misfortunes had happened. The people tried to doubt still, but the pallor of their cheeks, and the dull murmur of whispered conversation, showed that the sad truth had pierced their hearts like a sword. The ruin of Charles Albert seemed the forerunner of the ruin of Venice—and, to every Venetian, the ruin of Venice was the ruin of his family and children, the deprivation of every private and public good.

It was a fearful night—more terrible, perhaps, than those nights which subsequently were illuminated with the fiery shower of Austrian bombs! Three gloomy days succeeded. The Piedmontese journals confirmed the dismal tidings. At length, on the morning of the 1st of April, Venice, upon awakening from its troubled sleep, saw at the corners of its streets an official bulletin, which put an end at once to its doubts and its hopes.

It was only too true! On the 20th of March, Charles Albert entered upon the campaign: on the 23rd, all was lost. Accused of having badly directed the war of the preceding

year, he had placed the direction of the campaign and the whole command in the hands of a foreign general, a Pole, respected for his military skill,—reserving to himself only the duties of a soldier. He fulfilled these duties as he had ever done—like a hero. He was vanquished. Others have described the respective position of the two armies, the unfavourable conditions under which the struggle was recommenced, and the causes which led to his defeat. After that defeat Charles Albert could not endure to reign or even to live. His religion forbade suicide ; his grief must be the means of his release from life. To his eldest son, Victor Emmanuel, he bequeathed his throne, his sword, and his revenge, and retired to die in exile, leaving a few words of religious hope as a testament to his people :—

“If Divine Providence has not permitted Italian regeneration to be now accomplished, I am confident that it is only deferred—that so many examples of virtue, so many acts of courage and generosity, proceeding from the nation, are not destined to be without result, and that the adversities through which we have passed will only have the effect of teaching the popu-

lations of Italy upon another occasion to be more united and so to be invincible.”

The examples of virtue to which the ill-fated Charles Albert appealed were ere long renewed, nay surpassed, in the sacred citadel and last refuge of Italian freedom !

CHAPTER III.

The 2nd of April—Resistance at any cost—Letter from Manin to Lord Palmerston, and to M. Drouin de Lhuys—Diplomacy abandons Venice—Rigorous blockade—Traits of Venetian character.

ON the 27th of March, the evening before the news of the catastrophe reached the city, Manin received from General Haynau, who had succeeded General Welden in the command of the corps of observation before Venice, a despatch containing the bulletin of Radetzky's victory, with an invitation to *the persons who governed Venice* "to restore it into the hands of its legitimate sovereign, and thus obtain favourable terms for it, instead of rendering, by protracted resistance, measures of extreme rigour inevi-

table; the result of which must be as terrible as sure."

Manin immediately sent to Pepe to suspend all offensive operations, and to return to Venice, after re-placing the troops before Chioggia in their former positions; next he wrote to Pasini, instructing him to explain to France and England the position in which Venice was placed by the defeat of Piedmont. "France will surely protect us on the sea-side! In the present condition of Europe, can France and England be indifferent to the re-occupation of Venice by the Austrians? And if, in spite of those powers, if Austria interferes in Tuscany and the Romagna, would not the independence of Venice be a sustaining point for their policy? It is now time that France should sustain our hopes, and assist in our defence, or openly declare that she abandons us to our fate!"

On the 1st of April the Venetian government received from Admiral Albini, who was at Ancona with the greater portion of the Sardinian squadron, a letter breathing the deepest despair; in which this brave officer officially communicated to Venice the fact of the abdication of Charles Albert.

"The disasters of the Sardinian army have been immense," immediately replied Manin; "but Providence will not abandon so great a people, in their struggle for independence. Venice will persevere in her glorious resistance, and will still expect the assistance of her Italian brethren."

The Venetian government summoned the Assembly to a secret sitting on the same day, and communicated to it the letter from Albini. It was certain that a great catastrophe had occurred, but no one knew what its consequences were—no one could tell whether Piedmont had yielded or had found strength to continue the struggle. On the proposal of Manin the assembly adjourned to the next day, without passing any resolution.

On the 2nd of April the Assembly met again, in that ancient and illustrious council-hall, tapestried with the trophies of Venetian victories, and the marvels of Venetian art—which is the Capitol of the city of the Lagoons: it waited for Manin in profound silence. He entered and ascended the tribune.

"The armistice between Piedmont and Austria is signed," he said in a deep and solemn

voice. "Genoa has risen, determined to resist. So has Casale—and we hope that other cities have followed their example. Such is the news. What do you intend doing?"

"We expect the government to take the initiative."

"Will you resist?"

"We will."

"At any cost?"

"At any sacrifice."

"Will you give me unlimited power to direct the resistance? even to repress, if need be, those who presume to oppose resistance?"

"We will," they replied in one voice.

Minotto, the president of the assembly proposed the decree:—

"The Assembly of Representatives of the State of Venice,

"In the name of God and the People,

"Unanimously

"Decree:

"Venice will resist the Austrian **AT ANY COST.**

"For this purpose the President Manin is invested with unlimited powers."

Upon rising, the whole assembly crowded round Manin, seeking to take his hands and

press them within their own. The decree was voted with one voice, with one heart, and all, raising their hands to heaven, invoked, as witnesses of their oath, the thousand years of their glorious history : and the long series of doges, which, from the walls around, seemed silently to regard them.*

The spirit of old Dandolo, whom the English bard† invoked to enslaved Venice, hovered at this moment over the sublime plebeian who had regenerated Venice.

The whole Assembly was worthy of its chief : it was apparent to all, that ruin had seized upon the Italian cause. Charles Albert destroyed, Parma, Bologna, and Tuscany about to fall inevitably into the hands of Austria : the Roman Republic menaced by France. This same France with England, leaving Venice little hope of succour, while 30,000 men were ready to be-

* In this immense hall there is a collection of portraits of the Doges ; the colossal *Paradise* of Tintoretto, and a multitude of other *chefs-d'œuvre* of Titian, Paul Veronese, Gian Bellini, and others.

† “ Oh, for one hour of blind old Dandolo !

The octogenarian chief, Byzantium's conquering foe.”—*Lord Byron*.

siege and bombard the Venetian isles, already blockaded both by sea and land. The only hope was in a slight chance of diversion on the side of Hungary, victorious over the Austrians, but already menaced by the Russians. Finally, there was the certainty of receiving the most cruel treatment from an enemy incapable of any respect for law or misfortune ; everyone saw this, and yet not one hesitated.

Upon the Assembly leaving the hall, the entire people ratified the decree by unanimous acclamation ; and a red ribbon in the button-hole, as a sign of desperate resistance, was universally adopted.* From the top of the *Campanile* of St. Mark, far above the domes, the roofs, and the spires of the palace and the basilica, beside the golden angel that seemed to watch over the city, they planted a huge red banner, which stood out like a spot of blood against the azure sky, which was seen by the enemy's fleet afar off in the Adriatic, and by

* Manin, almost alone, always opposed to external signs, abstained from this emblem of a resolution, which he had no occasion to remind either himself or others of.

their army on the distant mainland. It defied them both, and announced to them that Venice would fight to the last drop of blood.

“For the first time,” writes an American historian, “in the long history of revolutions, the red flag purified, symbolised the cause of true liberty. From this day, ‘*resistance at any cost*’ became the password on every lip and tongue in Venice.” At the corners of every street, upon every column of the palace, placards were affixed, couched in the following terms:—

“Venice resists! Church plate, women’s golden ornaments, bronze bells, copper cooking utensils, the iron of the enemy’s cannon balls—all will be useful. Anything rather than the Croats!”

On the 3rd General Pepe returned with his troops to Venice, and the most energetic measures were concerted between the dictator and the Commander-in-Chief, to strengthen discipline, to free the army from any elements of discord which might have crept in, to secure upon an ample scale the hospital service, and to protect the soldier as much as possible against

of rights for them, they also remembered that during the persecutions of the middle ages, Venice had offered to them the only asylum in Europe.*

Manin had as an auxiliary, as minister of finance, Signor Maurogonato, a man of the highest merit, who was at home what Pasini was abroad. He did everything that could be

Ludovico Maria *Manin*, and of Cornelia Antonia Maria Balbi.

* In a new edition of the *Curiosities of Literature*, recently published, the following passage from the pen of the author's son appears:—

“My grandfather, who became an English Denizen in 1748, was an Italian descendant from one of those Hebrew families whom the Inquisition forced to emigrate from the Spanish Peninsula at the end of the fifteenth century, and who found a refuge in the more tolerant territories of the Venetian Republic. His ancestors had dropped their Gothic surname on their settlement in the Terra Firma, and grateful to the God of Jacob who had sustained them through unprecedented trials, and guarded them through unheard-of perils, they assumed the name of *DISRAELI* (*God has fought for us*), a name never borne before or since by any other family, in order that their race might be for ever recognized. Undisturbed and unmolested they flourished as merchants for more than two centuries under the protection of the Lion of St. Mark, which was but just, as the patron saint of the Republic was himself a child of Israel.”

done to regulate and employ the unexpected resources furnished by patriotism.

Feeble as their hopes were abroad, there also, until the last spark was extinguished, the struggle was continued with an invincible constancy.

In a despatch to Pasini, dated the 4th of April, Manin instructed him to endeavour to induce the mediating powers to prevent the resumption of hostilities against Venice. As the Venetian army had not re-entered upon a campaign, the affair of an advanced post like that of Conché, where the Austrians had been the aggressors, could not be considered as an offensive operation on the part of the Venetians. He claimed the benefit of a declaration from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, communicated in a letter from Pasini, dated the 19th of March, which promised that, if Venice did not quit the defensive, the mediating powers, even in the event of the defeat of the Piedmontese, would undertake to obtain a special satisfactory arrangement.

He commissioned Pasini to present to the French and English ministers a note, in which he said he did not ask for a definite arrangement for Venice. "Our poverty and weakness prevent us from exercising the rights which,

nevertheless, we feel belong to us. I make no proposition. I name no conditions. . . . Except the return of direct or indirect Austrian domination, the Venetian Assembly will accept, I am certain, any political condition whatsoever the powers can obtain for it. The project of making Venice a Hanseatic city is not new. It may be that present circumstances render every other combination impossible.

“ . . . But even if, to escape Austrian domination, no other resource remains for Venice, than that of giving herself up to France or to England, still, during the negotiations, its independence must be assured.”

The following letter, which was sent to Lord Palmerston, and to M. Drouin de Lhuys, deserves to be quoted entire:—

“MY LORD,

“It is in the name of justice and humanity, of legitimacy and liberty, that the people of Venice implore as prompt a conclusion as possible of that benevolent mediation which for many months past it has hoped for from the freest and most powerful nations of Europe. We are about to relate well-known facts, but

misfortune impels us to do so, and misfortune bravely endured, even when deprived of every other right, is of itself a claim upon generous hearts. The rights of the Venetian people, as is well known, are most ancient and legitimate. Venice rose from its lagoons like a creation of human perseverance and free-will, as a strong protest against foreign violence, which made its history the immediate result of its origin. Guarding its individuality and independence in everything, it contracted honourable relations with the most powerful nations of the earth, and rendered important services to civilization by its arts ; to humanity, by its commerce ; to charity, by its arms. The spontaneous means by which it acquired and kept its domains and political existence, the manner in which it lost its domains and its political existence, concur as testimony of its rights. While promised a truer liberty than it had hitherto known, it was delivered up to a power which had not, at the time, even the right of might. The Holy Alliance, whose office it was to respect all the rights violated by the Revolution and by wars—the Holy Alliance thought not of Venice.

Austria, whose proclamations excited the Italians to fight against France, giving them hopes of recovering their national life, and their inheritance of the past—Austria kept not its promises. England and France, who have recognized the legitimacy of the Sicilian movement, doubtless will not refuse to support our deliverance, the legitimacy of which rests upon the most sacred foundations. Venice, in joining its forces at the moment of the struggle to the forces of the other Italian States, guarded the ownership of its titles no less than it now does in its present efforts at resistance. We do not recall the promises with which Europe has resounded, nor those solemn words in which the pacification of the Peninsula was inseparably united with the idea of enfranchisement, nor the testimony of sympathy which Venice then received, and which in its present situation became equally promises for its future.

“If the other Italian States have hitherto rejected the aid of France, Venice, on the other hand, has been accused of the contrary. The journals of the day acknowledge it; and, if any one of them has ever dared to associate the name

of Venice with a refusal no less imprudent than ungrateful, none of the official acts of the Government can be quoted, which do not exhibit our confidence and gratitude. In this manner, from the commencement of the Revolution, we have addressed to the government of Her Britannic Majesty words the signification of which cannot be doubtful. But if under this relation we were guilty of a wrong, which we are not, it would be an insult to suppose that such governments as those constituting the mediating powers, would condescend to seize upon the slightest pretext to abandon us in our distress. In separating ourselves for a moment from our people, and assuming a pride of merit which is not personal, we may affirm that the principal claim of Venice to the support of the powers, is not so much in what has been done for it, or in what it was promised, as by its sufferings, and the manner in which it has known how to endure them. The history of revolutions does not present many examples of a love of independence, united to such a spirit of sacrifice. No factions, no tumult, no ostentation, no hatred. The new liberty has not extinguished the old piety. The

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habits of a far too peaceful life have given place to severe drillings, to daily privations which are with devotion sustained by all. The duration of our resistance is itself a claim, since it proves that it is not the mere excitement of passion, but a deliberate resolve which guides it.

“ While recommending to you Italy, the whole Italian nation—whose interests are one—whose pacification, which means its emancipation, has become the indispensable condition of European peace, we must entreat you immediately to take our condition into consideration, the prolongation of which ensures the ultimate success of the enemy from our want of pecuniary means. The delays of Austria are deeply calculated. She intends that the diplomacy of the two great powers should be her dupe while it appears to be her accomplice. What Venice solicits is, that the yoke of the Court of Vienna may not in future weigh her down—not that she should be restored all that Campo Formio took from her—but at least be permitted to retain her name, with whatever is strictly necessary to her political existence. Venice places herself under the joint protection of France and England, leaving

to them the choice of means. In these negotiations diplomacy has a fair field, since our deliverance is not a revolution, but the resumption of our historic rights. In the fact of *Venice liberated*, there can be no cause for umbrage; but *Austrian Venice* will be a present shame and a future embarrassment.

“MANIN.”

At the same time that Manin wrote to the existing government of France, he also wrote to M. Bastide, the minister of the preceding government, to ascertain what the Republican party could or would do in the National Assembly. (5th of April.)

“The disasters of the Piedmontese army have not shaken our courage. The Assembly, the people, the government are decided upon resisting *at any sacrifice*. But we are *alone* against the enormous power of Austria: our resources are exhausted: our desperate resolve may make our fall glorious, but cannot prevent it.

“You wrote to me in September, ‘that we were a brave people, whom a courageous

people could not be left to perish.' Our conduct has not changed: France is assuredly a brave nation, and yet we are ready to perish. Will France permit this? Will she abandon us? or, what amounts to the same thing, will she delay her aid so long that we shall not be able to continue our resistance till it comes?

"It is to you that I venture to address these grave questions; because I know your generous loyalty; and in the fearful responsibility that rests upon my head, it is of vital importance for me to know the whole truth, in its utter nakedness, without illusion and without evasion. . . "

Manin's dispatches crossed those which Pasini had sent to him at the end of March. (28th—30th of March.) Pasini informed him that M. Drouyn de Lhuys considered their cause as lost. This minister had said that, "to sustain Venice at the point to which the affairs of Piedmont had arrived was for France equivalent to her declaring war, which could not be done." Pasini vainly appealed to the promises and interests of France, the moral obligation it had contracted, to the lessening its power would undergo by the fall of Venice. All he could obtain was the

promise that Vice-Admiral Ricaudy, commander of the French station, should do every thing he could to aid Venice to resist, "*except fire a gun.*" This restriction annulled the important measure taken by the preceding government in favour of Venice, a measure maintained hitherto by the new government. The French minister concluded by saying that Venice must either decide to defend itself to the last extremity, or surrender without further delay; that if M. Pasini thought he could send to him, in his own name, a proposition to the latter effect, he would gladly offer a friendly mediation.

Lord Ellis, the English plenipotentiary, spoke to the same effect. The language of the French minister was also similar to that held by Lord Palmerston, after he had discovered that the French government would not draw the sword. "English diplomacy," wrote Pasini, "is for *peace*; the *how* is almost a matter of indifference." We have seen that it was not always so.

Instead of a demand for capitulation, M. Pasini sent to M. Drouyn de Lhuys a note, or rather a protest, couched in firm and dignified terms, against the desertion of Venice.

"If we must see France withdraw her support from us at this solemn hour, we may fall, perhaps; but it will not be against us that any just reproach can be made.

"We can always say to all the world that we have fought, that we have suffered, that we have exhausted all our resources, that we have ever maintained the most exemplary moderation, that we have obeyed the counsels of French diplomacy, that we have in no respect embarrassed its action; and yet France has abandoned us, just when our preservation was necessary, in the eyes of the whole world, to fulfil its solemn promises—promises many times repeated—promises inseparably bound up with the dignity, the interests, and the political influence of France." (29th of March.)

M. Drouin de Lhuys did not appear insensible to this noble appeal. Nevertheless he left M. Pasini but very little hope of diplomatic intervention obtaining for Venice—even her recognition as a free city, weak, indeed, but still the last refuge of Italian independence and nationality. He could scarcely admit that discussion was possible, except on the basis of a Lombardo-Venetian kingdom.

Manin received Pasini's dispatch on this conversation on the 21st of April, and immediately sent him fresh instructions. (22nd of April.)

"You are authorized to give your support to the project of a separate and constitutional Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, even should we be obliged to resign ourselves to an Austrian prince."

What it must have cost the man of the 22nd of *March* to write those words may be felt, but not expressed.

His only consolation, in renouncing the idea of a separate and independent existence for Venice, was the hope that this sacrifice would secure better terms for his brethren of the Lombardo-Venetian provinces.

"Your principal care," he continued, "will be . . . that the conditions established are not of a nature to compromise the future too gravely, or to be too hard for a country which for one year has enjoyed liberty and independence, which has become accustomed to it, and in which hatred of the foreign yoke has made immense progress.

"Above all things, and by every means, you

will strive to obtain that no Imperial troops be placed in Venice or in the adjacent forts."

These sad conditions, to which he resigned himself, required at least that diplomacy would obtain an armistice to discuss them.

"One point of vital importance," he said, also in the same letter, "is this—once the general bases are arranged, to put an end to the present situation of Venice; that its security and inviolability be secured during the time necessary to arrange the secondary conditions, in order that we may disarm and put a stop to the crushing expenses of its defence."

Even this moderate request a diplomacy that was resolved not, in any event, to appeal to the sword, refused to support effectually.

Their abandonment by diplomacy and the imminence of those supreme perils of war which Venice had had no serious cause to fear since the 22d of March, 1848—such were the gloomy realities against which Manin and his able auxiliaries exhausted themselves in struggling. The French navy was now prohibited from firing a gun for Venice; and the Sardinian navy had been obliged to quit the waters of Venice and

the Adriatic. In vain had Admiral Albini declared, in reply to Manin, who wrote to him, saying that he still relied upon his squadron, that he would never desert the noble city, and that he would bring his family from Ancona as a pledge of his faith. On the 7th of April, Albini received notice of the armistice to which the Piedmontese government had been compelled to submit, and which imposed the terms that their fleet should be recalled to Genoa. This brave officer, who worthily sustained the traditions of the ancient Genoese navy, obeyed broken-hearted. The Sardinians sailed away. The Austrians reappeared. On the 19th of April they were before Malamocco. The Venetian squadron, which had only 178 guns against 260, and a single steamer against four, felt that it was unequal to a contest, and remained in port.

An effective blockade was commenced. On the 11th of April the consuls warned their respective countrymen of it, in order that they might take measures for quitting the city. The dictator expelled all suspicious foreigners, and others, who took no part in the defence of the city.

Some French and English war vessels, and a

few peasants and sailors from the neighbouring shores, heroic smugglers, who penetrated the circle of the blockade, at the risk of being shot by the Austrians, as happened frequently, were henceforth the only intermedium between Venice and the rest of the world. For many months, not only were those at a distance ignorant of what passed at Venice, but the besieged city and the besieging army, kept at a great distance apart by the peculiar site of Venice, knew almost nothing of each other. "The devoted city seemed," says the American historian, "a voluntary victim, to withdraw, out of sight of the profane, into the sanctuary within which it sacrificed itself for Italian liberty."

Voluntary victim, it is true!—but yet a victim which, while braving death, always hoped that heaven would not leave it to die! A thousand vague rumours amused in their turn this unhappy people, so ardent and greedy of consolation. The unfortunate are very credulous. Now, it was the Hungarians who marched to their succour. Görgey already menaced Trieste, the cannon of the Magyars resounded across the Adriatic—then it was the great American Re-

public which was to restore to Europe the liberty it had received, and shelter Venice under its star-spangled banner—next it was Paris—it was France that had finally awoke, which withdrew itself from its sterile discords to come and retrieve its glory on the banks of the Adige!

To every disappointed hope another succeeded. Two essential traits of Venetian character are what we may call the indestructible faculty of hoping, and a passion for pomp and ceremonies in daily life, under the most brilliant and animated aspect—an artistic passion which has its source in a taste for the beautiful, and not in a frivolous indolence. The genius of the picturesque—child of the sky and the waters of the lagoons, creator of the forms of the fairy-like city, like no other upon earth, in inspiring Venice with a love of excitement and brilliancy, in no respect impairs its more solid qualities, which were never eclipsed in its gloomiest days.*

* When the Consul Vasseur arrived at Venice, upon seeing some fine young men in velvet tunics, plumed caps, and gay scarves, parading in the Square of St. Mark, he at first conceived an unfavourable opinion of

The religious solemnities were never suspended on their usual days during the whole siege. Even the horrors of war became the occasion of other solemnities and new spectacles of reviews, consecrations of banners, extraordinary processions,* and obsequies of the dead who had fallen for their country. Manin was also obliged to take his part in the principal ceremonies. The people, were struck by the contrast of his simplicity, and regarded this little man respectfully, while he walked in dark costume, at the head of the Assembly, beside the tall old general in a brilliant uniform.

Such was the *fête* of Saint Mark, on the 25th of April, at the conclusion of which, Manin, from the balcony of the palace, flung to the people that cry of indomitable hope, so much in harmony with the heart of Venice.

them, and took them for opera heroes. He soon corrected his opinion. They were the youth who formed the invincible company, *Bandiero e Moro*, which defended Malghera

* Such, for example, as took place on the occasion of exhibiting the image of the Virgin, painted, according to tradition, by St. Luke, the Apostle.

“Citizens:—

“Who persists will conquer!

“We have persisted, and we shall conquer!

“Viva San Marco!

“This cry, which for so many ages has echoed over the sea, we will shout again!

“On the sea! on the sea! on the sea! to the sea! . . .”

This voice of the great Venice of former days burst from the lips of the successor of the doges. New Venice, heroic, but weak, was not in a position to respond to it. It could not, in the days of Manin, reappear on the sea; . . . but it was at least faithful to the other words of its chief—it *persisted*.*

It persisted without bombast, without feverish excitement, without lamentations. Even in the excess of peril, until the city fell under the blow

* M. de la Forge relates, that, on the morrow of St. Mark's day, Manin visited the civil hospital. As he approached the bed of a dying old woman, and addressed a few words of hope and consolation, she recognized him, and looked at him intently, and, in a last effort, exclaimed, “Much more than life do I desire the liberty of Italy.” He kissed her hand respectfully. A few moments afterwards, she expired.

of supreme misfortune, sadness never fell upon Venice. This little world of the lagoon sufficed unto itself, and never altered its mode of life during all those days. Nothing betrayed the idea of a city on the verge of famine or assault. Every evening music resounded along the canals, glided with the gondolas over the tranquil waters, and animated the noisy *cafés* of the Piazza. The crowd prolonged its evening promenades in the spring, later than it had done during the peace, or the Austrian occupation. Venice had had one sad hour, on the eve of the outbreak, at the carnival of 1848 ; but when the tempest came, she flung herself joyfully like a sea-bird into the whirlwind of the storm. At the sound of the enemies' cannon, the popular comedy *Dell'Arte* put the Austrians on the stage in improvised buffooneries. Like the ancient Gauls, the Venetians could die laughing.

The great siege operations commenced. The enemy reckoned only too surely on not being disturbed from without. The Western Powers, which should have succoured Venice, would not. Hungary, which too late desired to do so, could not. Austria, in calling the Russian army

from the Carpathians to the Danube, assured themselves full liberty of action in Italy. It was in vain that Tommaseo cried, in a pathetic appeal to Europe :—"The voice that rises from the lagoons will resound throughout the world. Woe to those who do not listen to it." The thunder of the enemies' batteries alone responded to that voice.

The plan of this narrative does not include the development of facts purely military, or what may be called the technicalities of war. The hand which held the sword has taken the pen—the brave and skilful captain who was the soul of the military defence of Venice has just written the history of its siege; and we can refer the reader to that important work, which is calculated to serve and guide the future, as well as to throw light on the past history of the Italian struggle. Referring then to General Ulloa's book, we will confine ourselves to the general outlines which belong to the history of him whose life we are attempting to portray, and which characterise the people of whom this man was the chief, and the faithful expression. "We have," said Tommaseo, in his appeal to Europe, "we have, with our sole resources,

armed more than sixty fortresses, and more than sixty miles of coast. This city, so long unaccustomed to the use of arms, has levied more soldiers than the most warlike provinces have done."

He spoke the truth, and had even understated the facts ; for the immense development of the Venetian fortifications, following all their sinuosities, embraced not less than ninety miles, defended by seventy forts and batteries, and supplied with 550 pieces of cannon. A triple line of defence protected the last asylum of liberty. In the centre stood Venice, with the batteries of the lagoons, and the numerous gunboats of the canals : beyond, towards the open sea, was the line of shore and the isles of the east, with the fortifications of Chioggia, Pellestrina, Malamocco, Lido, then Brondolo, near the mouth of the Brenta, to Tre-Porti, towards the embouchure of the Silé : to the west, on the coast of the main-land, the forts and batteries of the interior shore of the lagoon enclosed the circle from Tre-Porti to Brondolo, with Malghera in the middle.

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CHAPTER VI.

Bombardment of Malghera—General Ulloa—Radetzky and Manin—Hungary and Venice—Consul Vassaur—Provisioning of Venice—Fresh attack against Malghera—Brave defence of Ulloa and the garrison—Evacuation—*Resistance at any cost* maintained—Attack on the great bridge and the forts of the Lagoon—Military Commission—Colonel Rosaroll.

THE enemy prepared to direct its efforts first against Malghera. This great fortress, built by the French between 1808 and 1810, amid the marshes of Ossellino, $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the city, commanding on one side the road from Mestre and Padua: on the other, the great bridge of the Venice railway. On one side it was flanked by the old fortress of O, which had recently

received the name of Manin : on the other by the Rizzardi redoubt, constructed since the Revolution. At the entrance to the great bridge, a battery, named *the Five Arches*, supported it on the third side. Malghera, without the detached forts, contained a garrison of 2500 men, and 130 guns.

The Austrians had several times menaced, without attacking it, during the summer of 1848. This time they returned with the determination to take it at any sacrifice. Haynau had arrived, stained with the blood of the Brescians. He had 30,000 soldiers, which could be renewed from powerful reserves, and an immense artillery.

Trenches were opened on the night of the 29-30th of April, and the enemy pushed his approaches with great vigour, compelling the unfortunate peasants of Dogado, at the point of the bayonet, to labour for the benefit of their tyrants, while exposed to the fire of their fellow-patriots.

Malghera was quite ready to receive the enemy. Its defence was confided to a man whose name was the best guarantee for *re-*

sistance at any sacrifice. The ascendancy of Ulloa over the soldier was maintained to the last both at Malghera and at Venice. He was one of those who command without words, and are obeyed without question or murmur.

It was high time that Ulloa assumed the command. On the 3rd of May Radetzky arrived at head quarters near Mestre, with three of the Archdukes, to whom he had promised the spectacle of the fall of Venice. On the 4th, at half-an-hour after noon, seven batteries, suddenly unmasked, vomited against one of the faces of the fortress the fire of sixty cannons, mortars, and bombs. The Austrians expected to see the garrison struck with terror, and Malghera reduced in a few hours ; and Venice rising against the Dictator, in demanding a capitulation. They were deceived. The garrison replied to their fire by a still more terrible fire, and General Pepe having hastened to share the perils of Ulloa, they received the old chief with joyous acclamations, under a shower of the enemy's projectiles. The losses of the besiegers were incomparably greater than those of the besieged.

As for the population, their demeanour exhibited anything but fear : they hastened in crowds to such points of the city as were nearest to the scene of action. From the platforms of the batteries, from the towers, the roofs, from the Rialto, and from gondolas, the Venetians watched through telescopes the spectacle of this fearful cannonade with most fearless curiosity. It was the same during the whole siege, and danger, as it approached nearer, did not appear to disquiet them.

The enemy's cannonade slackened at night-fall. During the night its only victim was an old horse, an incident which was made the subject of merriment next day by the garrison, who gave a festive entertainment, at which they drank "to the health of the brave Austrians."

On the morning of the 5th of May a flag of truce brought to the commander of Malghera a note, addressed "To the President of the present Government of Venice:" containing a Proclamation from Radetsky to the Venetians. The pitiless conqueror of Lombardy commenced in a paternal tone, by representing the evils of anarchy and revolution ; and concluded by de-

claring that if he bore in one hand the olive-branch of peace, in the other he carried the sword of war, to chastise the Venetians, if they persisted in a rebellion which deprived them of every claim upon the clemency of their *legitimate* sovereign. He would await, he said, at his head quarters, for four-and-twenty hours, the reply of Venice to this *last* summons. His unchangeable conditions were :—1st, absolute submission; 2nd, immediate surrender of the forts and arsenals of the city, to be re-occupied by his troops; 3rd, surrender of arms of every kind. On his side, he made the following concessions :—1st, liberty for those who chose to avail themselves of it, to quit the city within eight-and-forty hours; 2nd, a general amnesty to all inferior officers of the army and navy; 3rd, suspension of hostilities for the twenty-four hours granted for the reply.

The French and English consuls offered their non-official interference in the event of Venice wishing to capitulate. Manin communicated their offer together with the summons to the principal inhabitants. They were unanimous for continuing the resistance. Manin returned to

Radetzky the reply previously made, by order of the Assembly, to a similar summons sent by General Haynau, on the 26th of March. This reply was the decree of resistance at any cost. He added, however, "that under date of the 4th of April he had addressed himself to the cabinets of England and France, in order that, continuing their work of mediation, they might be able to interpose with the Austrian government, to procure for Venice a suitable political condition. . . . Nevertheless these circumstances need not forbid that negotiations should be directly opened with the Austrian minister, in the event that your Excellency should deem this mode proper, to resolve this question more easily and promptly." (6th of May.)

Radetzky, exasperated, replied by the following dispatch:—

"FIELD-MARSHAL RADETSKY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF VENICE.

"His Majesty, our Emperor, having decided to tolerate no longer the intervention of foreign powers between himself and his rebellious sub-

jects, all hope of that nature on the part of the revolutionary government of Venice is vain and illusory. It can only mislead the poor inhabitants. From this moment I cease all farther correspondence ; and I regret that Venice must submit to the fortune of war."

At all events, the threats of the old tyrant of Milan could not be immediately realized ; for the Austrians were not yet prepared to push an attack commenced in haste. Radetzky went off with his archdukes, greatly disappointed at their fruitless journey ; and a few days afterwards Count Thurn came to replace, in the command of the siege, General Haynau, who was called to Hungary, where he repeated his hideous butcheries of Brescia. (16th May.) The Austrians resumed their works with great difficulty, under heavy losses from the cannon of the besieged, from the heavy spring rains, which drowned the men in the trenches, and also from the balls and bayonets of the garrison, which made impetuous sorties from the fortress.

On the 14th of May, Manin received from the English and French cabinets replies to his

letter of the 4th of April. Of the nature of this reply Manin had been previously apprised by the dispatches of Pasini. Lord Palmerston assured him of the great interest with which the British government had regarded not only the immense sacrifices made during upwards of a year by the people of Venice in sustaining the cause they had embraced, but also the good order that had been maintained in the city during that period. Nevertheless, he repeated the statement of his letter of the 16th of October preceding, that the points proposed in August last to the Imperial government by the English and French governments, as the bases of negotiations, did not contemplate any alteration in the provision of the treaty of Vienna, which annexed Venice to the Austrian empire. He, therefore, seriously repeated to the government of Venice the advice to enter, without delay, into negotiations with the Austrian authorities, to "re-establish without collision the Emperor's authority in the city."

The language of M. Drouin de Lhuys was warmer and more sympathetic. There was the difference between French warmth and English

coldness ; but the conclusions were the same. Radetsky had rudely expressed the truth. Austria now arrogantly rejected all mediation ; and it well knew that the French and English cabinets would put up with this arrogance, since they were resolved not to go to war. M. Drouin de Lhuys, after highly extolling Venice and its leader, showed the impossibility, after what had occurred, of bringing the cabinet of Vienna to grant Venice a completely separate existence, which it had refused to it at the very time it had offered to grant it to the Lombards. The French minister then intreated Manin to take advantage of the combination of circumstances which still disposed Austria to spare Venice, and to make to it, under some form or another, important concessions. "It is not necessary for me to tell you that, if you proceed in this manner, France will do everything that depends upon her to facilitate your object."

Did it depend upon the unfortunate liberator of Venice to pursue the course to which he was driven ? His heart was bleeding, yet resigned to anything except that the almost inevitable fall of his country should be utter ruin and complete

slavery. He had taken the first step in the path indicated ; but here also Radetzky had pretty well made it understood that Austria, greedy to recover a despotism, pure and simple, wished neither for an arrangement nor a mediation.

The news from the rest of Italy was very gloomy. A counter revolution had succeeded in Tuscany : the Roman state energetically resisted. France, alas ! which would not interfere in behalf of Venice, interfered in Central Italy, but against Rome.* Fifty thousand French and Italians, who, if united, would have sufficed to drive the Austrians out of the Peninsula, had now commenced cutting each other's throats as in an arena, the amphitheatre of which applauded

* Manin did not receive M. Bastide's reply to his letter of the 5th of April probably until the end of May or the beginning of June. This reply, dated the 10th of May, informed him that a reaction was manifested in the National Assembly on the 9th of May against the policy pursued with regard to Italy. "My friends and myself made our best efforts ; but, as you ask me for the truth, I must give it to you. The truth, then, is, that at present you have no other protection than God and your own courage." The Constituent Assembly had disappeared before the Legislative ; and with the latter there was not a shadow of hope for Italy.

the European counter-revolution. Meanwhile the generous city of Bologna, assailed by an army of fifteen thousand men provided with siege artillery, was reduced to capitulate to the Austrians, whom it had so brilliantly repulsed in its *coup de main* of the preceding year.

Hungary alone, victorious and threatening Vienna—but menaced in its turn by the Russians, who descended from the Carpathians to the succour of Austria—caused Venice to echo with rumours of hope.

Kossuth had written to Manin from Debreczin, on the 20th of April, to inform him of the declaration of forfeiture pronounced by the Hungarian National Assembly against the House of Austria and of his own nomination to the office of Governor of the Hungarian state. This letter only reached Venice on the 23d of May. It was sent from Ancona by the Hungarian General Bratich, who informed Manin that he had received power to negotiate a treaty of alliance with the Venetian government.

Manin communicated Kossuth's note to the Assembly, who heard it with *Vivas* for Hungary and Kossuth; then dispatched the Vice-Presi-

dent of the Assembly, Ludovico Pasini, brother of the envoy to France. By the kind offices of the consul Vasseur, he was enabled to leave Venice in a French vessel, and proceeded to Ancona, there secretly to sign with the Hungarian Envoy a treaty which promised Venice as soon as possible a powerful Hungarian diversion from the shore of the Adriatic and a pecuniary subvention.

What might not have been the consequences of such an alliance had it been concluded during the preceding year ! But Hungary had let the opportunity pass ; and now, so far from being able to save others, the very utmost that could be expected was that she might by heroic exertions retard her own inevitable ruin.

On the 20th of May, an Austrian *parlementaire* came to intimate to the foreign consuls of the expiration of the time granted to their respective citizens to quit the city. About two thousand persons quitted it. Ten days previously, General Haynau had called on the English and French consuls to remove their ships-of-war, which must cease all communications with the place. The last feeble hopes and consolation for Venice would depart with the French flag, before

which even the sack of Messina, taken by assault, had lately been stopped. The friendly Vice-Admiral Ricaudy no longer commanded the station. The energetic consul Vasseur immediately advised his successor not to obey the Austrian summons, and replied to the besieging general, that he did not feel himself competent to decide on the questions as to the rights of war, which were involved, and that he must refer to his government. The French government, instead of ordering him to depart, sent an additional ship. The arrogance displayed by the minister of Vienna, in his diplomatic relations, wounded the pride of the French ministry, although unfortunately their resentment did not carry them to any great resolves. They supplied the worthy consul, however, with the means, if not of defending the cause, at least of protecting, in case of extremity, persons and humanity. The Austrians dared not insist; and the French and English vessels-of-war kept free communication with the port, on condition of communicating only with their consuls.*

* The brave French sailors would have preferred any other course to this sad neutrality. A short time before

The blockade, although from time to time some little coasting barques escaped it, began to make its effects tell against the city. The extensive provisioning effected in the early days of the Revolution, and which had been preserved intact up to the time of the blockade,* still as-

the parleyings referred to, an Austrian steamer had wished to prevent the French steamer *Solon* from entering the port of Venice. M. Robin immediately directed his vessel into the midst of the besieging squadron, demanded a written apology from the Austrian admiral, and obtained it.

* The history of this provisioning is interesting, and does honour to the Venetian government, and particularly to M. Pincherle, who directed the finances during the first period of the Revolution.

From the end of March, 1848, that is, immediately after the expulsion of the Austrians, they considered it their duty to provide against a blockade; and a survey of the cereals then in the city was made. Maize, with which the Venetians make their *polenta*, and rye were abundant. There was only a small quantity of wheat. It was resolved to secure a provision of bread for at least three or four months. This was not easy, as all the principal markets in the neighbourhood were in the hands of the enemy.

The government met the difficulty. It charged the Venetian Commercial Company to purchase, as on its

sured the moderate price of bread ; but except bread and the marine products of the lagoon, all kinds of provisions became scarce and dear. An effort was made to remove the scarcity.

own account, one hundred thousand hectolitres of wheat, one-half in the Trieste market, the other at Ferrara. When the Society had made the purchase, the Austrian authorities of Trieste prohibited the exportation of grain to Venice. The Venetian government then had recourse to an English commercial house, established at Venice, which chartered for two months all the English vessels then in port (there were five), and sent them in ballast to Trieste. The agent of the English house loaded these vessels with the grain bought by the Commercial Society, and the captains notified the Trieste authorities that they were going to Corfu. When ten leagues from port, the captains, in accordance with the orders they had received, opened their sealed instructions, which directed them to proceed straight to Venice with their cargoes.

As the five vessels could only carry twenty-five thousand hectolitres, they made a second voyage. The newspapers published no account of their arrival at Venice, and the vessels sailed again for Trieste as quickly as possible. From their quick return, the Trieste authorities were well assured that they had not been to Corfu. But the Austrians were also aware that, if the British cabinet wished at that moment to engage the King of Sardinia not to interfere with the maritime commerce of

On the 17th of May, the squadron sailed out of the port. The enemy's squadron took the offing, to entice the Venetians to fight ; but the Venetian flotilla did not follow it, and attained its object. It enabled a good number of small craft, laden with provisions, to enter the port, which quickly availed themselves of the opportunity. Some days afterwards, sorties from Tre-

Austria, it certainly would not tolerate on the part of Austria any obstructions to English commerce. The five vessels completed their voyage ; and before the end of April the fifty thousand hectolitres from Trieste and the fifty thousand from Ferrara were safely stowed in the granaries of Venice. The difficulties on both points had been surmounted with skill and success. The provisioning was husbanded as prudently as it had been formed. The full liberty of commerce in grain was maintained. Notwithstanding the impediments from time to time offered by the enemy, the free commerce sufficed to nourish the city up to the date of the strict blockade (April, 1849), without the reserve being in the least degree touched ; and the government, so frequently distressed for want of money, had always, in the most critical situations, the courage to resist the temptation to realize about two millions by selling its corn.

This corn gave to Venice the possibility of four months of heroism.

Porti and Brondolo, on the mainland, brought in a very considerable quantity of cattle and provisions.

Public spirit was admirably sustained. A subscription was raised to have a medal struck in commemoration of resistance at any cost. On one side was engraved the decree—the other represented Venice, with a sword in one hand, and the Italian flag in the other, the lion of Saint Mark at her side, with the following line from Dante, for a legend :—

Ogni viltà convien che qui sia morta.

Every fear must in this place be dead.

“Every fear, in fact, was dead,” in Venice and its army. They had soon to endure a new trial. The Austrians, this time much better armed and provided against a place of the third class, with sufficient means to reduce a place of the first class, recommenced at daybreak, on the 24th of May, the bombardment of Malghera. In place of 60 pieces of artillery, firing at a distance of 1000 mètres, as on the 4th of May, 150 opened fire at 500 mètres. The peril was increased tenfold. The courage of the garrison

increased with the dangers. In a battery served by the company *Bandiera e Moro*, a troop formed of the flower of Venetian youth, three marksmen were killed at the same piece in an hour; the fourth, a young man fresh from the counting-house, took their place, without heeding the commander himself, who entreated him to temporarily abandon the piece. The new marksman remained at his post until the next day. The artillerymen of the Rizzardi redoubt remained three days in their batteries, without stirring, with only biscuits and water for nourishment. A crowd of infantry volunteers disputed who should take the place of the artillerymen that fell. A Venetian, whose legs were carried away by a cannon-ball, clapped his hands upon falling, and died, crying, "*Viva Venise!*" A patrician named Correr, visiting his son working in a battery, manned by the company *Bandiera e Moro*, was struck down by a bomb. His son threw himself upon his body—the bomb, in bursting, tore their interlaced bodies to pieces.

The enemy's fire continued with frightful violence during the day of the 25th of May, the following night, and the day of the 26th.

More than 60,000 projectiles had during the three days been thrown into the fortress—a fire which, it is said, surpassed that of the French, in 1831, against the powerful citadel of Antwerp. The ramparts, battlements, and embrasures were crushed to pieces—the parapets so ruined, that the gunners were exposed—the gabions being exhausted, their place could not be supplied—the hollow balls pierced through, and scattered everything—the casemated barracks, torn by so many projectiles, were no longer proof against the bombs, which penetrated the masses of rubbish, and killed the soldiers in their rooms. Many of the guns were dismounted, and more than half the batteries of the place reduced to silence. Out of the garrison, consisting of twenty-five hundred men, five hundred were either killed or disabled. Ammunition began to fail, and could only be brought from the city through an incessant shower of iron or of fire which intercepted the route.

They were compelled, on the morning of the 26th, to take a deliberate view of their situation. It was evident that the enemy would be able to

assault the place on the morrow. They could make the victory cost him very dear—but it was almost impossible to prevent him succeeding, so to speak, by main force. It would be much better to preserve these brave men for the defence of Venice. On the 2nd of May, Manin wrote to Pasini in the following terms :—

“ You know that no *artificial* fortress is impregnable. Consequently, Malghera also can be taken. It is possible even, that our artillery being silenced, we should find it preferable not to expose ourselves to a forced surrender, but to abandon this external fort, and concentrate our defence upon the lagoons. Therefore, if you should hear that Malghera is occupied by the Austrians, you must not conclude that Venice has succumbed also.”

What Manin foresaw, he put in execution. On the 25th, in anticipation of an assault on the 27th, he proposed to General Ulloa the evacuation of the fort. The latter wished to hold it during the 26th, and asked for a decree ordering him to retreat. Manin sent him the following document :—

“The Provisional Government of Venice :

“Considering that the exigencies of military honour are satisfied by the striking proofs of capability, courage, and perseverance given by the garrison of Malghera and its excellent General. . . .

“Considering that strategic reasons, and the necessity for husbanding our resources, military and pecuniary, in order to prolong the resistance, demand that the defence of Venice be reduced to its natural limits, within which it is really impregnable :—

“After having consulted the Commander-in-Chief, and proposed the following to the army and navy departments :

“Decree :

“1st. That the fort of Malghera shall be evacuated.

“2nd. That Colonel G. Ulloa be charged with its execution.”

Ulloa directed the evacuation with as much prudence as he had directed the defence with heroism. Profiting by some hours of repose granted by the enemy's general to his troops

before the assault, at nine o'clock in the evening they quitted the fort, after rendering part of the cannon unserviceable, loading the others to the muzzle, and leaving lighted matches upon them, the time of burning of which had been nicely calculated. The gunners at first obstinately refused to quit their pieces. They shed tears, as they embraced them before spiking them. The forts Rizzardi, Manin, San Giuliano, and Cinque Archi were all abandoned at the same time. Fortunately, the Austrians, overcome with fatigue, were not very watchful, and had no suspicion of the intentions of the Venetians. This difficult retreat, which, in spite of the precautions taken, might possibly have failed, been cut off, or perhaps followed to the great bridge by the enemy, if any traitor had betrayed it, or sentinels had given the alarm, was accomplished by means of the bridge and the barges of the lagoon without the slightest loss. The Austrians only learned of the evacuation through a patrol, who at daybreak, hearing no noise, and seeing no person, advanced step by step, and, emboldened at encountering no obstacle, at length penetrated the deserted fortress. The Austrians took

possession of a mound of ruins, once the fort of Malghera. They could not walk four paces without falling into a bomb-hole. The cannon still continued to go off as the matches burnt down, and every cannoneer in his turn fancied he could recognize from the city the *last word* of his favourite piece. Fort San Giuliano blew up, carrying with its debris the bodies of an Austrian detachment which had gone to occupy it. These were the last farewells of the defenders of Malghera.

Fort *Cinque Archi* blew up at the same time as San Giuliano, and thus cut off communication with Venice from the mainland by the railway bridge.

Manin, as was his wont, had not deceived his people. The great advanced post of the mainland had fallen. Venice remained untouched within the lines of defence of the lagoons. Still the circle of iron and fire narrowed. Every one felt the near approach of great perils. We have seen a note of Manin's, a draft of a will, in which he distributed souvenirs to those he loved. Foremost stands the legacy of his bust to the French consul, a valuable testimony ren-

dered to a brave man who, to say the least, worthily represented the sentiments of France at Venice to the very last, although it was not permitted him to represent its power.

At the foot of the page are these words :—

“29th of May.

“Our lives are in the hands of God : our honour is in our own.”

A note in M. Vasseur's journal testifies to the anguish Manin suffered. He well knew that prolonging the resistance would exhaust the last resources of Venice, and render the enemy more implacable ; but it was impossible for him to entertain the idea of surrender, while the last resources were not exhausted. This would be not only to tarnish the glory of Venice, but to provoke anarchy ; for the people and the army would inevitably rebel against such a step.

“Better to maintain union and the struggle so long as they could bear weapons !”

The impression created by increased danger betrayed itself only by redoubling the energy of every one. The people of Venice, and even the

courageous mariners of the Chioggia, came in crowds to assist the soldiers in destroying, in a few days, eight arches of the great bridge, besides the five which had been blown up. This prodigious bridge, of 222 arches, is 3,600 metres (4,000 yards) in length. Four strong batteries, three of which were upon the bridge itself, the fourth on a small island, and a flotilla of gun-boats protected this immense causeway, henceforth widely separated from the mainland. Ulloa, surrounded by an *élite* of heroic officers—Cosenz, Rosaroll, Sirtori, Virgili—commanded all this part, the most essential of the lines of defence, and held, it may be truly said, the key of Venice.

The civil authorities rivalled the military authorities in vigilance: the annony commission took measures to prevent monopoly, and tariffed the provisions. The economy of a besieged city has nothing in common with the normal conditions of political economy. (End of May.)

On the 31st of May, the Assembly, after having, in secret committee, received from the Dictator a communication as to what he had

attempted in the way of diplomacy, issued the following decree :—

“ In the name of God and the People.

“ 1. The troops on sea and on land, by their valour, the people, by their sacrifices, deserve well of the country.

“ 2. The Assembly, persisting in its deliberate decision of the 2d of April, confides in the valour of its troops and the perseverance of the people.

“ 3. The President of the government, Manin, remains authorised to continue the negotiations entered upon, subject to the ratification of the Assembly.”

In the evening, Manin proclaimed from the balcony of the national palace the unanimous resolution of the Assembly, amid the plaudits of the multitude. Next day, at a review held on the Square of St. Mark, the crowd enthusiastically applauded the garrison of Malghera, and especially its intrepid commander, whom Manin raised to the rank of General. “ You have come to behold a portion of the glorious defenders of our forts,” cried Manin. “ Long live the gar-

rison of Malghera ! We have had some losses, and the gaps in our ranks must be filled up. To the enlistment offices ! Venetians, enlist yourselves !”

On the 3d, Manin temporarily closed the “unions,” a sort of clubs, from whence imprudent motions frequently emanated, and which, without any hostile intentions towards the Dictator, were the cause of dangerous agitations at times. No opposition was made ; and no occasion occurred to exercise severity against any of the members. During the long siege, there never occurred in the city any occasion to place it for a day *in a state of siege*.

From the 2nd to the 6th of June, the enemy, who could only maintain the blockade at the cost of much suffering and cruel losses, decimated by the fever of the lagoons, attempted attacks in full force against the southern lines of defence, towards the mouths of the Adige and the Brenta by land, and towards Chioggia and Brendolo by sea. They were repulsed at every point. After these fresh conflicts, the Director made arrangements for the benefit of the families of the killed.

On the 13th of June, the Austrians, who, since the fall of Malghera, had made the most energetic efforts to establish their position in the ruins of the *tête du pont* and of Fort San Giuliano, which it had cost them so dear to carry, opened the fire of six batteries against the works of the great bridge. The Venetian artillery had not permitted the enemy to finish his works except at the expenditure of much blood. It continued to reply in a most formidable manner to the enemy's fire, but could not silence it, and some Austrian bombs began to fall at the entrance of Canareggio, that quarter of Venice nearest to the great bridge. This was, at first, a source of great astonishment among a people who, for fourteen centuries, regarded themselves as absolutely invulnerable in the depths of their lagoon, and supposed that nothing could reach them but famine. The people of Canareggio were astonished, but not daunted for an instant. "You may bombard us," they said, "but you cannot come in. The bombs are more welcome than the Croats. Let our old houses fall!" And they quietly withdrew, with their furniture and other effects, to

the portion of their quarter which was least exposed to their fire.

On the 16th of June, the Assembly delegated full powers upon all questions of war to a commission composed of General Ulloa, Lieutenant-Colonel Sirtori, and Baldisserotto, lieutenant of the navy. The popular enthusiasm for Ulloa, and the desire to transfer the military direction into younger hands than those of Pepe and Cavedalis, had dictated this decree.

It was not between such men as Manin and Ulloa that a conflict about functions could arise. The young and modest general hastened to come to an understanding with the Dictator to avoid or repair anything that could hurt the feelings of his old commander, Pepe ; and a decree (arranged between the Dictator and the commissioners) called the respected veteran to the presidency of the commission which united the whole administrative control of the army and navy to the functions of Commander-in-Chief (18th June).

The command of the fleet was entrusted to the young captain of a corvette, named Buccia, who possessed much talent and courage. The paper-money, which, upon the attack of Mal-

ghera, had for a time fallen to 50 per cent., now rose in value. "There is perfect tranquillity," wrote M. Vasseur, in his journal.

The Commission called upon all the Venetian youth to enlist themselves for the period of the duration of the war (20th of June).

On the evening of the 19th, a terrible explosion threw all Venice into commotion. The gunpower mills on the Isle of Grazia had blown up. The damage done was much less than could have been anticipated; but the moral injury caused by this accident was much worse than the accident itself. A cry of "treason" was raised. The people had been much discontented with the annony commission (Committee of Subsistence), on account of the inferior quality of the mixed bread they had made for the past fortnight. Some evil-disposed persons, perhaps agents of Austria, took advantage of the popular excitement to collect a tumultuous crowd under the windows of the Government, who uttered threats of death against the supposed traitors, and loudly called for the dismissal of the subordinate officials.

Manin did not keep them long waiting. He

appeared hastily at his balcony, and, in an angry voice, said :—

“Venetians ! do you think this conduct worthy of you ? But you are not the people of Venice, you are only a handful of the factious ! Never will I submit my conduct to the caprices of an excited mob ! I shall submit myself only to the legal representatives of the people legally assembled. To you I shall always speak the truth, even when your guns are pointed at my breast, or when your swords are directed against my heart. And now—go ! go ! all of you !”

The people responded by a formidable cry of “Viva Manin !” The disturbers of the peace dared not reply a single word ; and in a few moments, the Square was empty. A single shout at this moment against Manin would have been a sentence of death against him who uttered it.

What is most extraordinary is, not that there should have been sometimes attempts at creating disturbances, but that there should have been so few, and those so easily checked, amid a people surrounded by so many dangers, submitted to so many privations, and feverishly excited by

the periodical din of a cannonade, which was never discontinued for an hour during weeks—nay, months!

On the 23rd of June, Venice suffered a great loss. The powder magazine of the great battery of the railway bridge (called the San Antonio) exploded. Colonel Rosaroll, the commander of the battery, repaired the disorder, rallied his men, remounted the national flag which the explosion had blown down, and waved it in defiance of the Austrians. He fell, mortally wounded by a bullet. He was one of those Neapolitan officers who, at Venice, so gloriously redeemed the honour of the army and the country. Strange country, this Naples, where such glorious minorities have for more than sixty years devoted themselves to a people who hitherto have shown themselves so little deserving of it, but of whom we must not despair while it produces such men!*

“To your guns!” cried Rosaroll, in a dying voice to his cannoneers, who ran to him, on seeing him fall, “to your guns!” Turning to

* Who can tell what change a few years of enlightened, free and honest government may produce in this people!

his friend Cozenz, he said, "I leave to you my battery! may it save Venice!"

The priest who was summoned to perform the last offices, asked Rosaroll if he died in peace with all mankind. "I have not an enemy in the world," he replied, "except the King of Naples and the Austrian invaders."

Rosaroll had spent fifteen years of his life in the irons of the King of Naples; and the word *irons* was in this case no metaphor; fifteen years he had spent in a dungeon and in chains, like Baron Trenck; and he only came forth to precipitate himself, all bent and stiff as he was by his fetters, into the torrent and whirlwind of the most heroic and stormy activity. The Frenchman jests at death, but dreads a prison. With him it is the highest act of courage to brave one. The Italians, habituated from childhood to looking the idea of captivity in the face, support with comparative impunity terrible imprisonments under which ardent Gallic natures would hopelessly pine away. The Venetian Coluzzi succeeded Rosaroll at the great battery, under the Neapolitan Colonel Cosenz, who was chief commander of all the defences of the great bridge since Ulloa had been appointed to the central commission. Coluzzi

was also killed on the 5th of July ; and during the night of the 6th—7th the great battery was surprised by an Austrian detachment, which arrived in barges. Cozenz, hastening to the spot, fell upon the Croatian bayonets. A corps of reserve rescued him, and drove the assailants into the sea.

CHAPTER VII.

Negotiation with M. de Brück—It fails—Appeal to the opinion of Europe—Measures for subsistence—The *bomb*-ballons—Grave situation—Vessels freighted by the consul Vasseur—Manin and the Assembly, 28th July—Bombardment of Venice—Heroism of the population—The Castellani and the Nicolotti—Losses experienced by the Arts.

HOSTILITIES had been incessant during all the month of June, without the enemy having made any progress since the evacuation of Malghera. Negotiations had made equal progress with the hostilities.

Manin, reluctantly yielding to the advice given by Paris and London, had tried a means of directly negotiating with Austria ; and, on the 11th of May, wrote to M. de La Cour, the *chargé*

d'affaires of France at Vienna, begging him to obtain safe-conduct for Pasini, who would come and treat with the Austrian cabinet. This request the Austrian cabinet refused to comply with, and referred the Venetians to Radetzky. Nevertheless Austria thought better of it. The Hungarians showed themselves still very formidable; the ruin of Malghera had not intimidated the Venetians; and the English and French cabinets were dissatisfied at the refusal to negotiate with the Venetians. M. de Brück, the Austrian minister of commerce, who was in Lombardy, arrived at Mestre on the 31st of May, and sent to the advanced posts of the Venetians a dispatch, addressed to the *Advocate Manin*. The officer charged with receiving the letter refused it, saying that he knew of no person of the name of Manin except the President of the Venetian government. M. de Brück altered the address. M. de Brück reminded Manin of his reply of the 5th of May to the proclamation of Field Marshal Radetzky, in which reply allusion was made to direct negotiations with the minister of the Emperor.

“Although,” he said, “I do not know in

what these negotiations consist, yet, to exhaust every means of moderation, I am authorized to inform you that I may be found at the head quarters, near Mestre, until eight o'clock to-morrow morning."

Manin immediately convoked the Assembly to a secret sitting. He communicated to it the diplomatic situation ; how the dispatches from the English and French cabinets clearly established that in future they would not wish to interfere between Venice and Austria ; of the fruitless attempt to negotiate with Vienna ; of the négociation with Hungary. He stated that the English consul had declared to him on several occasions that he considered all further resistance as a personal caprice of himself, Manin, and that, consequently, he held him personally responsible for all the misfortunes that might ensue, if the Austrians should take Venice by main force. Questioned as to the conditions upon which the Austrians expected to obtain the surrender, the consul had replied—"Without conditions, as the Austrian government would never consent to treat with rebels."

The proceedings of M. de Brück appeared to

disappoint Mr. Clinton Dawkins, who was more Austrian than Austria itself. Manin communicated the letter from the Austrian minister, and asked the Assembly what he should do. He exhibited the sad reality, just as it was. "The distant hope of succour from Hungary, itself about to be attacked by the Russians, shall it induce us to reject the overture of the Minister de Brück? *It is quite certain that negotiations can lead to nothing*; but if we refuse to negotiate, he will take advantage of our refusal, and with some show of truth proclaim that we are unworthy of the sympathy of free people, having refused the honourable conditions they wished to offer to us."

Upon the proposal for a commission, named at the request of Manin, and which made its report during the sitting, the Assembly authorized the President of the Government to negotiate with M. de Brück, or with the cabinet of Vienna, upon the basis of the instructions addressed to Pasini on the 22nd of April, subject to the ratification of the Assembly.

The decree above named at the same time with this secret authorization was voted, in order

to reassure the army and the people against any idea of capitulation. It was a treaty, and not a capitulation, they wished to enter upon.

Manin sent the decree to M. de Brück, and requested of him safe conduct for two citizens intrusted with his confidence, whom he was ready to send, in order to treat of a compromise, which assured a suitable political condition to his country. A first conference was held, on the 2nd of June, at the enemy's head-quarters, between the Minister Brück and General Count de Thurn, on the one part, and on the other the Venetian Envoys Calucci and Foscolo. The interview was courteous. General Thurn was not a Haynau. He even complimented the Venetians upon the defence of Malghera. The Venetians demanded the independence of the city of Venice, with a territory that should render its existence economically possible. M. de Brück replied that this basis was inadmissible; that Austria was firmly resolved to recover Venice; and that he could discuss only the future constitution of the country. And he read to the Venetians a project of the constitution of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom. He then

concluded with three alternatives, the selection among which he left to Venice :—

1. Venice annexed to the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom.

2. Venice the capital of a Venetian kingdom.

3. Venice a separate imperial city, like Trieste.

The envoys declared that they were without powers to treat upon such bases, and that they could only refer to their government.

On their return to Venice, they were charged to write to M. de Brück, to beg him to state in writing the bases of the project of a constitution, and to indicate precisely in what the guarantees of the imperial cities consisted. (3rd of June.)

M. de Brück, in his reply, repudiated having made any *proposals*. “He had,” he said, “only suggested *ideas*. The first point of a constitution, either for Lombardo-Venetia or for Venetia alone, is a *guarantee of their nationality* by the participation of the deputies of these countries in the debates of the parliament of the Empire upon all questions affecting the general interests of the monarchy, and by the establishment of a national diet for laws special to the Venetian or Lombardo-Venetian kingdom. The largest municipal liberty to be accorded to the whole

Empire. The fundamental rights which are prior to the constitution of the Empire to be applied to Lombardo-Venetia, with such modifications as the national character might demand, especially in matters relating to the independence and supremacy of the Catholic church." (5th June.)

As to Venice being a separate Imperial city, like Trieste, and administered by a municipal body, which would at the same time have the attributes of a provincial diet, he pointed out the serious drawbacks on the prosperity of the city which such an arrangement would entail.

The reply of the Venetian Commissioners to this strange *guarantee* of nationality offered to them was very energetic:—

"The offer you have made is to acquiesce in a capitulation pure and simple. Be assured, your Excellency, that the people of Venice—still mindful of the traditions of a free existence, accustomed to independence for fifteen months, and having acquired still more affection for their new institutions, from their having cost them so many sacrifices and blood—would refuse to listen to its government if it held such language, and for the first time we should see discord and anarchy spring up.

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“ We had great promises made to us in 1815. Your Excellency must honestly admit that they have not been kept.”

“ Now you do not even offer us promises, but simply hopes, accompanied meanwhile by a military occupation of an indefinite duration.”

“ His Majesty the Emperor, in a notification of the 16th of September, 1848, promised to make of Lombardo-Venetia a separate kingdom, tributary, but with a distinct political existence. If this be offered to us as a basis of negotiation, especially if modified by the wise suggestion of your Excellency, to make Venice the capital of a Venetian state—we have no doubt that we should receive full power to terminate the war. (June 9th.)”

M. de Brück, in his reply, alleged that the Constitution of the 4th of March, 1849, established that Lombardo-Venetia should form an integral part of the Empire. With this reservation, it was not a matter of mere hope, but of an actual concession of the institutions which would be compatible with this principle of unity. (11th of June.)

Manin submitted the whole of the negocia-

tions to the Assembly. (15th June.) The Assembly judged the proposals of the Cabinet of Vienna to be *too indefinite* for them to come to a *precise* decision, and instruct the government to ask for the necessary explanations, in order to ascertain whether it could treat or not. (16th of June.) Alas ! the intention was only too precise, although the form was not. It was absorption, more or less complete, into the foreign monarchy ! It may readily be conceived what Manin suffered, when reduced to discussing such things !

It was then, as we have seen, that the Assembly instituted a military commission, with fresh powers for war affairs. It created at the same time, but secretly, a purely consultative diplomatic commission, with which the government might confer in all that concerned the negotiations.

So long as Manin retained the hope of acting a great part he would not have tolerated any partners in the executive authority. At the point to which things had now arrived, he made no opposition, allowing words to escape from his lips that must have cost him the bitterest pangs.

“Resistance at any cost is not equivalent to saying, carry on the war indefinitely. Every war necessarily terminates in peace, and the terms of that peace must depend upon the relative strength of the belligerent powers.”

On the 17th of June, he wrote to the Austrian minister that he hoped it would be possible to regulate the institutions of the kingdom and its relations with the empire, so as to guarantee the well-being and national dignity of Venetia, according to M. de Brück's own expressions, and he charged MM. Calucci and Ludovico Pasini to resume the conferences.

M. de Brück made an appointment with the Venetian agents at Verona, on the 21st of June. Ludovico Pasini, quite as skilful as his brother, drew from the Austrian minister distinct declarations. The cabinet of Vienna not only refused to permit any debate upon the question of the unity of the empire, but they would not allow the Venetian envoys to discuss in detail the plan of a constitution for the Lombardo-Venetian provinces, which M. de Brück had drawn up under the directions of the Emperor. M. de Brück was not authorized to make any essential change in this project.

M. de Brück read the proposal to Manin's envoys. The fundamental rights accorded to all the empire were liberty of the press, individual liberty, liberty of association, &c.—with the reservation that these rights might be suspended in case of war or of internal troubles. There would be only one army, one navy, one public treasury for the whole empire ; a central ministry, to regulate the affairs of industry and commerce ; other ministries to direct communications of every kind, public works, police, &c. The Lombardo-Venetian kingdom would have, for all matters relating to its local interests, provincial and communal councils—a diet, composed of a senate and a chamber of deputies—and a state council, to aid the executive power, which would be exercised, under the control of the central ministry, by a governor and a council of government, appointed by the sovereign ; the citizens of all the provinces indiscriminately to be called to office throughout the empire. The State Council to be elected partly from the Senate, partly from the Chamber of Deputies.

It was clear that the diet of the kingdom would have only a purely nominal authority, between the

state council, which, with the governor and his council, would decide in local affairs—and the parliament of the empire, which would decide upon all great questions with the central ministry. This was in fact, if not in appearance, nearly the state of things before 1848. The functionaries and German soldiers would return; there would only be a few more powerless deputies. Nationality would be stifled under the Imperial Babel.

But this was not all. These institutions, such as they were, were to be established only when the peace of Italy and Europe was assured. Until then there would be the *regime* of military government and a state of siege!

The envoys, concluding that their instructions did not permit them to continue the negotiations, quitted Verona. (22nd of June.)

Next day M. de Brück wrote to the Venetian government that he regarded it as superfluous to return to the question of the future political condition of Venice after the explanations given to the envoys; but he hastened to declare, in concert with Field Marshal Radetzky, that nothing should prevent him from settling some

points over and above the conditions accorded the 4th of May by the Field Marshal. Thus the paper money, as a communal debt, would be reduced to two-thirds of its nominal value; and the paper styled *patriotic*, as well as all claims arising from forced loans, would be reduced to one-half. The municipality of Venice would be bound, at its own expense, to redeem the paper money after a very brief delay; and in consideration of this charge, the city would not be levied upon for contributions of war. All *foreign* military officers and employés,* and those who had formerly been in the service of Austria, to quit the city by sea, at the expense of the municipality, together with forty of the inhabitants, to be named at the time of capitulation, &c.

The Field Marshal granted eight days for the acceptance of these last conditions.

On the 30th of June, Manin presented the enemy's ultimatum to the Assembly.

"At length," he said, "we have in our hands documents which prove that Austria, whatever may be said to the contrary, is not

* That is to say, Italians not Venetians.

changed! It proposes to us simply a capitulation. Now, having a first-class place of defence in our hands, not yet reduced to the last extremity, can we capitulate honourably?" By a vote of 105 voices out of 118, the assembly made the following declaration:—

"After hearing the communications from the government;

"After reading the contents of the diplomatic correspondence;

"Seeing that the offers of Austria respecting Lombardo-Venetia, on the one hand, neither secure the rights nor respect the dignity of the nation,—and, on the other, reduce themselves to mere promises, void of all guarantee, and to be only fulfilled at the will and pleasure of Austria itself:

"Seeing that the special offer to Venice reduces itself to a dishonourable capitulation;

"And having heard the declaration of the government, that the terms of the negotiations will be made public, so that Europe may be judge between Austria and Venice;

"The Assembly proceeds to the order of the day."

Manin sent this minute to M. de Brück.

The people, as resolute as on the occasion of the preceding decrees of resistance, but more excited and more turbulent, threatened some of the members as they left the Assembly, whom they suspected of having voted against the order of the day; one of them, a canon, had excited a great disturbance in the assembly by some inopportune remarks. Manin found it necessary to interfere, and to remind the crowd that the liberty of voting must be respected.

On the 24th of June, immediately after receiving M. de Brück's last despatch, Manin addressed a beautiful and noble letter to M. de Tocqueville, the new French Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had succeeded M. Drouyn de Lhuys. He wrote him a summary of all the negotiations which had only resulted in this, he said, "that the unity of the empire did not permit of giving to Venice and the other Italian provinces anything but a nominal parliament, in which they would have no power in foreign affairs, nor in war measures, nor in taxation, and under which they could continue under martial law while in a state of transition between their present independence and the promised constitution. This state

of things to continue until the complete pacification of the empire,—that is to say, to end only with the empire itself.”

“Austria,” he added, “doubtless reckons upon the forgetfulness of France!” And he asked if France “would quietly suffer that mediation which had been the subject of such solemn promises to be trifled with.”

Alas! France, which, just before the war in Rome, had passed through a new and violent internal crisis, was further than ever from interfering against Austria. The revolutionary party, the party that had the disposition to act, was reduced to a state of helplessness: in the opposite ranks they could not but respect and pity Venice, but that was all. Scarcely any voice but that of a priest, the unfortunate Archbishop of Paris, was raised in behalf of the martyred city.

Two days after writing to M. de Tocqueville, Manin wrote to Kossuth to announce the sending of M. Tommaseo Gar in the capacity of *chargé d'affaires* from Venice to Hungary. But the course of events prevented the Venetian envoy from accomplishing his mission.

Rich and poor, citizens and soldiers, none

were faint-hearted at Venice. The rich, who day by day ceased to be so, with stoic resolution continued their sacrifices. On the 26th of June, in reply to the declaration of Austria, the municipal council voted a new tax of six millions of lire upon real estate, and took upon itself to advance this tax to the government in several stated instalments, by the issue of a new communal paper.

The assembly, like the municipal council, was fully equal to the occasion. It appointed one committee to visit the wounded; another to collect the most honourable facts of civic generosity and military courage. Four permanent committees were added to the government to second it in the various administrative branches (2nd of July), besides the two military and diplomatic committees. The latter was designed to enable the assembly to watch more closely the action of the government in foreign affairs. They seemed to fear that Manin was not inflexible enough! This shows the spirit by which Venice was animated! While the Austrians and their friends the English Tories strove to exhibit Venice, in the eyes of Europe, as a city enslaved by a

demagogue who by terrorism prevented peace and order from being restored within its walls ; the only fear the assembly entertained was that Manin might consent to a capitulation, while their last loaf of bread and their last charge of gun-powder were still unexpended. As for the people, whenever the cannons of the enemy were silent for an hour from the necessity of repairing the damage inflicted on the batteries by the besieged, they shrank from enquiring why the fire had ceased, in terror of learning that it was because an armistice had been concluded.

Early in July the commissariat department was reorganised, as the military had previously been. A new " Committee of Subsistence " was established ; its powers were universal ; it controlled everything by a skilfully arranged system of sub-committees. The question of provisions was the most pressing one with the government throughout the month of July. The bounty which had been already established on the importation of cattle was extended to every necessary of life. Every family was required to state what quantity of eatables they had beyond a week's demand, and what liquors

and fuel they had beyond a month's, and measures were taken to satisfy the people as to the quality of the bread, now become its sole nourishment.

The distress increased. "Misery, hunger, and sickness," wrote the French consul, Vasseur, "will soon overcome the energy of the Venetians, who still hope, and sustain themselves I cannot tell how."

We have already explained how it was. The foreseeing providence of the Government had secured the people, for several weeks longer, not from privations, but from famine.

"This people," says another eye-witness, "is disposed to suffer everything for liberty, everything but anarchy." The families of the less affluent citizens, the class to which Manin belonged, shared the penury of the multitude. The Dictator, whose humble cellar was empty, very frequently sustained his exhausted strength only with a little French wine, sent to him by the French consul, M. Vasseur.*

* M. Vasseur also rendered to Venice the service of obtaining from Trieste a quantity of quinine for the garrison, suffering from fever; and General Giulai, who commanded at Trieste, allowed the medicine to be sent.

The vigour of the defence never slackened: the besieged frequently attempted nocturnal sorties with success. Nevertheless, at night they ceased to reply to the incessant cannonade of the besiegers. Some uneasiness began to be felt respecting the decrease of ammunition, a diminution which accrued through a second explosion at the powder-mills of the Isle of Grazia. They were less experienced or less skilfully organized than the Austrians for fabricating gunpowder, and that which they did make to replace former stores was not so strong, and did not project the balls to so great a distance.

In this explosion, which was attributed to Austrian agents, a dozen unfortunate creatures were frightfully burned, and they nearly all died. The surgeon who attended them, a representa-

Acts of humanity are not so frequent with the Austrian generals, that we should neglect to mention them when they occur. M. Rapatel, commander of the *Pluto*, offered the assistance of French surgeons for the hospitals. The name of this officer, who zealously seconded M. Vasseur, deserves to be associated with those of MM. Ricaudy and Passama.

tive of the people, made to the assembly, in the name of the committee charged with collecting details of noble civil and military actions, a report upon what he had seen and heard.

"To obtain," said he, "an idea of the torments of hell, it was only necessary to enter, on the 14th of this month, the hospital of San-Giorgio, and look upon eleven unfortunates, covered with burns from head to foot, presenting a spectacle of the most frightful tortures. But in the midst of this agony, not a word of regret or complaint. . . Sebastian Nozzadini, of Venice, already a prey to the terrors of death, called me to his bedside. 'It is Manin,' he said, 'who has brought me to this; for it was he who urged me to become a soldier! But I do not reproach Daniel Manin with my fate. No. *Viva Manin! Viva l'Italia!*' "

Can we find anything more noble in the *acts* of the early Christian martyrs?

After the lapse of an entire month, the Austrians had not caused any serious damage to Venice with their batteries from the shore of the lagoon and the isle of San Giuliano. They started a new invention, worthy of their brutal

vandalism, not to destroy the fortifications, but to attempt to burn the city with all its marvels. One day, it was the 12th of July, twenty balloons suddenly appeared rising above the Austrian squadron, off the Lido; next little clouds of smoke and successive explosions showed that each balloon carried a bomb. Not one of them fell upon the city. They exploded on the Lido or upon the lagoon. Some of the balloons passed beyond the lagoon and the city, and threw their projectiles on the heads of the besiegers. The Venetians laughed merrily at this result. At every feeble detonation they heard in the upper air they responded with ironical shouts and clapping of hands. Next day caricatures of the bomb-balloons were circulated.

The balloons were succeeded by reciprocal attempts at nocturnal surprises, which were successful on neither side. The Austrians attacked for the second time the great battery of San Antonio. The Venetians boldly launched a fire-ship against an Austrian frigate, which, however, did but little damage.

The Venetian squadron was still at anchor in the port; and the people, astonished and irri-

tated at its inactivity, never ceased shouting for it to respond to the appeal lately uttered by Manin, "To the sea! to the sea!" Upon this, Manin announced to the people, from his balcony, that the squadron was going to make a desperate effort to break the blockade and revictual the city. The joy was universal; but still three weeks elapsed before the little naval armament gave any signs of motion. The painful suspense in which the President was kept was no less great than that felt by the people.

The besiegers imperiously renewed their intimations to the French vessels to quit the lagoon. Radetzky, upon his own responsibility, had summoned the Austrian Admiral, Dahlrup, to intercept in future all communications with the enemy, even by force. Admiral Dahlrup was more temperate and less arrogant than the Field Marshal. He consented that the steamer *le Brazier* should remain provisionally at Venice, and to communicate by boat with another vessel, anchored at the Lido; but this concession was only provisional; and M. Belvèze, commander of the French naval station, even pressed the consul to quit Venice with such of his country-

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men as remained in the city, and to arrange with the other consuls to depart. (24th of July.)

M. Vasseur remained. His example was followed by the whole consular body ; and he found means to make two French vessels remain to the last. He resolved to fulfil until the last hour the noble mission imposed on him ; and at this very time he chartered, without authority and at his own risk and peril, eight trading vessels, at an expense of 117,000 francs, to be at hand, when the inevitable catastrophe should arrive, as a means of escape and safety to offer to the *élite* of the citizens and defenders of Venice. (25th July.) In these sad days at least one man was found who, in what depended upon him, discharged the duty of France !

The people, who now no longer hoped for succour from France, and to whom its enemies had made known the fall of Rome (3rd of July), turned their eyes again towards Hungary. On the 26th of July, the *Venice Gazette* published a letter from Kossuth, who announced that, from one victory to another, he would soon be under the walls of Vienna ; that he would next be on the confines of Italy, to redeem his pro-

mise to Venice. But this letter bore date the 5th of June; and since then events had taken quite an opposite direction to the words of Kosuth. The Russian invader was in the heart of Hungary!

On the 28th of July, Manin convoked the Assembly to a secret sitting. He begged the Assembly to name a committee, invested with its full confidence, to which he might communicate their real situation and the state of the resources, which could not be made public. "If the enemy only knew upon what day our provisions would be exhausted, he would only have to fold his arms and wait till the cry of hunger extorted submission from us. Valentino Pasini, at the suggestion of Lord Palmerston, went from Paris to Vienna, to attempt to negotiate; but he was received only as a private individual, and obtained nothing. We have received no assistance from the Hungarians. We must either wait till the last loaf and grain of powder are gone, and then surrender at discretion, or anticipate that extremity. It is for the Assembly to decide the true meaning of the decree of the 2nd of April, *to resist at any cost*. Does it wish, I

ask again, to consume the last loaf and then surrender at discretion?"

An order of the day was proposed, which entrusted Manin with the necessary powers to provide for the safety and honour of Venice.

This was not a reply; and Manin did not accept the order of the day.

The Assembly could not bring itself to pronounce definitely upon the terrible alternative the President proposed to it. Tommaseo vehemently protested against the idea of giving the government authority to capitulate; and the following order of the day was voted:—

“ Having heard the communications from the government on the state of the country—

“ The Assembly, relying on the assurances of the navy, on the proved valour of the army, aided by the civic guard, on the heroic perseverance of the people, on the harmony and activity of the executive powers (the government and the military committee),

“ Proceeds to the order of the day.”

That was in effect saying—Continue to resist, without saying how long.

Manin obeyed.

The enemy made a terrible reply on the morrow.

The besiegers altered their plan of attack. On the 18th of July the enemy abandoned the extensive and costly works it had constructed before Brondolo with a vast quantity of materials. They retired to a distance, after burning the habitations and inundating the country. The garrison of Brondolo made a sortie, let off the waters, and saved a quantity of provisions. The cause of this retreat was, that the enemy suffered incalculably more from sickness than the besieged. The cholera, which at this time ravaged Europe, now reached this region, and united with the marsh fevers to carry off the besiegers by thousands, while neither in Venice nor in its dependencies had it yet manifested itself. But by this very sortie of the garrison it was unfortunately introduced into Brondolo and Chioggia.

At the principal point of attack, before the railway bridge, the enemy did not retire, but perceptibly slackened his fire. What was he about? It was very certain that he would neither raise the siege nor offer an honourable arrangement.

He was, therefore, seeking some means of abridging his operations?

Radetzky returned to head quarters on the 20th of July, inspected the works, and ordered new batteries to be established. Every night a great noise of workmen was heard in the Austrian trenches.

On the 27th of July Count de Thurn was replaced in the command of the army of siege by General d'Aspre, who rivalled, and even surpassed Haynau in cruelty. On a beautiful summer's night, the 29th of July, a little before midnight, as the crowd still occupied the Square of Saint Mark, suddenly a bomb prolonged its parabola of fire beyond the external defences and the long causeway of the railroad, and fell in the interior of the city. Then came another, and still another. A storm of fire burst upon the heads of the stupified people. The projectiles rained upon all the western portion of the city. Some balls fell beyond the *sestière* of San Luca, Manin's quarter, and even reached as far as the church of San Mose, at the south-west angle of the Square of Saint Mark.

Several batteries, numbering in all twenty-

eight pieces of various calibre, had been unmasked. The cannon were now mounted on platforms inclined at an angle of forty-five degrees, and the projectiles thus launched attained an immense height, and described, in descending, a parabola of proportionate extent. Twenty-four-pound balls attained a distance of 5,930 yards; bombs, with a maximum charge, 4,000 and 4,270 yards; red-hot balls, 4,400 yards. The English, in 1810, had also employed the angle of forty-five in firing upon the French from one bank of the Strait of Messina to the other, from *Charybdis* to *Scylla*. The Austrians had not thought of it before.

More than half of Venice now found itself under the fire of bombs and red-hot balls: more than two-thirds within range of twenty-four-pound balls. The central quarter, nevertheless, suffered but little the first night; at these unheard-of distances the projectiles lost in power what they gained in distance; but the populous quarters of Canareggio and of Santa-Croce, the nearest to the enemy, which had already suffered by the ordinary fire, were cruelly devastated. Nearly the entire population, wo-

men, children, and the aged, emigrated, carrying off hastily their beds and most valuable articles, amid the noise of falling chimneys and the light of bursting bombs and burning houses.

“And yet,” strange to tell, relate eye-witnesses, “these fugitives were calm and resigned, without a murmur, almost cheerful, while scarcely a tear was shed. The women, carrying their infants at their breasts or leading their little ones by the hand, went along in dignified silence. ‘They may drive us away, but cannot make us afraid,’ said the men, encouragingly, to each other, and to stifle the regret they might feel at quitting their firesides and abandoning their homes.”

The emigrating crowd encumbered the ducal palace, which had been thrown open to it, its court and porticoes, the church cloisters and open galleries; others sought an asylum in the Giudecca, the ancient Jewish quarter, or in the more distant isles, and even in the ships on the lagoon.

Soon a very moving spectacle presented itself. While the greater portion of the refugees swarmed upon the square of St. Mark and

twentieth of those who were killed, among the besieged and besiegers, in the works of attack and defence.

The enemy's fire, which had slackened a little on the morning of the 30th of July, before the vigorous replies of the Venetian batteries, now revived, and continued unceasingly: the devastation spread into the most beautiful portions of the city; a lofty chimney might be seen falling in ruins upon a marble balcony, on the Grand Canal; numerous splendid dwellings on this unrivalled canal were struck with from ten to forty balls. The Venetians were faithful to their character to the last. Householders who had not received a dozen of these Austrian visiting cards, were looked upon with pity by their neighbours. This poetic and artistic people made a spectacle, like a sombre epic in action, of the sublime horrors of a bombardment. It was, at the same time, both drama and actor.

The arts sustained cruel losses. The marvellous façades of the palace suffered greatly; the beautiful arcade of the Rialto was pierced. The bombs set fire to the church of San Geremia e

and mutilated those of the Frari and of San-Giovanni, and Paolo, so rich in paintings, sculptures, and the tombs of heroes : the balls passed through the Scuola di San Rocco, covered all over with the magnificent compositions of Tintoretto, including perhaps the master-piece of this great master ; a projectile carried away the *Moses Striking the Rock*.

The French, at least at Rome, even in the horrors of a war which might be called at the same time foreign and civil, had made some reservations, and exhibited a little of the remorse of civilization. They were compelled to respect monuments of art, in order to evade the maledictions of posterity ; but no such scruples could be looked for from the brutish hordes of Austria, nor from the generals who revived the memory of the atrocious heroes of the Thirty Years' War. Those who took aim at the black flag on the hospitals and the funeral processions in the cemeteries, were not the beings who would spare pictures and statues.

CHAPTER VII.

The Sortie from Brindolo and *La Fenice*—The Patriarch—The Cholera—The Provisions begin to fail—Anguish and Resolution of Manin—Manin and the Assembly—Grand sitting of the 6th of August—Full powers given to Manin—Agitation of the People and the Army.

THE heroism of the Venetian people increased with the inhumanity of the enemy. The president, the assembly, the civil and military committees, were on a level with the people; this is to say, all that is wanted for their glory. Every step had been taken, on the 30th of July, to repulse a general assault, to which the bombardment seemed a presage. Posts had been assigned to the various *corps de l'armée* and the civic guard, who displayed the firmest attitude. A very spirited and dignified order of the day

from the general in chief (31st of July) nobly commented upon these preparations, and animated the army. "If the worst extremity should crush us, be assured," said Pepe, in conclusion, "that the feeling you will inspire, even among our enemies, will be that of envy, and not pity."

After forming a committee to regulate the generous offers from the citizens of the spared portions of the city to those of the bombarded, and secure food and shelter to all the emigrant population (31st of July), the assembly addressed itself to the people in language as noble as the general had used to his soldiers :—

"We are now sensible of the honour of being the representatives of Venice! So much patience and courage, so much order and firmness, such a striking mutual affection, have surpassed the expectations of those who most esteemed you. Misfortune has exalted your nature.

"But you have no need of our exhortations. You suffer for the honour of our country, for the honour of all Italy, which has no other free city except the city of St. Mark. The blows aimed at the churches in which you were bap-

tised, against the monuments of art which are the admiration of the whole civilised world, will some day fall upon the head of implacable Austria. Heaven will record every sacrifice you make. Every sacrifice is a victory, if performed for the benefit of our brothers ; every grief endured for our country is a martyrdom, if accepted in the name of the Lord.

“ People of Venice, your sons will in their day piously relate to their sons your noble sufferings ; your perseverance will render your name venerated throughout the universe.”

Notwithstanding the skill and attention of the provision committees, the distress was increasing. The small quantity of meat that had been preserved, or captured from the enemy, was reserved for the hospitals ; the mass of the citizens lived only upon bad bread and pulse. An effort was made to break the blockade. Early in the morning of the 1st of August, twelve hundred soldiers, commanded by the intrepid Lombard Sirtori, now a colonel, but previously a priest, sallied out from Chioggia, made a descent upon the mainland, passed the Brenta, drove in the enemy's outposts, and returned in

the evening with two hundred oxen, some wine, corn, and other things, with a flag taken from the Austrians. When this success was announced at the *Fenice* theatre, where, amid the cannon-balls which from time to time fell around the edifice, some artistes and amateurs played Rossini's *William Tell* for the *benefit of the country*, the audience was transported with enthusiasm !

The illusions of the people revived ; they thought only of victorious sorties and of re-victualling by the soldiers. The failure of a second sortie next day from Treporti, at the other extremity of the line of defence, did not disabuse the minds either of the people or the soldiers. The besiegers had compelled the inhabitants of the coast to withdraw into the interior with their cattle, grain, and provisions of every kind.

To go in quest of provisions on a large scale, it was necessary to enter upon a regular campaign, which could not be undertaken in the presence of an enemy so superior in force. The little Venetian army was fearfully reduced in numbers, much more by sickness than by the

enemy's fire, and could no longer be recruited, while the Austrians continually repaired their enormous losses. The besieging army was almost entirely renewed during the siege.*

The land forces therefore were powerless in re-victualling the city. Let us see how far success was possible with the navy. Inferior to the enemy in strength, could it drive off the blockading squadron, cross the Adriatic, and obtain on the shores of Dalmatia or Romagna the provisions which it was impossible to obtain from the Venetian mainland? The government and the military commission had done everything that depended upon them to repair the error of the unfortunate night of the 22nd of March, and the early military errors, and to form a good naval division. The president, assembly, and the people, all felt the part the navy could perform. Manin's grand cry of *Sul marè! sul marè!* now found an echo in every heart in Venice.

But the squadron, since its re-organization by the military commission of the 16th of June,

* The Austrians admitted, officially, a loss of 20,000 men, which was probably 25,000.

had not yet put to sea. The navy, so full of ardour during the first days of the revolution, seemed to have lost its ardour in losing its hope. It seemed to conclude that what was expected of it was impossible, and, according to the testimony of certain persons who have examined the facts, that which a few months before was difficult, yet possible, was no longer so now.

The inactivity of the navy exasperated the people, whose excitement increased still more under the spur of a combination of evils. "The Austrians continued to shower their balls on Venice; death and destruction stalked in her streets; the CHOLERA spread horribly; the scarcity became more and more cruel every day; yet still, amid all these miseries, woe to him who whispered a word for capitulation. The people, faithful to its resolution to resist, at any cost, surpassed its own leaders in energy and obstinacy."

Nevertheless, there were found those who made the word capitulation, heard. A petition to the Assembly, praying that the resistance should cease, was concerted between the car-

dinal patriarch and an ex-chamberlain of the Emperor of Austria, who bore in obscurity one of the great names of ancient Venice. It was signed by a few persons, among whom were many who styled themselves *millionaires*, but who probably did not justify that title. This, it must be admitted, was the first sign of weakness among them.

The people took no notice of them. It had once loved its patriarch, but since the rupture between Pius IX. and the national cause, and the reverses of the Italian arms, the prelate was considered to have separated himself from the cause of the unfortunate, and to incline towards Austria. The people went straight to the archiepiscopal palace and surrounded it, with cries of "Death to the patriarch!" Tommaseo, with some deputies and civic guards, addressed the people, checked the *émeute*, and saved the trembling prelate (3rd of August).

On the evening of the *émeute* against the patriarch, strong efforts in behalf of the petition had been renewed by the British consul, who complained of having seen his *friendly advice* to negotiate and make terms with Austria—

advice many times repeated by order of his government—mistaken by the provisional government of Venice, and the misfortunes he had foreseen partly realized.

“It is almost impossible,” he wrote, “that the Provisional Government can shut its eyes much longer to the evils, still greater than now exist, that must result from persistence in the course it is now pursuing; and it is the duty of the undersigned once more to intreat the provisional authorities of Venice most seriously and energetically, in the sacred name of humanity, to pause before continuing a resistance which, although it may still be prolonged, can only result in being as useless as disastrous, and to well weigh the responsibility it assumes in devoting the lives and fortunes of its fellow-citizens to destruction.

“Mr. Consul-General,” replied Manin, “I cannot conceal the painful surprise your remarks have given me. After the communication I believed it my duty to make to you relative to the negotiations between our government and Austria, the dates and the terms of this correspondence clearly establish that Venice has

always scrupulously followed the counsel given to it by the English and French cabinets.

“In your letter of yesterday you strongly urge the government of Venice to cease a *vain and disastrous* resistance to the Austrian forces ; but you cannot be ignorant of the fact, that to the Assembly of the representatives of this country alone belongs the right to determine its destinies ; and I refuse to believe that you can suspect the government of having concealed from the Assembly, or from the commissioners named by it, the truth of the condition, either political or economical, in which we find ourselves.

“Be assured, Mr. Consul-General, that neither the Assembly nor the government require to be stimulated to act for the good of this unfortunate city ; and that for the greater majority of Venetians it is still a problem to discover which is the more endurable—their present sufferings, or those in reserve for them by the Austrian reoccupation, in whatever manner it may be accomplished.” (3rd of August.)

Still, while resenting so nobly the unjust reproaches and *humanitarian* phrases of the British

consul, Manin was only too well aware of the desperate situation pictured by a hostile tongue. The cholera, entering the lagoon by Brondolo and Chioggia, had now invaded Venice, and had rapidly developed itself among the people, already enfeebled by privations, driven from its dwellings by bombs, crowded into narrow places of refuge, exposed to a scorching sun by day and to a cold, humid air by night. As to provisions, the government and military commission had learned from the subsistence committee how many days remained before they would perish of hunger. The stock of grain would not last longer than the 24th of August.

The Assembly, on the 28th of July, had hesitated in accepting the proposal to take a decisive step. Eight days had since elapsed, the most calamitous days Venice had yet experienced. The solution could no longer be deferred. Venice must look her misfortunes full in the face, and decide for herself. It was Manin's duty, so to speak, to constrain it:—to plainly put to the Assembly the only two possible courses—What to do? Struggle on to the last? To die, sword in hand, in the ranks of the

besiegers?—or wait until hunger compelled the hands of Venice to drop its weapons, open its gates unconditionally, and deliver up the wreck of an exhausted army, its functionaries, and the representatives of the Revolution, all those officers who had escaped from the allegiance to Austria or Naples, to a mean and pitiless conqueror—to the tender mercies of the butchers of Brescia? * Must he, then, destroy the ornament of Italy and of the world by an act of

* “ My conscience will not allow me to expose so many generous victims to Austrian vengeance, with no benefit to the cause ; as the whole world is now compelled to admire the moderation, good sense, the justice of our cause. It is certain that a cry of disapprobation would be raised against a different course, *uselessly inhuman* ; and the curses of the victims would fall upon our heads with the loss of our cause and our renown. Besides, I could not deceive myself as to a prospect that appalled me. The sufferings of the people had now reached the extremest limit that human nature could endure. If these sufferings are prolonged and increased still more, the Austrian emissaries may succeed in exciting disturbances and riots which will render it impossible for the government to continue the defence. Then there will be anarchy ; all the merit of past good conduct will be lost ; and with this merit, honour also, the only thing

despair which the world would judge to be not heroism but madness? When Carthage was buried beneath its bleeding pyre, there was no longer hope, nor return, nor regeneration possible for Carthage. But was it thus for Venice and Italy? Manin's whole soul revolted against such a blasphemy. It had a future—a future to which none had so much contributed as himself to secure. Venice may for a time resume her chains, but Venice cannot perish!

He must capitulate, then. No longer, alas! make a treaty, a political negotiation, but surrender Venice. "If they had but a shadow of hope, rather than surrender they would eat the stones." But even this shadow had disappeared.

Yet he must save the unfortunate people!—preserve its existence, since he could no longer preserve the liberty he had given to it! Manin's

possible to save, and which we have saved."—(*Manin's MS. Notes.*)

The *possible* troubles of which Manin speaks were not *émeutes* to force the government to capitulate, but movements of the poor against the rich, wrongfully suspected of having concealed stores of provisions."

greatest effort, the most heroic of his life, is that which he made at this crisis.

But did the people wish to be saved? This people, which had again and again said, "We will resist to the last *polenta*. Then let old Radetzky come with his Croats and eat us, when we have nothing left ourselves to eat!" Would not Venice and Manin be opposed to each other for the first time? Would there not be a conflict between the leader who wished his people to live, and the people who wished to struggle to the last gasp? On the 5th of August, Manin convoked the Assembly in secret sitting, and in that same hall in which the decree of the 2nd of April had been resolved opened the gloomiest of debates, yet no less solemn, for the distant reports of the enemy's cannon echoed at intervals to the voices of the orators.

Maurogonato, the chief of the finance department, proposed a further tax of six millions upon real estate. A committee was appointed, and ordered to report *in an hour*. The hour having elapsed, Pincherle, the ex-minister of finance, of the 23rd of March, read the report, which was adopted.

Manin ascended the tribune:—

“This finance project represents fully our political situation. Our situation is *horribly* desperate! We shall soon have nothing to eat! It is necessary for the Assembly to take this critical position into serious consideration. I do not wish it to be said that the government has deceived the country.”

“We are in heroic Venice,” replied the representative Sirtori, the commander of the sortie of the 1st of August. “Venice has endured many miseries. She will yet endure hunger unto the furthest possible limits.”

“Hunger may be endured,” responded Manin, “but only to a certain point. When the last loaf is eaten, it is no longer hunger, but death. We are alone in the world. All the powers are united in reaction.”

“We are not yet in this extremity; we have not tried everything—the navy? Wait! Wait eight or ten days more!—the navy will act! If it does not succeed, then we can treat.”

“I have said that the provisions are nearly exhausted; prudence forbids me saying upon what day they will fail. I do not think that

cation of the Assembly. Only two courses are possible—either to resist to the very last of our provisions and our ammunition, or to endeavour, while there is still time, to make terms with our enemy. For the first course it is indispensable that you should have in power men who have a hope of success. Whether it be the result of physical exhaustion or of some other cause, I have the mournful courage to confess that I have no longer that hope. There are in this assembly some who still retain it, and who can govern you in pursuing this course. But if the contrary opinion be the prevalent one, then let us submit to necessity, and not give to might the apparent sanction of right—although Europe at present recognises no international right except the law of the strongest. When the hour of treating with the enemy arrives, let the assembly prorogue themselves, and surrender the supreme power into the hands of the municipality and non-political body. If you select the first course, then I propose that the government be entrusted to those who still believe in the possibility of success. I propose Avesani, Sirtori, and Tommaseo; or Sirtori alone.”

AVESANI.—Manin has not clearly stated which

of the two alternatives he prefers, and, in either case, he excludes himself from the government. His retirement is civil war ! none of us will dare to accept that sad inheritance.

TOMMASEO.—I think it is cruel to put President Manin to the torture. He has already sufficiently indicated his opinion. Before taking the last step, let us again make every effort to obtain provisions for the city, both by sea and land. Let us appeal to the fleet, the army, and to the civic guard. Let us first be perfectly convinced that all means of obtaining provisions are exhausted ; and then, when the impossibility of obtaining food is proved, the President will tell us so, and we will take steps to surrender with honour.

ULLOA.—I am fully convinced that it is impossible to bring provisions into the city by the land side.

MANIN.—Sirtori's brilliant sortie secured us the capture of a flag of the enemy's, but a very small quantity of provisions. As to the navy, remember what Baldisserotto has told us.

TORNIELLO (a Capucin).—Let the President Manin call the people to arms ; let the whole population march with the troops ; let us make a general sortie !

SANTELO.—At this hour we should think only of history.

ULLOA.—A general sortie would expose the city to falling into the hands of the enemy.

TOMMASEO.—What I ask is, that both the military commission and that of the commissariat shall supply us with written statements, which will be historic papers, showing the extremity to which we are reduced, and that General Ulloa assemble the chief officers of the army, and ask their advice.

ULLOA.—I ask of the assembly to decide whether we ought to attempt a desperate enterprise, which, in my opinion, could add nothing to the glory of our resistance. Circumstanced as we are, the glory of our army consists in preventing the enemy effecting his entrance by force. In my opinion there is no possibility of the success of a desperate attempt, and to assemble the chief officers, according to military usage, can only be done when a capitulation is discussed.

CAVEDALIS.—Ulloa is right. Provisions cannot be obtained on the land side. Make a capitulation for Venice and Chioggia. It would be madness to expose them to destruction without gaining any advantage to Italy by their ruin.

As for us soldiers, we are not disposed to give ourselves up. Soldiers and sailors, we will go together to the strongholds of the sea, and die sword in hand ; let a dictator be elected.

VARÈ.—Let us resist as long as it is physically possible to resist.

MANIN.—We cannot, we ought not to separate the fate of the army from that of the people. To carry out the proposal of Varè, it is necessary, I repeat, that those who govern should have faith in its success. Without this, they cannot inspire the people with strength to resist. The day upon which all means of resistance are exhausted, the chief of the government will be compelled to say, “There is nothing left.” But the people and the army, will they not have the right to reply, “You have deceived us?” Then I say, he who retains any hope, may, and ought to govern in the spirit of this hope—for him who has no hope it is impossible.

TORNIELLO.—Manin, be again the man of the 22nd of March.

MANIN.—We have no 22nd of March now ! From Hungary, from whence only succour can come now, we have no news for a very long time. We are in such an extremity, that help

to-day would arrive too late. Had we attempted the desperate enterprises suggested, the enemy would be within these walls to-day !

VARÈ.—Neither the people nor the army ask the *reason* of the resistance. Although the government has for a long time kept silent, yet the people have continued to hope. If we come to a decision to-day, it is all over.

MANIN.—It is not strictly correct to say, that no one, either among the people or the army, asks why we resist. . . . It is true that the government has no longer spoken to the people since it has ceased to entertain hope. The government has ceased speaking to the people of hope, because it is my only wish that upon my humble grave it may be written—"Here lies an honest man !" There still exist, I know, among the people, honourable, but vain hopes—vain, I am persuaded ! Still something may happen—something which no one expects, or can expect. Whatever we do, we must act a great part to-day.

TOMMASEO.—I insist upon domiciliary visits being made, to satisfy ourselves that there are no hoarded provisions. I insist that we obtain formal replies from the land troops and the

navy ; so that, on the day succeeding our fall, we may be spared the shame and the remorse of seeing a hope revive that we had deemed lost, and of learning that we have surrendered, while we might have continued to fight on !

MINOTTO.—We have not to decide to-day whether we shall surrender or not. We have to provide for the case in which the extreme gravity of circumstances will render an immediate resolution indispensable. We must elect a single person who will not degrade Venice, and yet will not drag her down to perish uselessly. It will be for this person to satisfy himself that all further sacrifice is useless ; and this person can only be Manin—Manin, who has governed us from the first hour ; who will not surrender, no one can doubt, so long as resistance will be humanly possible—Manin, who is the only person will accept it ! I propose the following decree :—

* * * *

“ The Assembly grants to the President Manin the full liberty of providing, as he shall consider best, for the honour and safety of Venice.”

TOMMASEO.—I propose the following order of the day :—

“ Considering that the Assembly, in so grave a matter, cannot come to a resolution without fuller knowledge of the facts, the Assembly passes to the order of the day.”

MANIN opposed the order of the day.

PINCHERLE.—I propose the following amendment to Minotto’s projected decree :—

“ Subject to the ratification of the Assembly in everything that determines the political conditions.”

MINOTTO assented to this, and Manin supported it.

MANIN.—Circumstances require a strong government, which the present government certainly is not. Public order is seriously compromised. It is impossible to govern, if the Assembly does not come to some conclusion to-day.

SIRTORI.—I must say frankly, that Manin is now unequal to governing the country alone. Neither the troops nor the people have any longer confidence in him.

MANIN.—I thank Sirtori for his declaration. It is true that I had all the confidence of the

country, and that I have no longer what I once enjoyed. The reason is this : the faith that everyone had in me proceeded from the idea I represented—an idea which at this hour can no longer be realised. There is yet another reason : I have lately been obliged to govern in a manner opposed to my own views ; I have not obtained that support from the Assembly which I expected ; and this is why a portion of the people and the army have lost their confidence in me.

BENVENUTI.—It is true that Manin has no longer his first prestige. Still he is the only one who can obtain the confidence of the country, and no one can take his place. Only one thing remains to be done, which is, for us to unite fraternally in a conscientious resolution, and give to the people the signal of concord. If the people see us return to our confidence in Manin, they will return too, and Manin will be to the last a martyr to principle.

SIRTORI.—Manin cannot assume the power alone. His name would imply immediate *capitulation*.

MANIN.—If I have not the frank, loyal promise of all to support the government—if any

party exists in the Assembly, neither I nor any other person can govern. I ask that all restrictions upon the government be removed; that the right to take the initiative, which is never denied to any government, be conferred on me. For some time past I have had the empty title, but not the reality of power.

He then alluded to the division of the executive power, which had been in operation since the 16th of June, between the President and the diplomatic and military commissions. He continued:—"I wish to ask, in the event of the Assembly conferring full powers upon me, if I may reckon upon Ulloa and Baldisserotto?" *

ULLOA AND BALDISSEROTTO.—Yes, under all conditions, and although the decision be yours.

TOMMASEO.—We are about to confer the dictatorship on a man who has from the first frankly told us he had no hope. It will be conferred upon him, then, not for the purpose of resistance, but of submission. If my order of the day is not passed, at least let Manin tell us upon what conditions he intends to negotiate with the enemy.

* The two colleagues of Sirtori in the military commission.

SIRTORI.—The question is distinctly put before us. It is whether we shall give Manin unlimited power to capitulate. We have rumours of favourable news from Hungary. Peace with Piedmont is not definitely signed. Let us wait for three or four days. This is the course of honour; it may be of our salvation!

PINCHERLE.—To believe it a matter of indifference whether we make terms some days sooner or later, is to deceive ourselves upon the state of our provisions. If any hope remains to us, it is in treating with the Austrian civil authorities; for the military authorities will insist on a surrender at discretion. Now, to treat with the civil power will require much time.

MANIN.—I cannot reply to such a question as that put by Tommaseo.

The order of the day proposed by Tommaseo was rejected by 65 votes against 28.

TOMMASEO.—I ask that in Minotto's proposition the words "Subject to the ratification of the Assembly" be omitted. If a capitulation be sanctioned, the Assembly ought not to meet again.

PINCHERLE.—I am of opinion that the Assembly should still retain its rights. If the govern-

ment is reduced to the proposal of a capitulation, then the Assembly must adjourn, yielding to force.

An adjournment of three days, proposed by Sirtori, was rejected; and Minotto's proposal—conferring full powers on Manin—was carried by 56 voices against 37.

MANIN.—I ask that every one will pledge his honour to make no opposition.

The Assembly assented with warm and unanimous expressions.*

Thus ended this tragical sitting, which, according to the testimony of Tommaseo, had been a long *torture* for the unfortunate President of Venice. During six hours Manin had found himself compelled, for the sake of preserving Venice to civilization, to mankind, and to the future, to oppose his own party, and the dictates of his own heart—a heart that beat for a struggle to the last, resistance even unto death.

Properly to estimate the true character of the discussion, it must be stated that Tommaseo and Sirtori knew as well as Manin the account of how many days' provisions remained in the

* Report of the sitting of the 6th of August, signed by the secretary Ruffini.

public magazines ; but they believed in imaginary reserves in the hands of private individuals ;* and, moreover, they were anxious that the question of a general sortie should be discussed by a council of war.

Manin proceeded to announce to the people, from the balcony of the palace, the decree of the Assembly.

“ You know whether I have truly loved Venice. I shall do everything I possibly can, aided by the Venetians, and all the Italians here assembled, for the honour and welfare of this city.

“ It cannot be possible that Providence will desert us.”

The following article from the pen of Manin was published in the evening in the *Venice Gazette* :—

“ Hearts are strengthened by their sufferings. Everything seems possible to us in future, except trafficking with our honour. That honour must be preserved at every sacrifice, and it shall be, whatever may be the future reserved to us by coming events.

* Ludovico Pasini and Minotto had clearly shown, in the course of the discussion, that these reserves could not possibly exist.

“The heritage left to this people by their ancestors is too glorious for us ever to reconcile ourselves to seeing the foreigner cross the threshold of those doors from which he was driven in an hour of high-spirited indignation, and to which the stranger must return to impose on us again the severe bondage from which we freed ourselves.

“Our present sufferings have made sacred in the eyes of the world the renown of the intelligence, heroism, and piety of the Venetian people.

“We have no doubt to lament that all compassion seems to be extinct in the world, that virtue no longer meets with favour, or even mercy. In former days—in those which we call barbarous ages, had such sufferings of such a people been witnessed, there would have been found among the powerful of the earth hearts generous enough to put an end to such horrible barbarities. Now, the utmost that is done is the display of some feeling of sympathy, a sympathy that is cold and barren of result, the last wreck of the moral inheritance of nations, in days when no country is recognised except that of finance, and no law but that of the ledger,

“Yet, if virtue be itself its own best reward, our present sufferings are worth the greatest of rewards ; and our fate, plunged though we be in the misfortunes of an expiring country, is a nobler one than that of the fortunate of the earth.

“For them, peace is the slavery of people ; the sacrifice of nations the most worthy of liberty, and they call these abominations ‘a hard political necessity.’

“For us our consolation is in the thought that there can be no durable peace, except in justice—that they build unsafely who build on the verge of an abyss—in the thought that for nations martyrdom is also REDEMPTION !”

Manin did not immediately make use of the power the Assembly had conferred upon him. If he had re-opened the negotiations on the day following the secret sitting, the enemy would have understood that all resources being exhausted, Venice was at its mercy.

Manin made arrangements with M. Vasseur, the French consul, who wrote two despatches—one to the Austrian admiral, to ask him if he would allow the eight vessels chartered to carry

away the persons most compromised to pass, so that all the civil and military leaders of the Revolution—all the Venetian political staff, so to speak—could depart, leaving the duties of the capitulation to the municipality. The other letter was addressed to the French minister at Vienna. Instead of sending it through the official channel, it was put into the post-office at Trieste, so that the Austrians might have every facility for opening and perusing it. In this letter the consul stated that Venice could yet hold out for another month, by husbanding her resources, and that the French Government, if it decided to interfere, had plenty of time to do so.

The French and English Governments had viewed the intervention of Russia in Hungary with much dissatisfaction, and M. Vasseur thought that Austria might not have lost all apprehension of some reaction at Paris; that this letter might possibly secure more supportable conditions for Venice (7th August).

Admiral Duhlrup replied in the negative to the consul's despatch. Manin waited for a few days for the second letter to produce its effect. It was not till the 11th of August that he

wrote to M. de Brück, at Milan, in order to reopen negotiations. Thus he exceeded the three or four days demanded by Sirtori at the sitting of the 6th of August.

Very serious events occurred during this interval.

Whatever the Assembly might have said, or even Manin himself have admitted, the mass of the people had not lost faith in its chief. When the people ascertained that Manin wished to treat with the enemy, it was shocked, but not angry. It mourned inwardly ; it pitied its chief, but did not accuse him ; the word capitulation ceased to be sentence of death ; and under the arcades of the square of St. Mark, it began to discuss in subdued voice, as a lamentable necessity, what, three days before, it would have been a crime to hint at.

Still, however, the party for resistance at any cost, which the day before included every Venetian, existed as a minority among those Venetians who were horror-struck at the idea of seeing the Austrians again in their country, and among the proscribed heroes from all the Italian provinces who were devoted to Venice, and who

would now be condemned to bear their misery to other parts of Europe. Desperate thoughts and passions began to ferment among these victims, perhaps also stimulated by secret agents of the enemy, who desired, above all things, to sully the purity of the expiring Revolution. They circulated a report that all the soldiers who had left the Austrian flag, or that of the Italian princes, would be excluded from the capitulation.

On the 8th of August a placard was posted in the streets, which invited all men capable of bearing arms to quit the city with the army, and not to return to Venice until it was provisioned for a year. "Whoever will not take up arms in the levy *en masse*, will be subject to be put to death by his neighbour. At midnight, on the square of St. Mark, be ready to take the oath to conquer or die for our country!"

Tondelli, the author of this placard, was arrested; but, in the evening, a tumultuous demonstration took place before the windows of the Government. They cried—"Levy *en masse*! Manin to the balcony!"

Manin appeared. He was pale, and his care-

worn face spoke plainly of the long months of anxiety he had endured. "What do the people wish?" he asked, in a kind voice. "What do my people wish?"

"The people of St. Mark wish to go out *en masse!*"

Manin, in a stern voice, replied — "The people of St. Mark know what I think on that matter."

"We wish to go out and fight."

"You wish to go out and fight? And when have I prevented you? Have not the rolls been open for a long time? Enrol yourselves, and do not come here crying like women!"

He descended into the square, and had a chair and table brought to him, with the registers of enrolment. "Now," said he, seating himself at the table, and seizing a pen, "let those who wish to fight give me their names."

Only eighteen presented themselves. The agitators were lost in the crowd of spectators. There was nothing surprising in this result. Those who were truly energetic and sincere, who composed what might be termed the party of despair, were already, like all the able-bodied

élite of the population, members of the civic guard or of the army, and at this very moment there existed among the military corps an agitation much more serious and menacing than that of Tondelli's.

The officers of the army were invited, by placard, to assemble that evening at the Great Britain Hotel. The chiefs of the corps, upon inquiry by the general-in-chief, declared themselves strangers to this invitation, and said that they were about to present a request to the general for a grand *sortie*. "A grand sortie is a grand folly!" replied General Pepe, sternly. "History can show no example of a fortified place resisting so long as Venice has done, under the conditions in which we are placed. It only remains for us not to compromise this glory, and to conclude the struggle honourably."

Nevertheless, he did not prohibit the officers assembling, on condition that they limited their proceedings to electing delegates to send to him. But, next morning, he told them that he had enough troops faithful to their discipline to put an end to all their cabals; that it was a capital crime for soldiers to deliberate in presence of the

enemy. He would forgive them this time ; but the next that disobeyed him should be shot on the square of St. Mark.

An order of the day from the general-in-chief, sent, under pain of military degradation, all the officers to their posts who had quitted the forts of the lagoon to come to the city (9th August).

The unexpected vigour displayed by the veteran soldier put a stop to these dangerous proceedings, and Manin and Pepe were effectually aided by the news, during the nights of the 8th and 9th, of the enemy's having made a fresh effort to surprise the great battery on the Railway Bridge. It is supposed that the enemy had been apprised of the project of the agitators for that night, and wished to profit by the disorder into which they hoped Venice would be plunged.

CHAPTER VII.

The Fleet — Manin opens negotiations — The last Review—Manin and the Curate of the Frari—The Venetian Commissioners and General Gorzkowski—Manin at the Batteries—The last Cannon Balls—Trouble in the Army—The Night of the 23rd August —The Last Duties of Manin—Capitulation—The Venetian Government Abdicates and refuses to sign —Pezzato—Manin quits Venice.

THE minds of the mass of the people during these troublous days had, however, been much more occupied with affairs without the city than within. The fleet,—so long deaf to every despairing appeal, either, as its commander said, on account of trouble with their crews, whose discipline had become relaxed through long inaction, or on account of contrary winds (*sirocco*), or by imperfect equipment,—the fleet at last set sail on the morning of the 8th of August, and

from the summit of the Campanile of St. Mark it could be seen making for the sea, while the enemy's fleet, instead of accepting the challenge, disappeared in the horizon.

The hearts of the Venetians bounded with hope ; the poor people expected to see the fleet return convoying ships laden with corn from Roumania and Dalmatia. They did not consider the almost insurmountable difficulties of obtaining supplies from ports in the occupation of the enemy. On the evening of the 10th the fleet returned, without meeting with any success than capturing a brig laden with wine. Thus the last hope became extinguished.

Next day, the 11th of August, Manin wrote to the Austrian minister, M. de Brück, in the following terms :—

“ The Assembly of Representatives, by its decree of the 6th of the present month, having given to me all necessary powers, I address myself anew to your Excellency, and beg to state that I am disposed to enter into a negotiation touching the positive clauses of a treaty reconcilable with the honour and safety of Venice.”

On the 12th, by an agreement between the

Government and the Municipal Council, the last six millions of paper money voted by the Assembly were issued. This money was devoted chiefly to aiding invalid soldiers, in indemnifying others who were to be disbanded, and in providing for the support of such citizens as would be forced to exile themselves.

On the 13th the civic guard was assembled for the last time on the Square of St. Mark. Manin wished to take farewell of those patriotic legions who had proclaimed him chief of the Republic on the 23rd of March, and who had supported him to the last. Notwithstanding the cholera, bombardment, and general exhaustion, the four legions presented themselves almost in full force. After they had defiled, they formed themselves in serried columns before the Government palace. Manin appeared on the balcony from which he had so often announced to the people the good or bad fortune of the country, where he had attracted so many regards, and received so many acclamations. Painful thoughts oppressed every heart. "Every one felt he was about to listen for the last time to the voice of the great patriot, orator, and statesman,

who had personified Venice. They kept a profound silence."

Manin, in a voice stifled with emotion, said—

"Citizen Soldiers!—

"During the seventeen months of our revolution we have kept the name of Venice unsullied; once it was despised, now it is respected both by friends and enemies.

"The chief merit of this is due to the constant zeal, the unwearying vigilance of the city militia.

"A people who has done and suffered what you have done and suffered, and who still endures, can never perish. The day must come when a glorious destiny will respond to its merits!

"That day is in the hands of Providence!

"We have sown; the good seed will fructify in a good soil. Great misfortunes may overwhelm us; perhaps they are imminent; amid these misfortunes we shall have the great consolation of saying that 'they have come from no fault of our own.' If it is not in our power to avert these misfortunes from our heads, it will always depend upon ourselves to keep the honour of our city inviolate. It is for you to preserve this patrimony for your children until better days

arrive, which, perhaps, may be very nigh ! This noble task is yours, without it we should become a prey to the sarcasms of those men who always seek to attribute misfortune to misconduct. Let not Venice cease to be true to herself for a single day, else all you have hitherto done will be lost !

“ I have, therefore, begged of the city militia, already crushed by fatigue and suffering, to assemble around me here as at a meeting of friends, as in a family conclave. I beg, I entreat of it, to persevere with, if it be possible, with still greater zeal.

* * * * *

“ The name of the civic guard of Venice will remain honoured in history.

“ The civic guard is not a political power ; but, at all times, the civic guard is the people. It was it that established and proclaimed the government of the 22nd of March. The Assembly of Representatives, which is the legal power, *par excellence*, has felt its duty to impose on me an overwhelming responsibility, which every one else had refused to accept ; but if the civic guard has no longer that con-

fidence in my loyalty (I do not speak of anything besides), that confidence which it has shown so long—it will be impossible for me any longer to support the burden of a power neither coveted nor desirable I ask of the civic guard to declare frankly : Has it full confidence in my loyalty ?”

The civic guard and the people burst out with an immense shout, followed by long and impassioned plaudits.

“This unshaken confidence touches my heart : it renders the thought of what the people suffers still more painful to me. You can no longer reckon upon my wisdom or my strength ; but upon my deep, warm, and imperishable love you may rely eternally ! whatever the trials Providence may have in reserve for us. You may, perhaps, say, ‘ *This man has deceived himself ;* ’ but you will never be able to say, ‘ *This man has deceived us !* ’ ”

“No, NO ! NEVER !” replied the entire crowd.

“I have never deceived anyone ; I have never encouraged expectations which I did not entertain myself ; I have never said ‘ hope,’ when I had no hope !”

He grew pale, his voice failed him, he could not go on. A violent pain in the heart stopped his respiration. He quitted the balcony staggering, reached the council chamber, and sunk on the floor, shedding scalding tears, and beating the floor with his hands. "Such a people!" he cried, "for such a people to be obliged to surrender!"

All that this noble soul contained, in which the sorrows of an entire people were concentrated, found vent at this tragic moment.

Subsequently it was attempted to falsify the meaning of his sorrowful words:—*This man has deceived himself*. He has deceived himself, they said, in causing the Revolution, in proclaiming the Republic! "No," he replied, in an unpublished fragment, which throws great light on his policy, "*I deceived myself only in reckoning upon the support of France. Events have frustrated my hopes; and still, notwithstanding the long history of our misfortunes, I have not renounced, I cannot renounce, this illusion. I still reckon upon France as a brother reckons upon a brother.*"

Manin could never review his citizen army

again. He nevertheless wished once more to share its dangers and devotedness. The civic patrols had always continued to traverse periodically the bombarded quarters, assailed by projectiles, which showered the debris of chimneys and walls upon the narrow streets, now for the most part abandoned by the inhabitants. On the evening of the 14th of August, Manin, at the head of a patrol, visited the most exposed quarters, and directed in person the courageous efforts of the firemen in extinguishing a fire which had broken out in a corner of the city, as happened several times every day. Every one worked assiduously, without concerning himself with the bombs, which the light of the conflagration enabled the enemy to direct to the spot, and which fell fast on every side.

The flames extinguished, the curate of the parish (the *Frari*), who had bravely remained in his parish while devastated by fire and the cholera, took the President and the patrol to his house to see a collection he had made of three bombs and eleven cannon balls. It was his share of the Austrian favours. The good pastor, after comforting Manin and his company with two

bottles of wine (his last), opened his heart to the President :—

“To-morrow is the festival of St. Roch. All the authorities, from the first doges up to the time of the dominion of the stranger in our poor Venice, have always attended high mass in our church on this day. This year the times are too hard : we cannot perform a very grand service ; but if the President Manin will condescend to attend a simple low mass, so that a good custom should not be broken ?”

“Good, dear curate,” replied Manin, “it is agreed—we will come.”

On the 16th, therefore, Manin embarked in the morning for the church of the Frari. As he approached the parish, a ball carried away the prow of the gondola. The gondoliers wished to return. “Go on,” said Manin. “To return would show cowardice ! The curate expects us to pray with him for our unfortunate country !” They proceeded ; and Manin, surrounded by all who remained in the parish, attended the service in the church, which was accompanied, in lieu of the tones of the organ, by the continuous whistling of the enemy’s missiles.

It was no longer his natural indifference to danger that made it so easy for Manin to defy death. He not only braved it, but desired it. A bomb or a ball he would have welcomed as a friend. "I believe my death at this moment would help the cause. My mission is accomplished. A memory sanctified by martyrdom would be of more service to Italy than a sorrowful life dragged on uselessly in exile."

But in this view he was wrong. The years of suffering that still awaited him were more fruitful in benefits to his country than his death by the iron of Austria would have been.

On the 14th of August, he had received news of the peace signed between Austria and Piedmont. On the 16th the reply from M. de Brück to Manin's letter of the 11th arrived. The Austrian minister replied to the *Advocate Manin* by reproaches for the inconsiderate rejection the Assembly had previously made to the conditions he had *generously* offered them. The *unjustifiable* prolongation of the resistance admitted now, he said, only of an unconditional surrender. Nevertheless, as a fresh proof of *moderation* and *humanity*, Field-Marshal Ra-

detzky, entirely discarding the idea of a new treaty, renewed to the Venetians the confirmation of the concessions offered by him on the 4th of May. When these offers were accepted, the Venetians might address General Gorzkowski, commander-in-chief of the besieging army, who would arrange with them as to the mode of their execution.

The letter from the minister was accompanied by a proclamation from Radetzky to the inhabitants of Venice. The tyrant of Lombardy softened the voice that had ordered so many confiscations and fusillades, to speak of *legal liberty* and of *moderated progress guaranteed* by the promises of the Imperial government.

Radetzky's conditions were, the immediate surrender of all the forts, arsenals, and the whole city, which would be occupied by his troops ; the delivery of all the vessels and materiel of war, and everything belonging to the public treasury ; the surrender of all arms belonging to the state and to private individuals. He consented to the departure of every one who wished to quit Venice by land and by sea ; and granted a general pardon to all private soldiers

and sub-officers of the troops in the army and navy.

Thus all the officers of the army and navy would be obliged to expatriate themselves, together with the forty citizens who were to be by name designated for exile. Moreover, the proclamation mentioned nothing respecting the recognition of the paper money, which had been offered on the 4th May at a reduction of one half. The Austrians displayed their usual good faith.

Manin had anticipated this reply. All the anguish of the 28th of July and the 6th of August was again renewed in his heart. Misfortune, when expected, is felt a hundred times in advance by our anticipating it, yet it strikes no less as a new calamity at the moment when the idea becomes a fact.—What was now to be done? The reasons which, on the 6th of August, induced Manin to say, “I have no longer any hope,” had become much more urgent. There were now provisions only for a few days. Had the domiciliary visits and searches suggested in the Assembly been made, nothing, or next to nothing, would have been found. The declarations of private individuals, in reply to the com-

mittees of subsistence, had been made with unexampled truth. There were no reserves, as was manifestly proved when all was over.*

The cholera had spread with fearful rapidity after the first days of the bombardment. On the 15th August it attacked four hundred and two individuals, and carried off two hundred and seventy, a proportion much greater than that of the victims to this scourge in Paris in the same year. On the 16th, the sittings of the tribunals were suspended. Nothing was to be seen but funeral processions by land and by water, proceeding toward the cemeteries of San Michele and of San Christofero, and in all the churches the funeral service resounded continually. On numerous houses the following written inscription might be read:—"Closed in consequence of the death of the master;" while, as a contrast, and as a mark of the incomparable constancy of this brave people, all the walls were inscribed in large characters with "Viva Manin!" "Viva la Republic!" "Viva San Marco!"

* Upon the entry of the enemy into the city, the Austrian general wished to give an increase of rations to his troops: it was impossible, there was nothing in the city.

While the provisions were becoming exhausted, the population decimated, the defences of the place ruined day by day, "the fiery hail of the Austrians fell faster than ever upon the devoted city." The exterior works, which were within the usual range of the artillery, suffered more than the city. More than twenty arches of the great bridge were crushed, the batteries of the bridge and environs, the floating batteries, the flotilla of gunboats were half destroyed. The great battery of San Antonia crushed and ruined, was another Malghera ; its powder magazine had blown up, it had renewed its seven cannons four or five times ; for nearly two months and a half it had sustained the fire of batteries very superior in guns and calibre. Nevertheless, everywhere, amid the débris, the fire continued with unabated vigour. The Venetian cannoneers stood to their guns between mutilated parapets, and upon platforms black with the blood of their comrades, which demanded a much greater amount of courage than that of the field of battle, waiting for death in one spot for weeks and months until your turn arrives !

All the youth who, raised in the lap of luxury,

had never handled firearms previous to 1848, remained there at their posts, till struck down by death. "There is not an inch of the soil over which the traveller rolls in his rapid course towards Venice, that has not drunk the blood of a hero." Three hundred and fifty of these young men were killed or wounded, for the most part mortally.

Everything that courage and perseverance could do had been done ; therefore they must surrender, if they did not wish for the stranger to seek at some future day for the place where Venice once stood, as in the case of Aquila !

Still, the hand that had freed Venice would not restore it to its oppressors. Neither the President, nor the Assembly of Representatives of the people, nor any legal authority, would open the gates of the city. As Manin had repeated on the 6th of August, and as he and Parsini, Tommaseo, and many others had frequently said, force should not have the sanction of laws, the legitimate power should not inaugurate the return of usurpation. A commission of private individuals, without any right to represent the sovereignty of the people, and at the

most, representing the purely administrative authority of the municipal corps, took upon itself the duty of saving the material structure of Venice by ceding to a stern necessity.

Manin assembled at the ducal palace the military commission, Admiral Graziani, General Cavedalis, and the ministers. They arranged to send as delegates to General Gorzkowski* some members of the municipality to protect the interests of the city, and a military man to protect the interests of the army. They selected the citizens Priuli, Medin, and Callucci, as delegates from the municipality; Antonini as delegate for the commercial interests, and General Cavedalis for the army. The latter required much persuasion before he could be induced to accept his painful mission.

As had been arranged between Manin and M. Vasseur, the delegates begged the English and French consuls, and the commanders of the French and English naval stations, MM. Bel-

* This is the same general who commanded at Mantua, in 1848. A saying of his is still repeated in Italy. The municipality begged that he would not quarter his Croats in the edifices consecrated to God. His answer was, "There is no God at Mantua but me."

véze and Clowell, to give them their non-official support.

At a meeting held on the 18th of August, at the house of Mr. Clinton Dawkins, the senior consul, who lent himself to it with a very bad grace—a letter was written to the commander of the besieging army. In it was stated, “that the necessity for putting an end, by some arrangement, to the present situation of Venice, was evident to the greater portion of the population;” that they had to submit to M. de Brück various considerations respecting the silence of Marshal Radetsky as to the paper money, which constituted the sole means of exchange in the hands of the people, and also with reference to the names of the persons who would be excluded from the amnesty, a proceeding which left the dread of a reaction suspended over the heads of all those who for seventeen months had participated directly or indirectly in the acts of the administration and of the government—and also the necessity of explanation as to some points respecting the army.

The signers of this document begged the general to suspend hostilities until they were able to confer with him.

The letter was sent in the evening to the Austrian head-quarters. Meanwhile, the people assembled upon the square of St. Mark, anxiously enquiring the news. Manin, according to custom, responded to their call.

“ Venetians !—

“ I have already told you, frankly and faithfully, that our situation is a very grave one . . .

“ I am authorized to negotiate, and I am negotiating—you know all.

“ But if our situation be grave, it is not desperate to the degree of reducing us to cowardice—of reducing us to surrender at discretion.

“ It is, therefore, necessary that the negotiations be conducted with calmness and dignity. It is meanness to suppose that Venice asks me to act the coward ; but were you to ask me, I could not make such a sacrifice—no, not even for Venice.

“ The honour of Venice for ever !”

The people, as with one voice, responded to this cry.

“ And the fleet ?” cried a voice.

“ The fleet put to sea on the 12th ; it remained a long time defying the Austrian fleet, which, although very superior in force, did not

venture to attack it. But the cruel disease which desolates the city has invaded the fleet, and it would have been inhuman not to have provided against attacks of the cholera. The fleet returns to port."

It was only too true. In one of the corvettes, the crew was reduced, in five days, from a hundred and ten men to sixty-one. The remainder were either dead or disabled.

"We are hungry!" cried a voice.

"Let him who is hungry stand forth!" replied Manin.

"It is none of us," was the reply on all sides.

"Famine has not yet reached us. There are still provisions enough for several days. Let him who says he is hungry show himself."

No one came forward, and the crowd dispersed, crying—"We are Italians! *Viva Manin!*"

Gorzowski replied to the letter of the commissioners on the morning of the 19th. He granted the conference, objecting, however, to "all foreign interference, as inadmissible, between his Majesty and his rebellious subjects." He also temporarily suspended his fire.

The conference took place at Fusina, between

the besieging general and the Venetian delegates ; the intervention of the foreign consuls having been rejected. Gorzkowski declared that he must send the observations of the delegates to Milan ; but that while awaiting the reply the bombardment must continue. He kept his word, and in the evening the fire was renewed with fresh fury. "The destruction became greater than ever," wrote the consul Vasseur, in his journal, two days afterwards ; "rage blinds the Imperialists, for they destroy a city which must soon belong to them."

The Venetian artillery replied with a desperate energy. On the morning of the 20th, Manin paid his last visit to the defenders of the forts and batteries. They received him with an enthusiasm that affected even himself. "Now, my friends," said Manin, "we must fire against Austria to the last ball." The brave youths spared no effort to realize Manin's words to the letter.

During the night of the 19th and 20th, the capitulation of Velago and the fall of Hungary became known. Venice would, at least, have the well-earned honour of being the last to fall !

On the morning of the 22nd, Gorzkowski announced to Manin that he had received full powers from Milan. The delegates repaired to the enemy's general. At six in the evening, orders were sent to the batteries of the bridge to cease firing. Officers and soldiers disputed which should discharge the guns for the last time: the Austrian batteries also ceased firing at the same time, and a funereal silence succeeded to the thunder which they had been accustomed to hear continuously day and night for months.* The people did not feel relieved, but stupified; it seemed to them like passing from a feverish existence to the silence, not of repose, but of death. They said that, until now, they had never been able to believe that they must surrender.

The people, plunged into a state of stupor, after an immense expenditure of energy during eighteen months, waited with resignation the destiny which it pleased Providence to bestow upon them. It seemed as if Venice had nothing more to fear besides this great misfortune; that

* Since the 4th of May, more than ninety thousand projectiles had been thrown into the city.

it had lost all that it could lose. But though the people were calm, the army was in a state of violent fermentation. Of the six millions of paper money voted by the Assembly on the 5th of August, and which was of the real value of three millions only, the municipality had contrived to procure a first portion of 1,200,000 lire in gold, to commence assisting the wounded, to give three months' pay to the soldiers who did not belong to Venetia, and ten days' pay to the Venetian soldiers. This difference in treatment was but just to the miseries that awaited all the poor volunteers of the various Italian regions,* whose native land was closed against them. The Venetian soldiers could not appreciate the justice of this arrangement, and were irritated at the inequality; some were exasperated at having to lay down their arms, and others, again, dreaded being compelled to enter the Austrian ranks. Excited by these several causes of agitation, they commenced to revolt.

* There were a few strangers, but only very few; some Hungarians and Dalmatians, and a company of Swiss chasseurs who had rendered very important services, and redeemed the honour of their country, so tarnished at Naples.

On the 22nd, the gunners of the navy, disembarked without the knowledge of the Government or the Military Commission, proceeded to the square of St. Mark, and with loud cries demanded three months' pay.

Manin and the military authorities succeeded in making them listen to reason, and promised to give them some days' additional pay; but next day they returned, bringing with them a great number of soldiers belonging to other Venetian corps, and renewed their demand for three months' pay, mixed with confused cries of "*levy en masse*" and of "*grand sortie*."

Manin invited them to send delegates to him. "We wish for three months' pay," said the delegates; "we want to be disbanded, so as not to be re-enlisted in the Austrian service after the capitulation; we had much rather go out of the lagoon under Ulloa and Sirtori, to continue the battle."

Manin assured them that the capitulation guaranteed their return to their homes; and, as to the pay, everything that was possible, under the sad state of things that prevailed in Venice; that the "grand sortie" was madness,

and would not even be fair, as there was an armistice, and their word given to cease hostilities.

The moral ascendancy of Manin produced its usual effect. The delegates withdrew, touched and mortified at having, by their disorders, sullied the honour the army had gained.

The majority of the soldiers did not neglect their duty; but four or five hundred turbulent ones suddenly flew to arms, and at about five o'clock in the afternoon took possession of a battery placed at the extremity of the great bridge nearest the city (the *Roman* battery), and turned the guns against Venice, intimating to the Government that if their demands were not acceded to by sunset, they would then open fire on the city.

The danger was immense; the revolt might again spread among the mass of the troops, and lead to consequences worse even than revolt; it might happen, in consequence, that the municipality, becoming frightened, would hasten the return of the Austrians, and have recourse to protection from the enemy. Manin shuddered at this idea, and made desperate efforts to prevent such a result,—when the people, roused

from its apathy by the tumult in the army, invaded the square of St. Mark, mingled with soldiers, and imperiously demanded to know the result of the negotiations.

Manin replied, that Cavedalis was at Mestre, with Gorzkowski, with the last instructions of the Government, and that the *convention* (he would not allow himself to pronounce the word *capitulation*) would be published on the morrow, the 24th.

The crowd would not disperse, but remained there, heaving and trembling.

Manin returned to the balcony.

“Are you Italians? Yes, or no?”

“Yes! Yes!”

“You wish to deserve being free, perhaps, before long?”

“Yes! Yes!”

“Well, then, drive out from amongst you the scoundrels who excite you to disorder. As for myself, I promise you I would rather take my own life than subscribe to a dishonourable contract. If the force of arms, if the abandonment of all Europe . . . (He could not say ‘reduce us to surrender!’) . . . let us preserve the honour, yet

unspotted, of Venice, which the whole world admires for the conduct you have maintained up to this hour! *Viva l'Italia!*"

A great shout arose, then a "solemn silence." An electric shock passed through every heart, except those of a small number of evil-disposed persons who happened to be among the crowd.

Excess of his own emotion had compelled Manin to retire for a moment. The enthusiasm broke out anew when he re-appeared, crying—"Let those who are truly Venetians come and patrol with me."

He descended into the street, sword in hand; a great number of the different corps and civic guards followed him. He took the route to the quarter occupied by the revolted soldiers.

He had listened, for the last time, to the acclamations of the square of St. Mark.

Night had come on. The factious had not accomplished their criminal menaces. They did not fire upon the city, but they maintained a military attitude.

When Manin and his patrol arrived at the entrance of the great bridge of Canareggio, a

sentinel of the revolted soldiers fired, and cried "To arms!"

The rebels did not advance, but guarded their position. Manin stood looking at them. The military commission ordered the *générale* to be beaten. General Ulloa, with the Swiss company and civic guards, cut off all communication between the revolted and the city, and advised waiting till the next morning before marching upon them. Night, as he had foreseen, abated the excitement, and on the 24th of August, at day-break, the *Roman* battery was re-taken without a blow, and the factious dispersed.

Meanwhile, the capitulation decided on the 22nd was definitely signed on the morning of the 24th, at Marocco, near Mestre, THE VERY DAY UPON WHICH THE PROVISIONS IN VENICE WERE EXHAUSTED. The reduction of the city and the forts was to take effect in four days. All the Venetian officers who had quitted the Austrian service to fight under the banner of St. Mark were to leave Venice, as well as all soldiers foreign to Venetia, and the "civilians" named in a list which would be sent to the

Venetian commissioners. The communal paper money was to be reduced to half its value, which the municipality would have to liquidate at its own expense after a brief delay, a charge which would take the place of contribution of war.

Every person not named in the list might remain in the country, without fear of being called to account for past events.

The following is the list, without any regard to order: it is the Golden Book of the forty families:—

Avesani, Benvenuti, Giuriati, Minotto, Mengaldo, Pincherle, Manin, Tommaseo, Zerman, Zanetti, Vergottini, Seismeid-Doda, Varé, Morosini, Malfatti, Torniello (capuchin), Degli-Antoni, Mircovich, Mazzuchetto (franciscan), Comello, Canetti, Giustinian, Levi, Stadler, Lanza, Ponzoni, Soler, Mattei, Bernardi, Grondoni, Fabris, Sirtori, Serena, the two brothers da Mula, Bellinato, Manetti, Lazaneo (priest), Manzini, Caffi.

On the evening of the 24th appeared the last proclamation of the National Government:—

“The provisional government of Venice,

“Considering that an imperious necessity

compels acts in which neither the Assembly of Representatives, nor a power emanating from it, can participate,

“ Declares :

“ 1st. That the provisional government ceases its functions.

“ 2nd. The government powers are transferred to the municipality.

“ 3rd. Public order, tranquillity, and the safety of persons and property are entrusted to the co-operation of the population, to the patriotism of the civic guard, and the honour of the military corps.

“ The President,

“ MANIN.

“ Venice, 24th August, 1849.”

Thus ended this noble government : thus, to the shame of civilized Europe, fell this irreproachable people.

The municipality had only to ratify and execute the capitulation ; the legitimate government did not abdicate into the hands of the enemy ; it adjourned to the hour of the future marked by Divine Providence.

Manin, up to the night preceding the enemy's entrance into the city, "continued to maintain good order, which could not have been preserved without him." The civic guard, the army, the administration, all were dissolved: the city had sunk into a state of gloomy apathy.

To the last, the people listened obediently and affectionately to the voice of him who was still their chief, who did not cease to be so in his exile, who is still so even in his grave. Manin, retired within his house at San Paternan, could hear the people pass and repass under his windows.

"Here," they said to each other, "here lives *our poor father!* How much he has suffered for us!"*

Venice, ruined, decimated, exhausted, still raised its feeble voice to bless the man who had initiated it in martyrdom and glory.†

* "*Il Padre*" is still the popular name by which Manin is spoken of by the Venetians. Some months after the departure of Manin, the Austrians broke the stone at the door of his house upon which his name had been engraved. The people collected the smallest fragments, and preserved them as sacred relics.

† Venice surpassed all that Manin had expected of

The man who for eighteen months had exercised over his country the rule of intelligence and virtue, had now, with his family, to go into exile without bread.

"I threw myself," he wrote at a subsequent date, "I threw myself body and soul into the Revolution, I sacrificed everything to it, considering it impossible for me to survive its failure. I never thought of reserving for myself or my family, in the event of misfortune overtaking us, a chance of safety, an asylum, or even the means of subsistence. I did not even think of supplying myself with notes or documents to defend my name against the accusations I might have to endure."*

her. "In our early days, I said to Toffoli, who extolled my popularity, the people now cry '*Viva Manin!*' they will soon cry 'Death to Manin:' and I believed so. But I deceived myself; the duration of my popularity to the last hour astonished and overwhelmed me."

* "I have little or no concern," he added, "as to what may be said of me hereafter. I did not even trouble myself to revise my speeches in the Assembly, which had been mutilated by incompetent reporters." He did not arrange the materials for his own history; but, fortunately, he preserved such as had accumulated confusedly in his hands during the eighteen months of liberty. These valuable documents have been studied

The municipal corps compelled him to accept, in the name of the honour of Venice, of a small sum from the funds voted for the army and the proscribed ; this humble civic list of the exile was 24,000 lire (£800).*

arranged, and classified, by a devoted hand and lofty intelligence, and by the aid they afford it has become possible to write this memoir. These documents, consisting of papers, correspondence, speeches, notes, &c., have been edited by F. Planet de la Faye, and published in two volumes, in the desire of raising to a noble life a monument worthy of it.

* The following is a translation of the original document :—

“To Citizen Daniel Manin.

“The city of Venice cannot allow that the disinterestedness with which you imposed on yourself the greatest sacrifices in order to devote yourself exclusively to the public good, should become a new source of suffering to you when removed from a country you so dearly love.

“The municipality is certain of being the interpreter of the unanimous sentiment of its fellow-citizens, in striving to diminish, at least in part, the sufferings you must undergo, by sending you the trifling sum of 24,000 lire (£800).

“The municipality too well knows the elevation of

Manin also found means of acquitting himself of a sacred obligation before setting out. The French consul had drawn upon the banking-house of Levi, for the funds necessary to pay for the eight vessels chartered to convey away the exiles. "Who will reimburse you?" asked Manin.—"I do not know. My government, my country, perhaps the Venetian families whose sons I shall save—no matter!"

Some days before the finale, Manin took M. Vasseur the 17,000 francs of charter money. He had with great difficulty realized this sum in

your sentiments not to be assured that you will listen to its prayer, and so prove to it that you understand the feeling that prompts it.

"When, to soothe the pangs of exile, you recall to mind the days in which your courage and intrepidity preserved Venice from the greatest disasters, and maintained order under the most difficult circumstances, you will at the same time remember that Venice will ever retain for you the deepest affection and profoundest gratitude.

"Signed, CORRER, Podesta.

F. DONA,	}	Municipal Assessors.
L. MICHIEL,		
DATAICO-MEDIN,		
MARZANI,		

gold, and he had guarded it with the most jealous care. "When the government had no money to buy bread," he said, "I have often been tempted to touch this money; but, thank God, there it is, intact!"

A new grief was still to strike that heart already pierced by so many wounds.

There was at Venice a man of the highest intelligence and the greatest firmness, who might have played one of the most important parts in the Revolution, yet whose name has never once been traced by our pen. It is because, in his devotion to the cause and to the man, he had allowed his strong individuality to become absorbed in that of Manin's. On the 22nd March he was at Milan; the Dictator of Venice had immediately sent for him, and since then Pezzato had not quitted Manin for a single day. He had been his secretary, his council, his useful opponent, and his intimate support; always agreeing with him as to the aim, but controlling and striking out with him the means. He was to him as the *good demon* of the ancients, the faithful companion of our soul—he returned to heaven on the evening of the fall of Venice. On the even-

ing before the day upon which the exiles quitted Venice, he died of disease of the heart, the same disease by which Manin himself was destined to die.

On the 27th of August, while the Austrians were defiling in the silent streets, between houses closed like tombs, the French war steamer *Pluto* quitted the port of Venice, bearing Manin, his family, and the principal civil and military leaders of Venice.* Manin delayed embarking until the conditions of the capitulations were entirely executed, and no possibility remained of his being able to render any further service to his country. Soon the *Pluto* left behind it the Lido; the domes, towers, the Campanile of St. Mark, disappeared in succession, and his country faded from the eyes of the exile for ever.

* Forty-three persons in all. Next day, the eight merchant ships chartered by M. Vasseur took away six hundred other exiles.

CHAPTER VIII.

Manin at Marseilles—Death of Madame Manin—Manin at Paris—Manin and France—Father and Daughter—Death of Emilia.

WHILE the staff of the Venetian army and navy, borne in the ships the French consul had provided for the exiles, went to disperse themselves in Turkey, Greece, and Egypt, from whence the greater part of these unfortunate defenders of a holy cause, exhausted by grief and privation, never returned to the west,—the ex-President of the Government of Venice, after touching at Corfu and Malta, landed at Marseilles in the beginning of October, 1849. Notwithstanding the many bitter disappointments she had caused, it was of France that he claimed an asylum.

The destiny, which seemed never to weary of aiming its blows at that head and that ill-fated

family, awaited them again at Marseilles. Pezato, the friend of Manin, his other self, had been removed from him by death on the eve of his departure from Venice. On his arrival at Marseilles, that fearful visitor, the cholera, which had assailed the exiles in the lagoons, and which at that time ravaged Provence, seized upon Madame Manin. She was wounded to the heart upon abandoning her country, as is shown by a touching letter written two days before quitting the sacred hearth, which neither herself, nor her daughter, nor her husband, were destined ever again to see.

“All is over, all is lost, save honour! I am going to a foreign land, where I shall hear a language not my own. My beautiful language, I shall never hear it again; never more!”

She had no resource to bear up against that plague which had no pity either for broken hearts or exhausted frames.

On the 12th of October, on returning from the funeral ceremony where friends unexpectedly found among strangers had assembled to attend the exile to her tomb, Manin wrote the following letter to Dr. Barral, a surgeon of Marseilles:—

“ Pray accept, monsieur, yourself and the other noble hearts who have associated themselves with you in your generous action, my warmest thanks for all that has been done to preserve the mortal remains and honour the memory of the cherished companion who has shared all my long sufferings. Accept my sincerest gratitude, which proceeds from the depths of a heart broken by innumerable misfortunes: wounded in its sincerest affections, both in country and family. I did not deceive myself when I chose France for an asylum. She is ever the land of noble sentiments and generous efforts. Adieu, monsieur; permit me to press your hand as that of an old friend !”

On the 28th of October the mourning father and children arrived at Paris, towards which the Dictator of Venice had so often turned his face, full of expectation and anguish. They established themselves, at the commencement of a dull winter, in a small dark floor in the gloomy court of the *Petites-Ecuries*. Nature, as well as mankind, were enemies to the proscribed, now banished from the light of the sun as well as from their homes ! The first months of their

sojourn at Paris were very desolate. The bitterest of solitudes is that which chills the stranger lost amid the waves of unknown multitudes.

Stranger! Manin did not remain long a stranger in the great city. Incapable of being cast down or despairing, he was one of those who die standing, and who think there is a place for action, and the means of acting, so long as it is possible to exist. He had not selected France to bury himself in obscurity, and leave no sign. He had to achieve a moral influence there, in order to convert it into a political influence. He had ties to form in view of a possible future. He had to enlist and retain all those men who quickly attracted around him the regret, sympathy, and respect, and, we might add, the remorse of their country, in the desire of expiating, as much as was in their power, the fatal inaction of France. The impression of these first interviews continues ineffaceable. His portrait, in the strongest and most delicate hues, has been drawn by an eloquent pen, under the impression of the blow which deprived us of him. We need not attempt to say again what has been so strongly felt and eloquently expressed: remarking, how-

ever, as the most remarkable characteristic, that his aspect was not striking, either by the beauty or dignity of his features, and at first engaged your attention only by the impression of strength which was given by his head—with its wide and regular expanse of thoughtful brow—majestically poised and firmly set on the robust neck and broad shoulders of the man of action. His glance when animated transfigured his countenance, and you were instantly subdued by the mixture of an authority at once brusque and attractive, and of a tender grace, coming from the heart, which appeared to yield everything to those whom he subdued. You were subdued, and you felt pleased to be so—pleased because you felt yourself subdued—by truth, by the principles of justice, and not by the man—because this man was most unreservedly the servant of his faith. The purest men, those most elevated above vulgar interests, are yet influenced by their self-love, by position and power legitimately acquired—by popularity. These things are often in their thoughts; they never were in his. Disengagement from self was united in him with the strongest individuality.

Constituted to be everywhere the centre and principle of action, profoundly understanding and feeling the nature of the French people, it was not long before he saw himself surrounded with undying friendships and warm attachments, but all connected with his political mission. His friendships, so disinterested for himself, were not so for his country. A friend was a conquest. He made every one around him an Italian. He seized by the spirit, by the intellect, and by the heart, every one who came under the influence of his words, so grave, so full, and so decisive, that he might convince his hearers of the identity of interests between France and Italy, and prove that this was the only alliance which could be complete and permanent without one of the two allies being sacrificed to the other. By thus acting upon individuals, he exerted himself to produce the realization of those words which were uttered from the bottom of his heart: "I reckon still upon France!"

Whatever was given to him and his country he returned with interest. How many have been revived, fortified, calmed, and invigorated by his vivifying influence! How he purified the atmosphere from every sophism, from every unhealthy

exaggeration ! How he dispelled the clouds from the mind, habituating every one to clear his thoughts, to regulate his activity. He could listen as well as talk, drawing out from every one what he had to give ; teaching every one, yet being taught by all. We have never met with anything resembling his condensed conversation, full of power. It was, in truth, "the verb"—action in word !

While he confirmed the strong, he had the valuable gift of raising the weak, and such as had failed, through what still remained to them of manliness and truth. Accustomed to govern men by a process the reverse of that of the vulgar politician—by the good side of human nature—this skilful statesman touched not a spring to which the most rigid moralist would have objected. We might say that in him the Italian patriotism of the nineteenth century atoned for the patriotism of the sixteenth. The policy of Manin was that of life and hope,—the policy of Machiavelli was that of despair and death !

There is a selfish charity which knows neither how to hate evil nor become ardent for good

an inert comprehension, which explains everything, but determines nothing.

The charity of Manin pardoned the past on condition of future services; his vast comprehension embraced everything, but only to combine and put everything into action. Above all things, he had an anti-sectarian spirit. The decorations of his study were the reflex of his mind; the walls were hung with the portraits of all those who had served, or wished to serve Italy, no matter in what way, nor at what period of their career. There hung Charles Albert opposite to Mazzini, Garibaldi opposite Gioberti, Montanelli near d'Azeglio, the Archbishop of Paris near Edgar Quinet. We may say that the soul of Manin manifested itself fully in two things; the representation of Italy united in the person of all her sons, and the noble maxims which we find scattered among the notes written during his exile—instance the following:—

“I hear many persons say that the failure of the great Italian movement of 1848 must be attributed to the loyalty, moderation, and generosity we have shown towards our enemies. I believe this to be an error, and a pernicious one.

"We ought not to repent, but congratulate ourselves on having shown ourselves loyal, generous, and moderate, even towards our enemies. Under a physical defeat, which is always repairable, the inward feeling of our moral superiority becomes a strength and support.

"The means which moral sense reproves, even when they may be materially useful, kill morally. No victory deserves to be placed in the balance against the loss of self-respect.

"Even were it possible to conquer by means which the moral sense condemns—a possibility in which I do not believe—still such a victory would not be really useful, it would not be lasting."

Manin loved France: he had forgiven her everything. He loved her not only for what he hoped from her, but for herself. He suffered as much as her people from everything that degraded her, from everything that materialized her or impaired her genius. What would he not have given to prevent her continual alternations of grandeur and weakness! The spirit of despondency—of despairing of one's self, was, perhaps, the only thing which was more opposed to his feelings than the spirit of sectarianism. He

preached unceasingly continuous and persevering action, and condemned unforgivingly political inaction. "We must always be doing," he said. He had well proved it. "No languor, no temerity! We must not neglect the smallest success, nor the efforts of every successive hour. We must not always dream of grand epic effects, nor disdain the necessary detail, the prose of war."

"In politics, as in war, there are ardent minds, who comprehend nothing of the marches and countermarches, the ambuscades, or the fire of advanced posts, and who always require the trumpet and the din of battle. They may be very good soldiers, but of a certainty they make very poor captains. The good general gives battle only upon favourable ground. When he has found it, he manœuvres, skirmishes, and harasses the enemy; for in politics, as in war, it is not the battle that is the aim, but the victory."

Passionately attentive to the internal movements of France, without mingling in them himself—for his principles forbade him from all active interference in the quarrels of the country that gave him an asylum—he wished never

to quit France. Sure of meeting esteem and respect everywhere, nowhere else but in France could he have found such warm affections or such moral affinities ; but his principal motive lay not in this. He did not wish to quit France ; because he was convinced that there only, now and for ever, it was possible to secure great things for his country and for regenerated Europe ; that England would probably never give more than a moral support, very important in retaining or recovering, but inadequate ; that he had little to hope from contemporary Germany, where (as the sad experience of the Assembly of Frankfort in 1848 too clearly proved) pride, rancour, the spirit of sophistry and encroachment, had almost stifled the sentiment of international justice.

That Italy could only liberate herself through the co-operation of France, and France could maintain her grandeur, her true European position, only by the co-operation of Italy—such was the truth which he endeavoured to persuade the French nation. Manin believed that a man of energy, the respected guest of France, knowing her well, and knowing how to speak to her,

might exercise upon her, in the hour of crisis, a decisive influence, and induce her to act for herself and for the world. "When France rises," he thought, "we must hasten to put her in motion. Her first impulses are excellent. If time is left her, to pause, to doubt, for the negative and critical spirit to reappear, all is lost. We must hurry her to commit herself to the cause of the great and the good. Once in action, she will not retreat."

He dreamed of this appeal to France under very different conditions, having, with regard to these conditions, sympathies and preferences, but not actual partizanship. The republican who had already once accepted, and was about again to accept royalty, as an instrument of safety for his country, could not be exclusive in his external relations. Faithful to the principle of reserve, if not of neutrality, which he had established relative to internal affairs, he would have treated, we do not say indifferently, but resolutely, with the popular government (which one time thought of raising upon the *Pont Neuf* the sacred table of enlistment, and of calling volunteers in the name of Italy !), or with a totally different government, not discussing the form, when external

action was concerned, provided he found the motive, that is to say, the inclination to act. Absolute unity in the aim, diversity in the means.

From these lofty ideas of the future, of a future which, alas! he was never to see, he had to descend continually to the hard necessities of material existence. The small sum he had brought from Venice, already greatly reduced by travelling expenses, was not sufficient to secure the maintenance of a family. Determined to accept nothing, not even the private affection of his new friends, nor of political sympathy, and to owe nothing either to governments or private individuals, the successor of the doges sought, in the humble profession of a teacher of the Italian language, the means of subsistence for himself and family. Another pen has drawn the sad picture of the illustrious professor exhausting himself in the immense circuit of the streets of Paris, in the damp and cold of winter, while labouring under the attacks of a disease that threatened his life—disease of the heart, and of an affection even still more painful and distressing. The cause of this disease of the

heart was the same as that which excited its development. It was the domestic grief which embittered his life, the frightful condition of his beloved daughter. Poverty, personal suffering, had been as nothing to him, without the painful emotions encountered at his fireside. Can there be anything comparable to the anguish of a father who witnesses the sufferings of a child without the power to soothe them, without hope, and almost without respite? And such a child! There was but one soul between this parent and child. "From the time she was five years old," said Manin, one day, "I perceived that we understood each other." Initiated into all his ideas, and, like him, adoring Italy, she had become to her father the living image of his unhappy country, as Beatrice had been to the poet of Florence the vision and the voice of the immortal land. •

The elevation of soul in Emilia, and the rare qualities of her mind, portrayed themselves in her delicate features; her strong and penetrating intellect, which always went direct to the root of everything, to the absolute and to the perfect, singularly displaying itself in mathematical and meta-

physical forms, was associated with a charming temper, and all the delicate shades of feminine sensibility. The preservation and growth of these rare faculties, through frequent and constantly increasing crises, always more and more distressing, of the strange and terrible nervous affection which enveloped her in its torments, was almost a miracle. Her soul seemed to expand in proportion as its mortal tenement wasted away, and this contrast redoubled her father's anguish.*

Of this long torture there exists a very painful memento,—the sad journal in which the father recorded, almost hour by hour, all the

* A letter from Béranger shows the impression this painful condition produced upon the mind of the great poet, who gave so many proofs of his sympathy for Manin, and who preceded his daughter but a few weeks to the grave. "What most affects me is Manin. I have seen his unfortunate daughter in a state which it is impossible to describe. It pained me too much to describe it to Bretonneau. Can you imagine the mind to remain intact amid such sufferings? Can you picture to yourself this poor girl thinking of the pain her disorder gave her worthy father, clasping him with her withered hands, and asking his forgiveness for the martyrdom she caused him?"

incidents of his daughter's sickness. On the first page is this heading:—

Alla mia santa martire!

For her, death would have been a blessing; and yet she did not wish to die: she knew that a smile from her, in the brief intervals of suffering, consoled her father for all, and restored him for a few moments to himself, to his happy, charming disposition, crushed by misfortune, to his naïve and spirituel gaiety, shining like a gleam of azure amid the murkiest clouds!—Emilia's last words were:—"Dear Venice! I shall never see thee more!"

On a morning in January, 1854, Manin and his son conveyed the remains of Emilia to the family vault of the magnanimous artist* who, after having re-created, as it were, the creation of Dante, and translated the great exile of Florence into a language equal to his own, made a brother of the exile of Venice, and offered him the hospitality of the tomb.

Manin remained with his son, the young and courageous companion of his eighteen months of peril and glory; so lately full of energy, in dan-

* Ary Scheffer.

ger, but crushed by grief at the painful spectacle of his sister's long sufferings, and by the loss of his mother and his native land,—a land as passionately loved by the son as by the father. The bereaved father had to sustain this young heart, tried too soon, and prepare it to bear alone the weight of a name which he nobly sustains at the present day, surrounded by the sublimest recollections.

An immense void was left in the heart of Manin; the kind of gloomy repose which followed the departure of the object of so many years' solitude crushed him. He missed even the sight of her sufferings which he had been so long accustomed to behold. Except in his country and his friends, he no longer interested himself in any of those things which occupy or console men. When he was urged to travel to see new countries, and seek a solace in those spectacles of nature which soothe wounded hearts—"How can I go," he replied, "to see Nature? *She* is no longer there to see it with me!" "They talk to me of the sea," he cried, one day; "what a tempest of remembrance and feeling that word awakens within me! That word reminds me of my dear country, which perhaps I shall never see

again. It reminds me of my dearly beloved parents, who sleep beneath an isle kissed by the sea waves. It reminds me of *my holy angel*, who died far away from her native sea, which she so dearly loved. To sustain myself in an artificial calm, I must bury myself, entomb my heart and soul in apathy and forgetfulness !”

He was destined to become acquainted with all forms of moral suffering. Accustomed to live in action—in present duties—the thinker absorbed in the patriot—as must always happen when a country is to be recreated, and when every virtue assumes a political form—his mind had dwelt but little in the sphere where a clear and serene belief in man’s eternal destinies is formed. He came near to that belief more by sentiment than opinion. Sometimes, by a feeling which may well be called the noblest instinct of our nature, his spirit soared towards those who had gone before him to the other world, and who he hoped could still see and hear him. At other times, when he saw evil reigning on the earth, so many wrongs triumphant, so many sorrows crushing the just, cruel doubts upon the very principles of things assailed him. “I cannot do wrong,” he said, “be-

cause I have a natural horror of it; because I am born so. But where is the merit? where is the law? where is the object of this world?" In doubting the law he affirmed it, because this distinction of good and evil was at the root of his very being; this impossibility of doing or enduring wrong was already, even in the excess of his miseries, a noble recompense. Among the gloomiest moments of these moral perturbations, two things were never shaken in him — kindness and patriotism. This man, crushed under overwhelming misfortune, and in whose presence no one should have dared, so to speak, give a thought to his own troubles—this man retained sufficient freedom of mind and heart to perceive the slightest shade of sadness on the countenance of a friend, and to express his concern thereat!

Doubt and misgiving could only be transitory in his great soul. Torn and mutilated, he rose up invincible, and returned to action. He had no longer to divide himself between his daughter and his country. Henceforward he gave wholly to the Italian cause the remainder of his strength and his days.

CHAPTER IX.

Manin resumes action—Manin's advice to Italy—*Independence ; Unification*—The Italian Tricolour at Paris—Unity through Piedmont—National Plan traced by Piedmont—Piedmont at the Congress—Against Political Assassination—The Hundred Cannon of Alexandria—The National Italian Society—The last Illness and Death of Manin.

DURING the lapse of these four years Manin found no means of acting for his country in a direct manner ; and he severely condemned the attempts at insurrection which, " without any reasonable chance of success, by increasing the number of victims reduced that of future combatants." Now the general position had changed. The three leading powers of Europe had entered upon a great war, which might react upon Italy, and afford her an opportunity of regenerating

herself. The question was, how should she prepare for a new war of independence? What could she do to this end? In what manner could she dispose of herself?

To work out the solution of this question, and instruct others in his conclusions, was the exclusive occupation of the last years of Manin. The history of his plans and views has recently been faithfully sketched by an able hand; and we shall, therefore, sum up more succinctly, perhaps, than we otherwise intended, the progress of Manin's ideas and conclusions. Our analysis shall be carried on by quotations; for what better can we do than to let him speak for himself? Entirely agreeing with him in the object, it is for us only to interpret him as to the means. His country was the judge to which he appealed.

The first public act by which Manin signalized his return to active life was a letter in *La Presse* of the 22nd of March, 1854. Lord John Russell had said in the House of Commons that, "if the Italians, instead of rising against the Austrian government, were to remain tranquil, the time would come when that government would be more humane, and give

more popular privileges to Italy than she could obtain by insurrection."

When we consider the manner in which English statesmen reconcile principles and facts, according to the political necessities of the day, we may understand that this meant:—"The war in the East is begun: we wish for the support of Austria against Russia; it will, therefore, be most convenient to us that you do not stir while matters are in their present condition."

Manin had no occasion to discuss the intentions or the convenience of the English minister. He went straight to the point.

"We do not ask," he said, "that Austria should be liberal and humane in Italy. Even if she wished to be so, it is impossible. We have nothing to do with her humanity and liberality. We only ask of her to leave us. We wish to be our own masters.

"The aim we propose to ourselves, which, without exception, we all desire, is this:—

"Complete *independence* of the whole Italian territory; the *union* of all parts of Italy in one single political body.

“Upon this we are all unanimously agreed.

“The dissensions which subdivide Italian patriots into several political parties (republicans, royalists, unitarians, federalists, &c.) concern only *secondary* questions, upon which we are ready to make all the arrangements and concessions which circumstances may demand.

“But as to *union* and *independence*, we can make no concession—we cannot make any terms.

“No—we cannot resign ourselves. For a nation which bears a foreign yoke, resignation is cowardice; and we have no desire to be cowards.

“No: we cannot remain tranquil, while we have not attained the object of our pursuit—so long as we have not obtained the *independence* and *union* of Italy.

“Let it be well understood that the Italian question is henceforward an European question of the first order. It must be solved in a manner conformable with our indomitable aspirations for nationality.

“Up to that time, whatever is done, we must continually agitate—there will always be a focus

of trouble in Italy, a provocation for war, threatening the repose of Europe, which will not permit of its calculating upon a durable peace.”

A short time afterwards, Manin wrote many sketches of a programme of conciliation to propose to the Italian patriots. His rallying cry was, *Independence and Union*. Subsequently he replaced the word *union* by that of *unification*, which could be applied at the same time to the federative as well as to the unitarian form. No arrangement with the foreign domination, no separatism, no *two* Italies, nor *three*, or more; but *one* Italy, either federative or united. Alliance with France, whatever might happen to be its government, provided it made war upon Austria. The Italian insurrection must sacrifice its preferences, both of persons and of forms, if that be necessary to arrive at its aim. She must do nothing to alienate her allies, France and Piedmont. She must not touch Rome until the French have ceased to sustain the temporal power of the Pope. Union, and not fusion of the insurgents with the French and Sardinian armies. Immediately a territory revolts, it should proceed to form a provisional junta of government, and

a provisional assembly elected by the popular vote ; then, as the movement extends, they could unite together. After the war, the entire nation will decide. Until then there must be no party propagandism. Mazzini must make a sacrifice for the good of his country. He must withdraw from the political arena, where his presence will be prejudicial to the cause.*

“There are three forms admissible for Italy :— a single monarchy ; a confederation of republics, or a single republic. Of these three forms that ought to be selected which has the best chance of success? A monarchical confederation must be rejected as decidedly as the plan of separate states independent of each other.

“Such a confederation,” he said elsewhere, “would be none other than a league of the princes against the people, or an antagonism and rivalry which would open the door to the foreigner. It would unite in itself all the evils of bad monarchies and of bad republics.”

* In this he had no prejudice, no personal hostility. Manin fully recognised the services of this *great Italian*, as he called him, in the past, but he blamed his present course, and feared his future attitude.

In June, 1854, this programme was approved by a number of the most influential emigrants.

While he laboured to prepare Italy for action, he exerted himself to caution public opinion in France against the delusions which Austria from time to time circulated in Europe. A journal having stated that "Austria herself had entered upon the way of reforms," "Austria," he replied, "did she even desire to do so, cannot lay aside her old system of compression—a system which is indispensable to the forcible retention in one bundle of all the heterogeneous elements of which her empire is composed. She has not entered, she cannot enter, upon a system of reform."*

"Besides, the disaffection of the different races which submit to her domination, so far from diminishing since 1848, has steadily increased."†

"It is right this should be known: the government which will have the courage to prefer the open enmity to the equivocal neutrality of Austria may reckon upon the support of three-fourths of the inhabitants of its empire."

* Political and liberal reforms are here understood.

† In the war in the East.

Manin, a few months previously, had made a visit to England. He considered it useful to contract some direct relations with English statesmen, the just appreciators of the political capacity of others, and susceptible of being influenced, occasionally and up to a certain point, by these personal communications.*

An important act of the Piedmontese government was warmly approved by Manin, and influenced his ulterior determinations. This was the alliance of Victor Emmanuel with France and England—an alliance which gave to Piedmont a position far above its material power, and assured to it the support of France for the future, and, by a happy combination of circumstances, did not call down upon it in the future the resentment of the great power against which

* "My personal reception is flattering," thus he writes from London; "but for the object nearest to my heart, the wind is not very propitious. They say here that the useful is the just; and I reply, that the just is the useful. These theories appear identical, but nevertheless they produce very different results. I still hope that my visit will be not altogether useless. It is always good to sow. Favourable conditions may arrive which will cause the seed to grow up."— (24th June, 1854)

it took up arms, and which carried its resentment elsewhere.

“In serving under the tri-coloured flag of Italian redemption,” he wrote, “the soldiers who fight in the Crimea are not the soldiers of the Piedmontese province, but the soldiers of Italy.”

The first moment of real happiness which perhaps the heart of the exile had felt since the fall of Venice, was that when he saw floating upon the boulevards of Paris “the tri-colours of the Italian Revolution united in fraternal embrace with the colours of the French Revolution,” on the day of the arrival of the Queen of England. To him it was a vision of the future; it was great Italy, sister of France, which appeared to him in this flag, courageously preserved and hoisted by a little Italian state.

The working of his mind soon displayed itself on the occasion of the affairs of Naples. King Ferdinand being on bad terms with France and England, projects of a dynastic revolution at Naples were agitated among the emigrants, and a pamphlet was published in favour of these projects.

Manin published at London, Paris, and Turin, the following declaration :—

“Faithful to my flag—*independence and unification*,—I reject everything opposed to it. If regenerated Italy must have a king, there must be only *one*, and that one the King of Piedmont.

“The republican party, so bitterly calumniated, now performs another act of abnegation, and makes a sacrifice to the national cause.

“Convinced that before everything we must *make an Italy*, as that is the principal question, superior to all others, it says to the House of Savoy: *Make an Italy, and I am with you*.
IF NOT—NO!

“It says to the constitutionalists: think of making an Italy, not of aggrandizing Piedmont; be Italian patriots, and not exclusively Sardinians, and I am with you! IF NOT—NO!

“The real dissension is in two camps:—

“The camp of unificatory national opinion;

“The camp of separatist municipal opinion.

As a Republican, I raise the flag of unification. Come and rally round it, and defend it, whoever wishes for Italy to be, and Italy WILL be!” (15th—19th September, 1855.)

“ Piedmont,” he wrote in explanation of his ideas, and speaking of the guarantees to be asked of the house of Savoy, “ Piedmont is too strong to be overthrown by a revolution, too feeble to overcome its rival without a democracy.

“ In my opinion, federation would be the most suitable form for Italy ; but federation can work out unification only by a republic. For unification, the federal diet must be armed with full power. Monarchs would not consent to be thus reduced to the condition of mayors. All the princes of Italy, except the King of Piedmont, are at present hostile to the national cause. This greatly simplifies the question, and renders the state of things very different from that in 1848.

“ We were not prepared for the Revolution of 1848. We must prepare ourselves for that which is possible and desirable ; for that which may break out in ten years, in five years, in a month, or to-morrow !

“ Let us know what we want, and will it with inflexible energy.

“ The great national Italian party includes all the republicans who love Italy more than the republic, and all the royalists who love Italy more

than a dynasty, whichever it may be. This is the same party which, in the interest of the whole of Italy, defended Venice, abandoned by every one, from the month of August in 1848 to the month of August, 1849."

Thus (to sum up Manin's ideas), in the present state of Europe and of Italy, not being able to give to his country the form of government he preferred, he turned to that which appeared to him actually possible—a constitutional monarchy, uniting all Italy.

English politicians, when they consider it their duty to spare Austria, willingly make the Italian question turn upon the governments of Rome and Naples; stigmatizing the latter, and saying nothing of the other. Manin vigorously exposed such tactics.

"All that is said of the governments of Rome and of Naples is true, and, what is worse, only a part of the truth.

"But what they have forgotten to say is, that the government of Austria in Italy is worse still. It is so, it has always been so, it must always be inevitably so.

"There is this peculiarity in the evils of Italy,

that we must attribute them not to the perversity of individuals, but to the invincible power of situations. Austria, the Pope, and the King of Naples labour under the impossibility of governing well, even if they desired to do so.

“The conclusion of all this is very simple. Aid Piedmont in driving Austria out of Italy. That will not settle the national question, but we will undertake the rest.

“Aid Piedmont as it aided you on the Tchernaya. The Italian question is also an European question of the first order. It can have no other solution than this.

“If France enters upon a struggle against Austria, it will not meet with such a resistance as it met with from Russia.

“The papists and the abettors of Austria combine to vituperate the House of Savoy, because it has become a great Italian power. When they praise it, it will have ceased to be a national power.”

At another time he submitted the following question to France:—

“If we should happen to attain our object; if Italy, ceasing to be a mere geographical denomination, should become a powerful and pros-

perous political individuality, will that be injurious or dangerous, or simply disagreeable to France?"

Petty policy, like that of the old diplomatic routine, that which believes a nation can be rich and powerful only through the poverty and weakness of its neighbours, will perhaps reply—Yes! A noble policy, not only that of the sentiment of justice, but that of great interests, of natural alliances and views of the future, must reply—No!

Manin's Italian constitutional monarchy encountered, on its first proposal, many sorts of adversaries independently of the pure separatists, men of the past, who insisted upon maintaining the isolation of the States. 1st. The unitarian republicans. 2nd. The federalist republicans, who, not hoping for the near realization of an ideal that Manin had accepted with them, preferred to unity through Piedmont, the plan of a confederation of princes, by means of dynastic revolutions, or of local constitutional reforms. 3rd, finally, at the first view, the greater part of the Piedmontese themselves. Most of the Piedmontese journals commenced by rejecting, with a sort of horror, the grand and bold

programme offered to their prince and country. The Italian unitarian monarchy seemed too grand to those who aspired only to a kingdom of Upper Italy.

Manin made a dignified reply to the charges of ambitious temerity directed against himself:—

“ This banner of conciliation I propose is that which enabled Venice to resist to the last, after being foremost in the Italian movement.”

“ To judge of me, it is necessary to study the whole course of my political conduct. It will then be seen that I have always had the same aim, and that I have always proceeded by the same path. I neither ask nor hope for justice. I shall content myself and be contented with the conviction of having spoken and acted for the good of my country, without any personal consideration.”

Nevertheless, he made a fresh effort. On the 12th of February, 1856, he addressed a noble appeal to the Piedmontese journals:—

“ I now make a loyal attempt to unite the powers of the nation under the same banner. Receive this attempt with sympathy ; discuss it

calmly. As a man of good faith, I address men of like good faith; for I am the friend and brother of whoever loves Italy. I entreat of you, in the name of our beloved country, that the discussion be such as becomes brothers and friends. The aim I have in view is sacred. If I deceive myself as to the means, shew me my error in a friendly manner. I cry, peace! peace!—peace between ourselves, if we wish that some day our war-cry, terrible to the enemies of Italy, shall resound in their ears.”

His voice was heard. Justice, which he had but now despaired of, began to shew itself. His real motives were better appreciated. The number of his supporters increased; discussion became more serious and profound; and the movement never ceased to spread around his idea, which he explained and developed in several interesting papers.

“As a thinker and *à priori*,” he wrote to M. Valerio (11th September, 1856), “I believe that a Republic is the best of governments; and that the exercise of liberty is greater and surer under the federal form.

“As a politician, I seek to discover what is practically possible.

“ *Independence and Unification.*
Italy cannot become united, if she be not independent ; and she cannot remain independent, if she be not united.

“ I accept the monarchy, provided it be unitarian. I accept the House of Savoy, provided it concurs loyally and effectually to make Italy ; that is to say, to render her **ONE AND INDEPENDENT—IF NOT, NO !**”

But, if the Piedmontese monarchy failed in its mission ?

“ The national party ought not, on that account, to desist from its labour ;” it will seek “ to make Italy by other means, and also have recourse, if necessary, to ideas which diverge from the monarchical principle.

“ The Piedmontese monarchy, to be faithful to its mission, must always have before its eyes the final aim—the **INDEPENDENCE and UNIFICATION** of Italy.

“ She must profit by every occasion which permits her to make a step in advance on the road that leads to this end.

“ She must not by any treaty, or under any pretext, make any divergent or retrograde step. . .

"She must avoid everything which . . . shall tie her hands; abstain from all union with *the perpetual enemies of Italy—Austria and the Pope*;* under no pretext to take any part in treaties which recognise and confirm the territorial and political positions which she is called upon to destroy.

"She must maintain herself the nucleus, the centre of attraction for Italian nationality.

"She must prevent other nuclei—other centres from being formed.

"When the great battle of national freedom begins, she must resolutely take part, and not

* The practical man had formerly accepted the alliance of a Pope, who took the initiative in the movement; the theoretician, sustained by a decisive experience, condemned the principle of pontifical royalty. On a certain occasion, he roughly summed up his ideas in a well-known, and often-quoted remark, but which he would not have published without explanation, for the habitual moderation of his language is well known. "So long as the Sovereign Pontiff retain two powers united, he cannot be pope and an honest man." He meant that the two incompatible powers imposed two contradictory duties, and that it would be impossible not to fail in one or the other.

lay down the sword, before Italy is MADE ; risking, without hesitation, the loss of the throne of Piedmont, to conquer the throne of Italy."

The attitude of the Piedmontese government at the Congress of Paris confirmed the conviction Manin had of viewing the case correctly. In a letter to the *Diritto* of the 11th of May, 1856, he approved of the conduct of Piedmont, in the following terms:—

"The Piedmontese monarchy has made no concession to the perpetual enemies of Italy—Austria and the Pope.

"She has profoundly offended the pride, the interest, and the views of Austria, in protesting against the military occupation of the legations and the duchies, and in denouncing to civilized Europe the bad government of the different Italian Sovereigns devoted to Austria, and protected by her.

"She has exercised, and caused to be admitted, the right of speaking in the name of Italy.

"She has constrained diplomacy to recognise that the situation of Italy is intolerable, and by implication, that if no remedy be applied, revolution is necessary and legitimate.

“ Piedmont has made a new step in a direction where, sustained, and, if necessary, impelled, by the opinion of the country she governs, by the applause, sympathy, and gratitude, of the other Italian provinces, it will be easy for her to advance ; and, as I hope and believe, impossible to retreat.”

Manin appreciated at his highest value the able and courageous minister who, supported by the confidence of a loyal-hearted prince, and of energetic and enlightened assemblies, had raised the Piedmont of Novara, and had made it, when vanquished, stronger, more active, and more respected, than before its defeat. These two men would have been able to accomplish great things together ; and they both knew it. At the epoch of the congress of Paris, they had been able to mutually understand and encourage each other : and the Piedmontese minister, as circumstances grew great around him, must certainly very often have mourned the exile of Venice !

Manin, in recommending union and co-operation with Piedmont, had no intention of advising the Italian patriots to submit themselves passively to the Piedmontese Government : “ co-

peration means action, not passiveness
Until we shall have attained our aim, until Italy has become one and independent—Italians ! you who love your native land, listen to the words addressed to you by an Italian exile :—

“ Agitate ! Agitate ! Agitate ! ”

Agitation, according to his idea, would prepare the way for the great national revolution, but would exclude the petty plots and *coups-d'etat* of refugees. If Manin rejected as a crime all useless effusion of blood, all vague flying to arms, he still more forcibly and energetically reproved political assassination, private murder raised to the rank of an instrument of war and of revolution ; that legacy of antiquity so ill understood, and of the violence of the middle ages. He combated, in three noble letters (June, 1856), the theory of the poniard, with the ardour which animated him against everything that could injure Italy in the estimation of nations. He attacked, in itself and in its results, that child of despair, which a people who were recovering life and hope should send to the same oblivion as the book of the *Prince*—the theory of employing crime as an instrument of freedom.

“Consider how the Romish church has lost, and still loses authority, particularly in Italy, because, in defence of her temporal interests, she has not shrunk from the employment of means which the universal conscience of mankind condemns. . . .

“Undoubted purity of morals in theory and in act, constitutes the true and vital power of every religion. But the ardent and devoted love of our country is also a religion, and it loses its authority if, in theory or in act, it deviates from the moral sense. . . .”

At this same epoch the Neapolitan question was revived by fresh excesses on the part of the Neapolitan Government. Manin advised the people of the Two Sicilies to refuse the payment of taxes in the name of the Constitution of 1848, which had been violated—a constitution which had been suspended *de facto*, but which in legal right was existing; that is to say, he advised legal resistance as a prelude to insurrection. “If the government, instead of ultimately executing the laws, persists in its illegality, and drives the people to revolution, they will make a clean sweep of the dynasty, and afterwards dispose of

the country according to the inspirations of Italian nationality."

It was the man of 1847 that reappeared here. In him the practical man always remained associated with the theoretician. He proceeded to his aim "unhasting, yet unresting," and even against the King of Naples he had no extreme policy. (June and July, 1856.)

"At Naples," he wrote at a later date (November), "Poërio must be minister, or Victor Emmanuel king!"

We perceive, that while systematically disproving the monarchical federation, he still admitted transitions and modifications. He did not essentially differ from the federalists, except in condemning all change of dynasty that did not tend to junction with—absorption by Piedmont.

The *subscription for the hundred cannon of Alexandria*, the citadel of Piedmont against Austria, proposed by a Genoese journal, the *Gazetta del Popolo*, was the first opportunity for Manin to excite a significant demonstration of French sympathy for Italy. The second demonstration of the same character was, alas! accomplished at his grave!

“Whoever wishes Italy to be freed from foreign domination,” he wrote, “can and must subscribe, whatever otherwise may be his opinions upon other points of the Italian question. In a word, the signature of the Italians signifies ‘*We wish Austria to go ;*’ and the signatures of strangers signify, ‘*We join in this wish !*’ Nothing more, and nothing less” (1st Sept. 1856).

In the presence of Italy and of the stranger, indeed everywhere, he was in the breach: he spoke and acted everywhere; counselling Italy, appealing to France, making Switzerland blush at the disgraceful anomaly of a free people furnishing mercenary troops to maintain tyranny over others (December 1856, January 1857).

His activity, however, slackened during the early part of 1857. These new and ardent struggles had rapidly consumed the feeble remnant of his strength. Alarming symptoms betrayed the progress of the disease which shattered his frame. An excessive nervous agitation rendered every discussion a torture to him; then the conversation even of friends, who shared all his sentiments, interviews which formerly were his moral aliment and

consolation, became almost impossible. He secluded himself for weeks and months in an almost impenetrable solitude, vainly seeking in absolute silence an alleviation from the feverish excitement which mounted from his heart to his brain ; and he never for a moment quitted his solitude, save to press the hand of a friend, or write a few lines upon some Italian question, and that at the price of great effort and extreme suffering.

The progress of his idea, which gradually spread over Italy, calmed and revived him sometimes for a moment. Great events beyond the Alps might perhaps have enabled him to wrestle with death ; he would then have wished to live—and his will was so strong ! But events seemed still to be very distant ; he could not stay for them. He did not live to see the beginning of the end, else he would have cancelled from one of his letters the following lines :—

“ Exhausted by a struggle far beyond my strength, I await with ardent desire the hour of repose, the true and last repose.”

His last political act was to sign, with a trembling hand, the following circular of the

National Italian Society, founded for the propagation of his principles (August 1857).

"The National Italian Association declares— That it intends placing the great principle of Italian independence and of unification above every predilection for political forms, and above every municipal or provincial interest, whatsoever it may be.

"That it will support the House of Savoy by every reasonable and possible means, so long as the House of Savoy supports the Italian cause.

". . . . That to arrive at the independence and unification of Italy, it believes popular action to be necessary, and the co-operation of the Piedmontese government useful." *

* "His name is worth legions," wrote the worthy Marquis Pallavicino, Silvio Pellico's companion in captivity, but who had not adopted his doctrine of *resignation*. This circular was written by M. La Farina.

M. Pallavicino was right. We read in the correspondence of *La Presse*, dated Genoa, 24th April, 1859, on the day after the ultimatum of Austria, which commenced the war in Italy: "The national society, instituted in past time by Manin, and directed by M. Pallavicino and La Farina, secures to Piedmont eighty thousand volunteers on the day after the attack."

Manin died "in the full faith of the excellence of his work, and of its ultimate triumph. Louder than ever he repeated that there, and there only, lay the safety of Italy. The greatest consolation of his friends is the remembrance of the profound serenity and contentment shed over the last days of the martyr, by the firm conviction of having well performed his rough task, of having well served his country to the last."*

Daniel Manin expired on the 22nd of September, 1857, at the age of fifty-three years.†

His body was laid in the funeral vault beside that of his daughter and the remains of his wife,

* This note was found among Manin's papers, it is in the handwriting of the devoted friend who had surrounded with pious cares the last days of Emilia, and afterwards those of the desolate father and noble citizen.

† He was born on the 13th May, 1804.

brought by the son and brother, who alone remained of this devoted family. The illustrious friend who gave them the shelter of his tomb, and whose crayon and pencil have fixed for posterity, in life and in death, the features of the father and daughter—Ary Scheffer—carried off by the same disorder, the disease of noble souls, was not long in following Manin to the grave.* Their mortal remains will be separated one day, on the day when the bondage of Venice has ceased for ever. Their memories can never be sundered!

The soul of Manin hovers at this hour, over that Italy which his thoughts pervade and in-

* An attack commencing at Manin's funeral almost carried off Ary Scheffer immediately. In a letter written upon the occasion of this malady, we read the following passage:—"Manin's death was a source of grief to him, and Cavaignac's was also another. We cannot see without pain men of so rare an elevation of character disappear one after another. Our age presents so few examples of similar virtue." The hand that traced these affecting lines was in its turn soon cold in death, even before that of Ary Scheffer. It was the hand of the Duchess of Orleans, whose death helped to hasten the artist's departure from this world.

spire. Some day, an early one, if it pleases God, France will restore his body to VENICE THE FREE ! *

* And with his body, that noble picture of Manin on his death-bed, painted for Venice by Ary Scheffer, which breathes so noble a serenity and so lofty a confidence in the coming of the day of justice and reparation.

THE END.



